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How can we know ourselves? This thesis argues that Plato’s dialogue 
Phaedo replies to this difficult question. The dialogue suggests that we must 
discover our intellectual desire and governing function through the practice of 
philosophical investigation. Although this is an implicit suggestion, it is just as 
important as the explicit discussion of the soul’s immortality.  
Focusing on this topic, the thesis also argues that we should read the 
dialogue as a suggestion for the process of improving a human being; it does not 
intend to provide a complete definition of the soul’s nature. A philosopher will 
recognise his progress towards achieving his objective, the Forms, through the 
investigation itself. Moreover, this thesis argues that Phaedo asserts that a 
philosophical desire should be found explicitly in a process of discussion with 
Socrates. In the first main discussion of the dialogue, interlocutors of Socrates 
request him to defend the goodness of death (62c-63a). This goodness is based on 
a claim that death as the soul’s separation from the body provides them with 
wisdom. However, the defence will be meaningless to people who do not desire 
wisdom. When the interlocutors become clearly conscious of their desire for 
wisdom, Socrates’ arguments would succeed in the truest sense. 
The process of the philosophical investigation, though, is not simple. This 
thesis will argue that a philosopher must employ both objective discussion and 
subjective self-recognition of his desire, which contrasts with the view that focuses 
on the objective understanding of human psychology in Plato’s work. This thesis 
argues for a reading of Phaedo that focuses on the process of self-improvement, not 
the goal or the definition of the soul’s nature. Moreover, it also emphasizes self-
discovery of intellectual desire in a philosopher, which cannot be reduced to an 
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Summary of the Thesis 
 
How can we know ourselves? In this thesis, I argue that Plato’s dialogue, 
Phaedo, replies to this difficult question.1 Specifically, the dialogue suggests that we 
discover our intellectual desire and governing function through the practice of 
philosophical investigation. That contention is implicitly suggested, but it is of the 
same importance as the dialogue’s explicit discussion of the immortality of the soul. 
 Focusing on that topic, this thesis also argues that we should read this 
dialogue as a suggestion for the process of improving a human being. That process 
is shown in the interlocutors’ evolutions through their discussions with Socrates. 
The process does not provide a complete definition of the soul’s nature. Socrates 
suggests that a philosopher improves himself as part of his objective which is to 
know the Forms.  
 Moreover, I argue that Phaedo states that Socrates helps the interlocutors, 
mainly Simmias and Cebes, to understand that a philosopher must have 
intellectual desire. Specifically, the initial main argument of the Phaedo, the 
Defence of Death (63e8–69e8), discusses the philosopher’s desire for wisdom and 
the necessity of managing one’s life based on that desire. This desire supports the 
goodness of death, defined in the dialogue as soul’s separation from the body. The 
philosopher’s objective, which is wisdom, can be obtained through the soul’s 
separation from the body. In the course of the dialogue, we should observe the 
process of improvement of a human being in two areas. One area is the 
philosopher’s improvement discussed by Socrates and the interlocutors. The other 
area is the interlocutors’ progression through the argument about the philosopher. 
                                                        
1 All Greek texts of Phaedo are from Platonis Opera, tomus I. 1995. Duke, Hicken, Nicoll, 
Robinson and Strachan edit. Oxford Classical Texts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Other Platonic texts are also from the latest Oxford Classical Texts referred to in the 
bibliography. All translations of Phaedo are by D. Sedley and A. Long 2010. 
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The dialogue offers a normative blueprint for the improvement of a philosopher 
as well as the actual progress of the interlocutors. Readers of the dialogue should 
understand both the philosopher’s ideal conditions and the interlocutors’ 
recognition of the conditions and intellectual desire. In many cases, the process is 
advanced by a revelation of the interlocutors’ problematic beliefs. Thus, Phaedo 
also suggests the interlocutors’ self-discovery of their problematic beliefs.  
  The interlocutors observe that a philosopher has the intellectual desire for 
the Forms within himself,2 but neither the nature nor all the essential contents of 
the self are defined clearly in Phaedo; therefore, the self is not a fixed concept upon 
which we can depend in the dialogue. Rather, the self must always be improved 
gradually, through philosophical investigation. In that sense, this dialogue intends 
to show the interlocutors a possible method of improving themselves. It does not, 
however, define the true nature of the self. Thus, the self in Phaedo exists within the 
context of a dynamic process. Andrea Nightingale also explains the concept of the 
philosophical desire as it is revealed in Plato’s middle dialogues (especially in 
Phaedrus) as follows:  
 
To grasp the nature of the soul, Socrates must apprehend its erotic desire 
for the Forms (and feel this desire in his own soul) and also contemplate 
the Forms themselves. 3  
                                                        
2 Plato does not think that only males can become philosophers. In the Republic, he admits 
that a female should also perform the same task depending on her nature (455e–456c). In 
this thesis, I use the masculine pronoun while referring to a philosopher to simplify the use 
of pronouns. A philosopher can be a woman. 
3 Nightingale 2010, 23. She also claims that “Ultimately, however, he attains self-knowledge 
by moving back and forth between his contemplating soul and his earthly person: it is the 
interplay between these two that generates self-knowledge in the Platonic philosopher” 
(ibid., 26). I admit that an individual corporeal person dynamically improves himself 
through his focus on attaining wisdom. However, I still think it is problematic to 
acknowledge the concept of “contemplation” in Phaedo. The dialogue shows that we have 
some higher-order quality that we must use as much as possible to attain wisdom, but 
wisdom can only be obtained after death. If Nightingale thinks, by using the term 
“contemplate,” that the soul can know the Forms in this world, I cannot acknowledge the 




I argue that we can also discern the “apprehension of desire for the Forms” in 
Phaedo. We must not say, however, that the dialogue suggests that a philosopher 
can grasp the nature of the self in this life. The dialogue displays a possible and 
viable process of improving ourselves, but we cannot observe our true nature 
when we are in the process of investigating the Forms. There are two levels of 
cognition regarding the Forms: 1. Investigation or attempting to know the Forms; 
2. We know the Forms following the investigation and the purification of the soul. 
In this second (higher) level, knowing of the Forms is accomplished only after the 
complete separation of the soul from the body, namely, after death.  
Phaedo also suggests Socrates’ epistemic modesty regarding knowledge of the 
Forms. The Forms are hypothesised in the dialogue; however, Socrates does not 
claim that he knows the true nature of every Form. Rather, the hypotheses 
regarding the Forms need to be examined (107b4–9). Thus, the interlocutors are 
required to continue their examination without steadfast knowledge of the Forms. 
The immortality of the soul is explained based on the hypothesis of the Forms in 
Phaedo. Additionally, the soul’s essential characteristics are considered in its 
affinity to the Forms (in the Affinity Argument of Phaedo). Thus, it does not seem 
that the nature of the soul is grasped before knowing the Forms since the Forms 
are foundational in explaining the soul’s nature. Knowledge of the Forms is 
obtained after the soul is separated from the body (66e1–4); thus the interlocutors 
must continue their examination of the Forms in this world to eventually know 
their true nature after death. Therefore, the process of philosophical investigation 
cannot reveal a clear scheme of interplay between individuals and the true self 
during life.4 Rather, the Phaedo shows that a philosopher must manage himself in 
                                                        
4  Nightingale defines “self-knowledge” as a kind of “self-referential awareness.” 
(Nightingale 2010, 13). She claims that “when epistemic knowledge is achieved (even if 
only partially) the soul also comes to know itself in its ontological relation to a divine Other” 
(ibid., 25). I do not think Plato actively suggests the kind of direct grasp of the Forms in 
Phaedo that Nightingale observes in Phaedrus (ibid., 23). The method of dealing with the 
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a more difficult way. Socrates suggests that death, as the soul’s separation from 
the body, would allow a philosopher to grasp his true nature, because in death, 
bodily distractions that interfere with the intellectual ability of the soul are 
removed, so that one is able to understand the Forms (66e4–67a1).  Self-discovery 
of one’s intellectual desire and identification of faults is important in a 
philosopher’s continuous effort and development. Socrates and the interlocutors 
decide how they should live based on the desire and correct their beliefs 
accordingly. They cannot know the Forms in this life. However, the purified soul 
will obtain the Forms after death. Knowing the Forms is the final goal for a 
philosopher. To get close to the goal, a philosopher must do his best in this world. 
Socrates’ epistemic modesty regarding knowledge of the Forms suggests that the 
dialogue is intended to encourage the philosopher’s continuous effort, not to offer 
Plato’s doctrines regarding the soul and the Forms. Self-discovery of intellectual 
desire and the governing function of the soul encourage the philosopher to 
continue his efforts to know the Forms and the nature of the self in the end. 
Considering the importance of self-discovery and the indeterminate outcome 
of the argument regarding the nature of the true self, this thesis also intends to 
clarify the importance of philosophical desire. It will suggest a reading of Phaedo 
that emphasises the process of improvement.  
 
The Self as an Essential Problem in Phaedo 
 
Consideration of the self should be an essential topic in a demonstration of 
the soul’s immortality. Even if Socrates and the interlocutors successfully 
demonstrate the soul’s immortality, if the soul is irrelevant to their existence, this 
demonstration gives them no advantage. Indeed, Socrates and the interlocutors in 
the dialogue try to confirm the immortality of “their own” souls (c.f. 76e3, 78b9). 
                                                        
Forms is hypothetical as suggested in the Final Argument (I will discuss the hypothetical 
characteristics of the theory of Forms in Chapter 6.) 
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The theory of the soul should not be merely an abstract idea. Therefore, the 
demonstration must include some arguments that connect the soul and those 
involved in the dialogue themselves. 
Plato seems to recognise the pressing problem of selfhood or that of the 
connection between the soul and the self in his demonstration of the immortality 
of the soul in Phaedo. Besides the multiple references of Socrates and the 
interlocutors to “their own souls,” the notion of selfhood is also an important factor 
in the arguments. For example, the Recollection Argument (72e1–77a7) and the 
criticism of the Harmonia theory of the soul (85e3–86e5, 91c7–95a3) emphasise the 
important role played by selfhood. In the Recollection Argument, the interlocutor 
Simmias not only wants to understand the theory of recollection, but also needs to 
experience that recollection himself (73b6–9). In the criticism of the Harmonia 
theory, Socrates suggests to Simmias that they would not “be agreeing with” 
themselves, if they acknowledge the Soul-Harmonia theory (94e8–95a2). In these 
important arguments concerning the demonstration of the soul’s immortality, 
Socrates is deeply concerned with the interlocutors’ mental state and encourages 
them to engage in their own understanding. In other words, Socrates is concerned 
with how to make their own souls conform to the ideal soul as much as possible.      
Moreover, in both the introduction and the end of the dialogue, Plato makes 
remarkable statements that describe selfhood and aid us in our investigation. The 
first term that is brought up in Phaedo is the Greek “autos,” which means “yourself” 
in the sentence. 5 Plato writes the first sentence of Phaedo in the form of a question 
that Echecrates poses to Phaedo: “Were you with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on the 
day he drank the poison in prison, or did you hear about it from someone else?”6 
(57a1–3). Echecrates is eager to hear the details of Socrates’ death from Phaedo, 
                                                        
5 Burger, Burnyeat, and Notomi also point out the importance of the first word in the 
dialogue (Burger 1984, 7; Burnyeat 1997, 9–11; Notomi 2013, 54).  Burger says, “The very 
expression that will be used to designate the “idea,” that which is “itself by itself,” refers 
at the outset to the individual and identifies the self with the living being, without implying 
any separation of psychē from body…” (Burger 1984, 7). 
6 Translation of Phaedo by D. Sedley and A. Long 2010. 
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who was himself at Socrates’ side at the last moment. Moreover, in the final part 
of the dialogue, after presenting all the arguments, Socrates is about to drink 
poison. One of Socrates’ friends, Crito, becomes anxious about how he should bury 
Socrates. Socrates responds by laughing:  
 
However you want, […] as long as you catch me and I don’t escape you […] 
Gentlemen, I’m not convincing Crito that I am Socrates here, the one who is 
now holding conversation––setting out remarks one by one. Instead he 
supposes that I’m that corpse which he’ll shortly be seeing, and he actually 
asks how he should bury me. As for the argument I have spent a long time 
propounding, that when I drink the poison I won't stay behind in your 
company any longer, but will depart and be gone to some happy state fit for 
the blessed, I seem to be wasting my breath on him, while reassuring both you 
and myself.” (115c4–d6, emphasis mine). 
 
Socrates’ response to Crito implies his intention in his long arguments: the 
audiences must understand that the one who is really Socrates would leave this 
world after death and “be gone to some happy state”(115d4). As we will see in 
each argument of the Phaedo discussed in this thesis, the intellectual function of the 
soul is the essence of Socrates: the body does not define him at all. If someone 
misunderstands who Socrates really is, his demonstration will be worthless to that 
person, because immortality is offered only to the soul which comprises a human’s 
core. In other words, his core must be “who Socrates really is.” If Crito still believes 
that Socrates’ body is also ‘Socrates,’ what Crito calls ‘Socrates’ cannot be immortal.  
 
A Method of Self-Discovery and Self-improvement 
 
Socrates establishes that a philosopher has an intellectual desire for 
wisdom. Thus, how do the interlocutors discover philosophical desire and 
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improve themselves properly? Socrates and his interlocutors develop arguments 
about the goodness of death and the immortality of the soul throughout this entire 
dialogue. Through those arguments, the essential characteristics of the soul are 
also suggested (specifically in the Affinity Argument), and the interlocutors’ false 
beliefs are examined (in the Criticism of the Harmonia Theory). Thus, prima facie, 
it seems that the objective arguments or Socratic dialogue achieve the aim of self-
discovery and the resulting improvement of the interlocutors.  
Indeed, some influential scholars have already pointed out that in ancient 
Greek thought, which includes Plato’s ideas, objective interpretations of human 
beings are revealed.7 They seem to claim that the value of ancient Greek thought is 
in its escape of the problems caused by the extreme subjective understanding of 
the self as evinced in post-Cartesian thought. In other words, they try to resolve 
the gap between the individual and the universal in order to answer the question 
related to how we understand the outside or universal world from our individual 
view-points. 8  Christopher Gill emphasises the “objective-participant view”’ in 
Plato’s understanding of the human being, which is contrasted with the 
“subjective-individualist view.” 9 The objective-participant view means that the 
mind is guided by objective reason and does not depend on a subjective or isolated 
self, which has a privileged access to one’s own mental conditions. This privileged 
access can be also understood as a first-personal authority in knowing one’s own 
psychological conditions. For example, if I cut my finger and feel pain, I have a 
cognitive authority over my pain. Gill interprets the self in Plato’s ideas through 
the image of an interpersonal dialogue or a dialogue with reason. Furthermore, A. 
A. Long also denies the subjective understanding of the concept of the self in 
ancient Greek thought. Instead, he offers the possible different view of selfhood, 
stating: “The facts that they denote are subjective because only I can do my 
thinking; only she can have her feeling. However, the fact that I can think is not 
                                                        
7 Gill 1996, 11–16. A.A. Long 1992, 260–262.  
8 cf. A.A. Long 1992, 260–261. 
9 Gill 1996, 6–12. 
12 
 
subjective, but objective because it is grounded not in my being me, but in my being 
human. Furthermore, while my thinking is peculiar to me, what I think can be 
objective and something you share, as when I say there are people in this room. 
That statement does not express my personal perspective. It identifies an objective 
or public fact.” 10  He introduces the concept of the “objective” self that was 
originally suggested by Thomas Nagel, which claims that we can be both 
subjective and objective selves. Long explains the objective self as follows: “The 
objective self is my thinking of the world as something that contains me and my 
consciousness along with everything else. It is my capacity to achieve a viewpoint 
in which my ordinary human individuality ceases to be the perspective from 
which I look at the world.” 11  Indeed, Phaedo develops rich interpersonal 
discussions and shows that the interlocutors improve themselves through 
examining their beliefs by means of discussions. Thus, the dialogue seems to 
emphasise the objective viewpoint in accomplishing the philosophical 
investigation and the improvement of oneself.  
I argue, however, that Phaedo also includes some points that cannot be 
reduced to an objective form of investigation. There are two kinds of limitation of 
the objective dialogues: 1. The discussions in Phaedo use the interlocutor’s 
subjective or individual experience and self-decision to agree with the conclusion 
of each argument. 2. Phaedo suggests that a philosopher can obtain wisdom only 
after death, thus, the objective arguments or dialogues in this world are insufficient 
to achieve the final goal. Regarding the second point, a philosopher obtains 
wisdom only after death (66e4–67a1). Thus, the objective arguments or dialogues 
are necessary but preparatory steps in the pursuit of the final goal. Regarding the 
first point, we can observe following specific points in the Phaedo. First, the 
demonstration of the soul’s immortality originally surfaces in an attempt to defend 
Socrates’ claim of the goodness of death (63e8–69e4). Death’s goodness is 
                                                        
10 A. A. Long 1992, 260. 
11 Ibid., 262. 
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supported by the philosopher’s desire to attain wisdom, because death is defined 
as the soul’s separation from the body and the body disturbs this attainment (66e1–
6). If the interlocutors did not share that desire, they would not be persuaded by 
the argument, because it would be difficult for them to find an advantage in death. 
Thus, they would not be willing to be separated from bodily sensations and desires 
as philosophers wish to do. Socrates also mentions false virtue (68e2–69c3). Some 
people, who are not philosophers, may appear to control bodily pleasure and pains 
and possess the virtue of temperance. However, they merely exchange large and 
small pleasures and pains in the same manner as they would exchange currencies. 
Their lack of self-indulgence is not in the interest of gaining wisdom. They merely 
fear, for example, “being denied other pleasures” (68e5–6). Such virtue, as they 
possess it, is called skiagraphia (i.e. “scene-painting” or “painting with the 
shadows”),12 and is considered a kind of illusion (69b7). It is the internal desire that 
decides whether that restraint is truly virtuous. Therefore, whether they really 
possess that desire is important in deciding the quality of their life. The discussion 
might encourage that desire. Without self-recognition or conviction related to the 
desire, however, Socrates’ claim of the good life or goodness of death is not 
effective for individuals.  Second, even after concluding two arguments that 
demonstrate the immortality of the soul (the Cyclical Argument and the 
Recollection argument), Socrates perceives that the interlocutors have a childish 
fear of the soul’s destruction following its separation from the body. He advises 
them to chant a spell to their inner child every day until they manage to chant the 
fear away (77d5–77e10). Socrates also advises them to look for singers of such 
chant everywhere, regardless of cost (78a3–9). This advice implies that they should 
continuously allow themselves to be persuaded by the demonstration. Simply 
listening to an argument once cannot create the internal attainment of goodness. If 
a demonstration is correct, however, why must they receive it repeatedly? When 
that demonstration is true, its core claim neither can nor should be changed. I think 
                                                        
12 Liddell and Scott 1940, A Greek–English Lexicon. 
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Socrates presupposes a process of gradual change within his listeners. The shared 
argument alone is not sufficient to improve the listeners completely. Third, the 
requirement of continuous persuasion is implied through vivid descriptions of the 
characters in the final part of the dialogue (115b1–118a17). Although Socrates and 
his friends share all the arguments (some as interlocutors, others as audiences), the 
results within each person are different. Crito, one of Socrates’ best friends, does 
not understand Socrates’ claims of the soul’s independence and his 
encouragement of its separation from the body. Crito is concerned about how to 
bury “you” (i.e., Socrates) (115c3), even though Socrates’ corpse could never be 
Socrates himself. Other clever friends cannot stop themselves from becoming 
overwhelmed by emotion when they watch Socrates drink poison. In contrast, 
Socrates maintains his imperturbable attitude even in the moment of his death. His 
attitude suggests that he can organise himself harmoniously as a whole person, 
based on the beliefs he obtained through the arguments. The friends, however, 
must still endeavour to continue improving themselves after they have lost 
Socrates.  
Furthermore, Socrates himself confesses in Phaedo that he must have been 
solitary or introspective during his youth. He thought that he knew why things 
grow. However, any existing explanation of why things grow became insufficient 
to him (96c3–97b7). He lost confidence in his beliefs because he became aware of 
reasoning that was the basis of natural science. Thus, he had to begin his own 
investigation based on what he considered to be “the most robust” hypothesis 
(100a3–7). He hypothesised that Beauty existed by itself, and Good and all the rest 
(what should be called the Platonic “Forms”). In this period, Socrates had to 
recognise his ignorance and begin an independent investigation, because he did 
not receive any refutation of his beliefs from others through the discussion. He 
recognised the problem with his own previous understanding of the growth or 
development of things.  
15 
 
In that confession, he mentions his past investigations. We also find that 
Socrates offers some support for an introspective investigation in the progressing 
arguments of Phaedo. He mentions cases in which a “belief” occurs to people who 
are truly philosophers (66b1–67e1). This belief states that the body distracts them 
from attaining truth and they must be separated from the body to view things with 
the soul itself. Moreover, he says that “philosophy” encourages lovers of learning 
to separate their souls from their bodies (82d9–83b4). Socrates says that such an 
encouragement occurs to lovers of learning, but he does not mention other 
ordinary people. We should emphasize this qualification of the recipient of 
learning. I argue that Socrates presupposes the love in those who will listen to that 
philosophical encouragement.  
On the other hand, similar to Plato’s other dialogues, Phaedo also shows 
that objective arguments or shared discussions are indispensable to efforts to 
improve a human being. Indeed, young Socrates did not remain at the 
introspective investigation either. He started with the recognition of his ignorance 
and advanced to examination of himself and others through discussions with other 
people. A philosopher whom Socrates depicts in the arguments also organises his 
own conditions based on both discussions and intellectual desire. The 
interlocutors are shown these characteristics of a philosopher and must examine 
their similarity with him if they agree with Socrates’ arguments.  
However, we should not ignore the aspects of self-improvement in Phaedo 
that cannot be understood only from an objective viewpoint. I call those aspects 
“subjective” because they are closely connected with the introspective recognition 
of their own conditions, as a response to Gill’s interpretation of ancient Greek 
thought that emphasizes an objective model of mind. According to Gill, 
subjectivity or subjectivism is characterised by two points: 1. it gives “privileged 
status to the idea of the ‘subject’, the ‘I’ as seat of self-consciousness.” 13 2. it gives 
“a similarly privileged status to the subjective (especially first-personal) 
                                                        
13 Gill 1996, 6. 
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perspective in their accounts of our access to, and knowledge of, human 
psychology.” 14  
I argue that the interlocutors are required to recognize their own 
intellectual desire and governing function over the body in the context of 
improving themselves. The context is specifically suggested in the Defence of 
Death and the Recollection Argument. Furthermore, Socrates’ autobiography in 
Phaedo (96a–100a) suggests that Socrates’ recognition of his own ignorance does 
not depend on a dialogue with others. In addition, even though Socrates and his 
friends share the argument of the soul’s immortality, their mental conditions 
suggested in the ending part are diverse (115b–118a). The discussion alone cannot 
sufficiently improve the interlocutors. The arguments in the Phaedo include 
subjective or individual approaches in improving one’s own conditions, which 
cannot be recognized only from the objective viewpoint. 
Does Phaedo suppose a first-person viewpoint to improve oneself in the 
sense that only the individual himself has privileged access to his own mental state 
that other people cannot have? The dialogue requires the agreement of the 
interlocutors with the steps and conclusions developed in each argument. Those 
arguments suggest intellectual desire and the governing function of the soul. If the 
interlocutors cannot confidently agree with those arguments regarding the soul’s 
immortality, they will never become as stable in their stance as Socrates. Therefore, 
considering those points, Phaedo requires self-recognition of intellectual desire and 
reflective access to their own mental conditions. With regard to their decisions 
related to how to live or their agreement with Socrates’ encouragement about the 
best kind of life, the first–person view seems to be required. This perspective will 
clarify the subjective aspects in the dialogue. 
 
Structure of this Thesis 
 
                                                        
14 Ibid., 6. 
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Based on the general strategy described above and my intention to clarify 
the concept of self-discovery in Phaedo, this thesis examines each argument in the 
dialogue, using the following structure: 
 
1. Separation of the soul from the body as a method of self-discovery  
  ––Socrates’ Defence of Death (63e8–69e4) –– 
2. The soul and self-discovery in the Recollection Argument 
  ––The Recollection Argument (72e1–77a7) –– 
3. The Encouragement of Self-improvement in the Affinity Argument  
  ––The Affinity Argument (78b4–84b7) –– 
4. Removal of the false theory from the soul 
  ––The Criticism of the Soul-Harmonia Theory (85e3–86e5, 91c7–95a3) –– 
5. Examination of the soul as the cause of life 
 ––The Final Argument of the immortality of the soul (102a11–107b10) –– 
6. Self-discovery through Socrates: the meaning of Socrates’ deeds 
––The ending of Phaedo (115b1–118a17) –– 
Conclusion.  
  
1. Socrates’ Defence of Death (DD) suggests that the defence presupposes the 
existence of intellectual desire for the Forms. The DD defines a philosophical life 
as the practice of the soul’s separation or purification from the body. Philosophers 
long for wisdom and therefore attempt to purify their souls. This argument 
clarifies the target of a philosopher’s desire which is knowing the Forms. Based on 
the target, purification is acknowledged as a required process. Therefore, death is 
good because it allows the philosopher to escape from the bodily distractions of 
the soul’s intellectual ability. Furthermore, philosophers are able to observe the 
appropriate way of dealing with bodily pleasures and pains by recognizing 
wisdom as their true objective. Through this argument, the interlocutor finds the 
philosopher’s ideal conditions and intellectual desire. Without this recognition, the 
18 
 
argument regarding the goodness of death is worthless to the interlocutors, 
because the goodness presupposes that desire. Thus, the interlocutor’s self-
discovery of intellectual desire is indispensable in the Defence of Death. 
 
2. The Recollection Argument (RA) as a demonstration of the soul’s immortality is 
also a suggestion for self-discovery of the intellectual desire. The RA presupposes 
the love of the Forms and implicitly encourages the agent of recollection to 
recognise the love by himself. This love or desire to know the Forms displays 
shortcomings in the sensible things. Both the desire and shortcomings cause the 
things to appear to “want” to be the Forms. The RA is also remarkable in that the 
interlocutor, Simmias, wants to experience recollection. This implies that he should 
also experience intellectual desire and the process of intellectual cognition that an 
agent of recollection must experience. 
 
3. The introductory part of the Affinity Argument (AA) suggests that the 
interlocutors must chant away their childish fear of the soul’s dissipation. After 
that point has been made, Socrates demonstrates the soul’s characteristics which 
displays its similarity to divine existence. These characteristics are offered through 
an examination of the characteristics of their soul and body. Thus, through the 
Affinity Argument, the interlocutors find the proper characteristics of the soul. The 
soul’s cognitive ability, which is independent from the body, and its governing 
function over the body are also confirmed through an examination of the 
characteristics. The AA also depicts an encouragement of “philosophy” for “the 
lovers of learning” to allow the release of their soul from the body. We see that the 
philosopher’s soul agrees with that encouragement and chooses a better life 
because of that encouragement. At that time, the philosopher internalizes the 




4. The criticism of the Soul-Harmonia theory both implicitly and explicitly reveals 
false beliefs based on a problematic mind-set within the interlocutor’s soul. 
Socrates explicitly reveals the inconsistency of Simmias’ Harmonia theory with his 
agreement with the RA and argues that it contradicts itself. Meanwhile, Socrates 
implicitly reveals that the Harmonia theory lacks the element of the harmonization 
of the agent. The absence of the idea of the agent is remarkable, considering that 
such an agent is clearly mentioned in Plato’s other dialogues. The lack of an agent 
is based on Simmias’ insufficient understanding of the causative relationship 
between the soul and the body. This point is emphasized when the Harmonia 
theory is compared with Cebes’ counterargument to the Affinity Argument, which 
is examined in Chapter 5. The harmonizing agent is closely connected to a 
governing function. Indeed, Socrates quotes Homer’s work and depicts Odysseus’ 
self-governance in the conclusion of his criticism of the Harmonia theory. The lack 
of the agent is a problematic obscurity in the account of the causal or governing 
order between the soul and the body.  
 
5. Another interlocutor, Cebes, also offers a counterargument against the AA. His 
argument compares the relationship between the soul and the body to that which 
exists between a weaver and cloaks. The weaver makes and wears out many cloaks. 
In the end, the weaver might die, leaving behind the final cloak. In that way, 
although the soul can endure entering and existing the body, at the point of life 
and death, it might perish before the body. In this argument, the soul does not 
depend on the body for its existence, as it is the cause of life. Even that soul, 
however, might finally perish. Socrates takes this argument seriously and says that 
they must “study thoroughly and as a whole the cause of coming-to-be and 
ceasing-to-be.” (95e10–96a1) Therefore, he confesses his past despair with existing 
causal theories in natural science, which caused him to begin his solitary 
investigation and to establish the hypothesis of the Forms.  
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The Final Argument (FA) shows that Socrates considers the soul that 
animates the body to be the cause of life. He demonstrates that the soul, as a cause 
of life, cannot accept death. The FA forces the interlocutor to reconsider his 
understanding of life: as presented in this argument, the soul can be damaged even 
though it is the cause of life. Thus, the FA encourages him to recognize the soul’s 
animating function and to change his understanding of life accordingly. Cebes is 
concerned that life might damage the soul as his core, as it is a disease to the soul. 
Socrates suggests that there is such a thing as eternal life. Thus, the perspectives of 
Socrates and Cebes reveal completely different kinds of souls; one is the 
invulnerable soul, and the other is the consumable one. The soul should be the core 
of one’s self. Thus, believing in the consumable kind of soul would lead to a 
nihilistic perspective, since every living thing can perish. Believing in the 
invulnerable soul requires ongoing and continuous efforts to self-improvement, 
since the self never perishes and requires purification. Thus, this belief in the 
invulnerable soul encourages and forces Cebes to live a life dedicated to the 
consistent improvement of his soul. The belief in soul’s eventual perishing does 
not support or provide guidance of how to live a good life, since any effort would 
be of little consequence in the end. In this way, the concept of self-discovery would 
make a significant difference in affecting how one should live.  
 
6.  The ending of the Phaedo again implicitly suggests that the focal point in the 
dialogue is of the investigation into what should be the true self. Furthermore, it 
provides an example of the internalisation of the theory through Socrates’ deeds. 
The contrast between Socrates’ steadfast attitude and that of his friends, who are 
disturbed by emotions, demonstrates the difficulty of self-management and 
encourages the ongoing improvement of the individual’s psychological states. 
 
Conclusion. Through my discussion of Phaedo, I argue that the philosophical 
investigation in the dialogue requires self-discovery. The objects of self-discovery 
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are the soul’s intellectual desire and its governing function over the body. In the 
process of that discovery, false beliefs must also be revealed, because they lead to 
a false understanding of the soul. Self-discovery is practised in various and 
ingenious ways. Some of the ways include a subjective approach. As I have 
mentioned above, Christopher Gill emphasizes the objective–participant 
conception in ancient Greek thought. I will compare my perspective with that of 
Gill and clarify the meaning and role of subjectivity. In my conclusion, I will clarify 
the significance of self-discovery. Self-discovery of intellectual desire and the 
governing function of one’s own soul reveals how one should live. Knowing the 
Forms and one’s own nature is the final goal for a philosopher, which will be 
accomplished only after death. Self-discovery contributes to one’s understanding 





Chapter 1. Separation of the soul from the body as a method of self-discovery 
––Socrates’ Defence to Death (63e8–69e4) –– 
 
Introduction to Chapter. 1 
  
Plato’s Phaedo is a dialogue that depicts the last day of Socrates. Facing his 
own death, Socrates surprisingly suggests to his friends that a person who is a 
philosopher should follow him, specifically, he should die (61b8–e4). Socrates 
demonstrates that a philosopher seeks to cause his soul to be by itself, by 
separating it from the body (67b1–e7).  Therefore, death, as the soul’s separation 
from the body (64c4–9), is exactly what a philosopher seeks. He thus defends the 
goodness of death to his discussants, who are not persuaded by this astonishing 
claim.  
This view is the essential starting point of all the arguments in Phaedo, 
because the subsequent discussions of the soul’s immortality are required to 
ensure Socrates’ defence to his interlocutors. Anyone who correctly engages in 
philosophy pursues15  dying and being dead (64a4–6). Through that pursuit, a 
philosopher will obtain wisdom, and, moreover, he will be able to be with better 
people and gods after death (63b9–c4). In this way, the Defence of Death (DD) 
defines the theme of Phaedo; thus, what is the theme? 
                                                        
15  ἐπιτηδεύουσιν: Burnet and Gallop understand this word as “practise.” Indeed, the 
Defence of Death suggests the practice of the separation. However, this term also means 
“pursue” as Sedley and Long translate. This sentence is followed by “If this is true, it would 
surely be absurd for death to be their sole aim throughout their life, but, when it actually 
arrives, for them to resent that which has long been their aim and pursuit” (64a6–9). This 
“aim” is depicted by the Greek word “προθυμείσθαι,” which relates to the word ‘‘pursuit’’ 
(ἐπετηδεύον, the imperfect form of ἐπιτηδεύειν). It seems that ἐπιτηδεύειν must include 
the meaning of practise, but it also presupposes the implication of aiming in its practice. I 
think the English word “pursue” or “pursuit” can mean both ‘prosecuting’ and ‘seeking’ 
according to the Oxford Dictionary of English second edition revised 2005 (edited by 
Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson). Thus, the translation by Sedley and Long of the 
term ἐπιτηδεύειν as “pursue” seems correct. 
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In the DD, Socrates focuses in particular on the philosopher’s way of life 
and explains the soul’s conditions in this context. In that sense, the defence is also 
an explanation of who philosophers are and a suggestion of the criteria for true 
philosophers. Socrates proclaims that he has tried to be one of “those who have 
pursued philosophy correctly” (69d1–4). Therefore, this argument also explains 
who Socrates is concerning his occupation (we should probably call it a “mission” 
considering his statement in Apology 23b–c).16 On the other hand, Phaedo does not 
clearly suggest that other discussants profess that they are philosophers, although 
they agree with an essential point of Socrates’ investigation, namely, the existence 
of the Forms. They agree with the explanations of the philosopher shown 
objectively or normatively in the discussions with Socrates. However, it is not clear 
whether they admit becoming philosophers. The DD is based on the notion that 
death can contribute to a philosopher’s search for wisdom. Therefore, the value of 
the argument depends on whether the listener is a philosopher. As a result, the DD 
requires the listeners to be a philosopher if they want the argument to be 
worthwhile for them. 
  So then, who is a philosopher? Socrates’ arguments on this topic have two 
remarkable points. First, Socrates considers what a philosopher longs for and what 
he avoids. Second, he points out that a philosopher is misunderstood by ordinary 
people “because they haven’t realized the sense in which true philosophers are near 
death, the sense in which they deserve death, and what that death is like” (64b7–
c1). This suggestion replies to Simmias’ statement that a philosopher appears to 
desire death in the eyes of ordinary people (64b4–6). We can assume that this is 
because a philosopher seems to have abandoned all corporeal pleasures, although 
Simmias does not clearly assert that. Indeed, Socrates and Simmias admit that a 
philosopher does not appear to be eager for such pleasures (64d2–7). However, 
                                                        
16 “So even now I continue this investigation as the god bade me––and I go around seeking 
out anyone, citizen or stranger, whom I think wise. Then if I do not think he is, I come to 
the assistance of the god and show him that he is not wise.” (23b4–7). Translation by G.M.A. 
Grube in Plato Complete Works.  
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ordinary people do not recognize the philosopher’s real purpose: wisdom. In this 
chapter, I argue that essence of being a philosopher is about what he wants; 
philosophers’ apparent abstemious attitudes are a source of misunderstanding by 
ordinary people. A philosopher must separate the soul from the body for the sake 
of wisdom, and those superficial abstemious attitudes are merely by-products of 
this separation. To be a philosopher, a person must have a clear aim and manage 
his life based on the desire for the goal. 
The distinctive feature of the philosopher’s life and its difference from that 
of an ordinary person are also demonstrated in the exchange metaphor (69a6–c3). 
Socrates considers true and fake virtues in the metaphor. Even when ordinary 
people appear abstemious, they are merely afraid of being deprived of other 
pleasures; therefore, they abstain from one set of pleasures out of desire for another. 
In other words, their apparent virtue of temperance is a false or slavish one. A 
philosopher, however, is concerned with pleasure, pain, and fear in a different way. 
While ordinary people merely exchange pleasures or other sensations as 
currencies, a philosopher only exchanges these experiences for true currency, i.e., 
wisdom. The interpretation of this metaphor can be used to understand the 
philosopher’s life as compared with that of ordinary people. However, since this 
metaphor is difficult to understand when reading the Greek text, it has caused 
considerable controversy. I will explain my reading of the text and a good life of a 
philosopher based on this reading. 
Throughout the whole of the DD, we find that Socrates explains the 
characteristic of a philosopher, namely his desire. Socrates covers what the 
philosopher should want and what he becomes when he follows his desire. The 
DD explicitly suggests the goodness of death, but it also implicitly requires the 
listeners or participants in the discussion to consider their desire and whether they 
are philosophers or not.  
Based on this viewpoint, I consider the topic of self-discovery in the DD 
through the following process. First, I discuss the real desire of philosophers and 
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their tendency to be misunderstood by ordinary people. Second, I examine the 
meaning of the soul’s separation from the body. In this separation, what does a 
philosopher do? Third, I investigate the relationship between wisdom and true (or 
fake) virtue in the exchange metaphor. How should a philosopher deal with 
sensations in order to be virtuous? Furthermore, how does wisdom work in a 
philosopher? Through these arguments, I will claim the importance both of self-
recognition of philosophical desire and of the management of life based on the 
desire. 
 
1. Real characteristics of a philosopher 
 
At the start of the DD, Socrates suggests that a philosopher pursues dying 
(ἀποθνῄσκειν) and being dead (τεθνάναι) (64a4–6). The philosopher’s pursuit is 
depicted using two terms: ἀποθνῄσκειν has a form of the present infinitive and 
seems to express the process of dying, and τεθνάναι has a form of the perfect 
infinitive and seems to express the state of being dead. Hearing Socrates’ 
suggestion, Simmias, a discussant of Socrates in the DD, laughs and says that many 
people would think that Socrates’ saying applies accusatory to philosophers, 
believing that philosophers wish to die (θανατῶσι)17 and that they themselves 
realise that philosophers deserve to suffer that (ἄξιοί εἰσιν τοῦτο πάσχειν) (64a10–
b6). However, Socrates disagrees with Simmias, saying that those people do not 
realize in what sense philosophers desire to die and deserve death (ἄξιοί εἰσιν 
θανάτου) (64b8–c1).  
                                                        
17 θανατάω can be translated as both “desire to die” and “to be moribund.” A Greek-English 
Lexicon (Liddell and Scott, 1940) supports the former, Burnet, Gallop, and Sedley and Long 
supports the latter (Burnet 1911, 29. Gallop 1975, 8. Sedley and Long 2010, 50). Rowe 
suggests that both fit this text (Rowe 1993, 136). I think θανατάω should include both 
meanings. A philosopher wants to die because he can escape bodily disturbances by death. 
This attitude appears to be dying in a sense. On the other hand, being close to death does 
not necessarily mean that the agent wants to die. A dying person can still have a strong 
desire to live. Therefore, I think “to desire to die” is better here than “being close to death” 
or “moribund”.  
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Furthermore, Socrates offers the following definition of death: 
Text 1. 
Can we believe that it (θάνατος) is anything other than the separation 
(ἀπαλλαγήν) of the soul from the body? And do we believe that being 
dead (τὸ τεθνάναι,) is the following: the body has been separated from the 
soul and come to be apart, alone by itself (αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ), and the soul 
has been separated from the body and is apart, alone by itself (ἀυτὴν καθ’ 
ἁυτὴν). Can death be anything other than that? (64c4–8)   
 
This definition deals with both death and being dead. 18  It is not clear 
whether death and being dead are distinguished here and they exactly correspond 
to dying (ἀποθνῄσκειν) and being dead (τεθνάναι) mentioned in philosopher’s 
pursuit (64a4–6). Death is defined as the soul’s separation from the body, but it 
might be able to include both a process of separation and the state of being dead. 
After discussing about “being dead,” Socrates simply inquires whether “death” 
can be anything other than that. Thus, it seems that death is rather an inclusive 
term here that can cover both process and separation. At the very least, the 
definition of “being dead” conveys the state of death by depicting the state of the 
soul and body. Being dead is specifically defined as the soul being by itself and the 
body being by itself, which is the target of the philosopher’s pursuit. The process 
of dying arguably aims at that state. Socrates must explain why philosophers 
pursue that state in the DD. 
                                                        
18  This point is suggested by Ebrey. He thinks Socrates “carefully gives distinct 
formulations, which he later relies on, but he realizes that Simmias may not have 
immediately grasped these nuanced differences, so he only asks Simmias about the simpler 
definition, that of death.” (Ebrey 2017, 18). He also claims that “death is easier to obtain 
than being dead” (ibid., 19), because “being dead” means that the soul is alone by itself (in 
Ebrey’s translation, “the soul is itself according to itself”) while death just means the soul’s 
separation and “something can be separate without being itself according [to] itself” (ibid., 
19). I think that Ebrey’s use of two different terms regarding death is appropriate. However, 
it is not clear why Socrates need to consider Simmias’ lack of understanding. It seems more 
appropriate that Socrates understands the term of “death” as that with the wider 
significance. Death is a continuous process aiming at the proper state.   
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After this definition, Socrates describes the three stages of the philosopher’s 
practice as corresponding to the three realms; they are listed below:  
 
1.  The philosopher despising corporeal pleasure (64c10–65a8) 
2.  The soul’s pursuit of wisdom (65a9–65d3) 
3.  The description of the Forms as targets of thought (65d4–66a10) 
 
It should be noticed, as Dorter claims, those realms are in ascending order.19 
Regarding stage 1, Socrates argues that a philosopher is not eager for the so-called 
pleasures of eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse, and that he does not value 
beautiful clothing. Even ordinary people who do not recognize the philosopher’s 
real desire to die would be able to recognise only the condition of the philosopher 
in this stage; however, they see only the superficial manifestations of the 
philosopher’s abstinence. Socrates explains this abstinence from consideration of 




So first of all, is it clear that in matters like these the philosopher releases 
his soul as much as possible from its association with the body, he above 
all other people? 
Simmias:  
So it seems. (64e8–65a3).  
 
When a philosopher despises corporeal pleasure, his real objective is to release his 
soul from the body. This release, which a philosopher is devoted to achieving, 
corresponds to the definition of death, since death is defined as the separation of 
the soul from the body. In this first stage, Socrates describes the philosopher’s first 
                                                        
19 cf. Dorter 1982, 26. 
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step towards death and states that ordinary people perceive only the appearance 
of this attitude:  
 
Text 3. 
And ordinary people think, don’t they, Simmias, that life isn’t worth living 
for someone who finds nothing of that kind pleasant, and who takes no 
interest in bodily things. They think that he who gives no thought (μηδέν 
φροντίζων) to the pleasures which come via the body is pretty close to 
being dead. (65a4–7)  
 
These ordinary people can see that philosophers do not care for bodily pleasures; 
therefore, they think that their lives are worthless. They cannot see the real desire 
in the philosopher’s life. A philosopher has a real target that is suggested in stage 
2. Socrates implies that the object of a philosopher’s acquisition is wisdom. He 




What about the acquisition of wisdom itself? Is the body an impediment or 
not if one recruits it as a partner in one’s inquiry? I mean something like 
this: do both sight and hearing offer people any truth? Or are even the poets 
always telling us this sort of mantra, that nothing we hear or see is accurate? 
And yet if these particular bodily sense are not accurate or clear, then the 
others will hardly be, because, I assume, they are all inferior to them. Don’t 
you think so? 
Simmias: 




As poets also say, perceptions are not accurate regarding the offering of truth. 
Socrates inquires further as to whether the body is an impediment or not when it 
is a partner in inquiring wisdom. How does the inaccuracy of bodily perceptions 




‘So,’ he said, ‘when does the soul grasp the truth? Because whenever it 
attempts to examine something together with the body, clearly at those 
times it is thoroughly deceived by the body.’ 
Simmias: 
That is true. (65b9–c1) 
 
The body is not only unreliable but also deceptive; therefore, the philosopher’s 
soul despises the body and seeks to escape it to be “alone by itself” (ἀυτὴ καθ’ 
ἁυτὴν) (65c11–d2). However, Socrates does not offer any evidence of the deception 
here. Just because the body gives incorrect information, it does not necessarily 
mean that it causes deception. Thus, as Rowe claims, the poets’ suggestion that 
they cannot trust perception does not support the claim that the body is deceptive. 
20  However, if his claim implicitly presupposes that a human being tends to believe 
in perceptions, it would be more plausible. Socrates indeed explains this danger in 
the Affinity Argument later: “Because each pleasure and pain rivets and pins it to 
the body as if with a nail, and makes it corporeal, since it believes to be real the 
very things that the body says real.” (83d4–7). In the argument, Socrates is 
concerned that the bodily perceptions make the soul believe them to be real, which 
can indeed be acknowledged as a deceptive characteristic of the body. Thus, to 
                                                        
20 Rowe says “[…] the argument is singularly lacking in rigor; we should need more than 
poetic hyperbole (b2–4) to convince us that the evidence of the senses is always deceptive, 
as S[ocrates] here implies (cf.66a5–6).” (Rowe 1993, 139–140)  
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understand the deception of the bodily perceptions in stage 2, we need to assume 
that Socrates supposes that those perceptions make a human or the soul believe 
they are true.21 
 Socrates does not develop this danger of bodily deception further, but he 
introduces the object of wisdom in stage 3. What, then, is this wisdom? Is it general 
knowledge like craft knowledge or natural science? Socrates defines wisdom as 
the acquisition of the “ousia,”, namely, Just, Beauty, and Good itself, as well as 
Largeness, Health and Strength, and what each of them really is (65d4–e1). This 
kind of existence is repeatedly mentioned in the dialogue, and it is also described 
in a different term, “eidos.” (102b1, 103e2, 106d6). Specifically, this “eidos” is used 
in the Final Argument. We should carefully examine how Plato uses those words. 
However, these terms “ousia” and “eidos” can be used interchangeably in many 
cases, because they share the typical examples (Large and Small) and the typical 
character (they cannot have their opposing properties).22 I use the English word 
“Form” that covers those terms in this thesis. The Form is unchanging and retains 
its property. We can see beautiful things or people but cannot grasp the ideal 
existence of Beauty itself through bodily perceptions. Socrates summarises this 
philosopher’s aiming at wisdom as follows: 
 
Text 6. 
So wouldn’t the man who did this most purely be one who so far as 
possible used his thought in its own right to access each reality, neither 
adducing the evidence of his sight in his thinking nor bringing any other 
                                                        
21 Scott understands sensations’ deception in the similar way by using the same passage of 
the Affinity Argument (83d4–7). See Scott 1995, 72. 
22 Plato also uses another term “idea” in the Final Argument. I do not think that eidos and 
idea can be used interchangeably. The term “eidos” first appears at 102b1 and is used 
exclusively in the Final Argument. Ousia is used singularly in the arguments before the 
Final Argument, therefore, eidos and ousia are separated from each other. Conversely, eidos 
and idea share the same argument. Thus, it is salient that Plato uses two different terms in 
one argument. We should consider how Plato uses these two terms differently within the 
Final Argument. I consider the usage of the terms in Chapter 5. 
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sense at all along with his reasoning, but using his thought alone by itself 
and unalloyed, and so attempting to hunt down each real thing alone by 
itself and unalloyed (ἀλλ᾽ αὐτῇ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ 
χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν 
ὄντων), separated as far as possible from eyes and ears and virtually from 
his entire body, for the reason that the body disturbs his soul and, 
whenever it associates with it, doesn’t let it acquire truth and wisdom? Isn’t 
this, Simmias, the man who will hit upon reality, if anyone will?” 
‘That’s eminently true, Socrates,’ said Simmias.” (65e7–66a10, emphasis 
mine). 
 
Across these three stages, Socrates shows the philosopher’s attitude towards life 
and connects that life with the purified way of the soul’s being, which is being 
alone by itself. This is because a philosopher needs to use his thought alone by 
itself in order to acquire the real thing. The appearance of philosophers to ordinary 
people (seeming to avoid any bodily pleasures) are by-products that only show 
the superficial appearance when philosophers are fulfilling their real desire. Their 
real goal is to obtain wisdom concerned with the Forms. From that perspective, 
death and the pursuit of separating souls from bodies must be understood. Indeed, 
this summary uses the term to suggest the philosopher’s desire: “attempting to 
hunt down each real thing alone by itself.” (αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον 
ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων) (66a2–3). While ordinary people desire bodily 
pleasures, a philosopher attempts to obtain the real thing. Neither the pursuit of a 
philosopher nor death can be evaluated correctly without understanding the 
philosophical desire. Indeed, ordinary people cannot understand in what sense 
philosophers desire to die and deserve death (64b8–9). Thus, a philosopher is 
defined by his desire in the DD first. Moreover, a series of points regarding a 
philosopher’s desire is agreed by the interlocutor. The goodness of death depends 
on this desire. Soul’s separation can allow the philosopher to obtain wisdom. Thus, 
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the interlocutors must recognize that they have that desire, otherwise, this DD is 
worthless. The DD presupposes that the interlocutors have that desire. 
  
2. The soul’s separation from the body of a philosopher 
 
These three stages show the objects with which the philosopher is 
concerned: corporeal pleasure, truth and wisdom, and the Forms. Socrates also 
shows how the soul is when it is concerned with these objects. At this point, he 
tries to separate his soul from his body in order to cause it to be “alone by itself” 
(ἀυτὴν καθ’ ἁυτὴν) (65c11–d2). However, as already mentioned, ordinary people 
see only a philosopher’s abstinence and cannot see what philosophers do 
positively. Socrates focuses on the real condition of a philosopher when he does 
what he should do––avoiding bodily sensations and seeking wisdom. 
We must confirm the meaning of the peculiar phrase “ἀυτὴν καθ’ ἁυτὴν” 
(“alone by itself”) here to understand the meaning of separation as accurately as 
possible. This phrase is repeatedly used in Socrates’ argument to separate the soul 




οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα 
καὶ φεύγει ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν γίγνεσθαι;   
So here too does the philosopher's soul particularly devalue the body and 
try to escape from it, seeking instead to become alone by itself? (65c11–d2) 
 
If we try to translate the phrase literally, the philosopher’s soul seeks to be “itself 
by itself.” These two pronouns should refer to the soul “itself” reflexively. 
However, the meaning of κατὰ is opaque. How should we understand the united 
phrase of αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν? According to A Greek-English Lexicon, the preposition 
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κατὰ with an accusative word primarily means a downwards motion (B-I). It also 
means “distributive” (B-II), for example, “by tribes”, “by clans.” Furthermore, it 
also means “fitness or conformity” (B-IV), which can be translated as “in 
accordance with.” Socrates also suggests that a philosopher’s soul should use 
“thought” (dianoia) without using bodily perceptions (66a1–3). Therefore, his 
actual suggestion is that the soul should use its appropriate function without using 
other things. Based on this interpretation, it seems that we should understand 
κατὰ as “in accordance with.”23 The translation by Sedley and Long of καθ᾽ αὑτὴν, 
“by itself”, seems to allow this meaning.24  
However, how can we translate the phrase “alone by itself” as Sedley and 
Long do? The reflexive pronoun αὐτός seems to be translated as ‘‘itself,’’ but it is 
used for “alone” in A Greek –English Lexicon (A-I-3). However, Gregory Vlastos 
retains its direct translation “itself by itself.”25 Thus, we should consider which 
translation is better. It should be noticed that this phrase is originally used in the 
definition of death (64c4–8. See Text 1 in section 1 of this chapter). Using this phrase, 
Socrates defines death as separation. Therefore, considering those contexts, the 
phrase itself must include this meaning of separation. In the latter part of the DD, 
Socrates defines “purification” as separation, in which this phrase is used again: 
 
Text 8. 
                                                        
23 Broackes claims as follows: “What is it for a person or thing to act αὐτὸς καθ’ αὑτόν? 
αὐός of course means himself, herself, itself, but also by himself, by herself, etc., i.e. alone (LSJ 
s.v. I.3: αὐτός περ ἐών, although alone, Il. 8.99; αὐτοὶ γάρ ἐσμεν, for we are alone, i.e. 
among friends, Ar. Ach. 504; usages with which LSJ lists αὐτὸς καθ’ αὑτόν). When a 
person––or the soul––acts αὐτὸς καθ’ αὑτόν or αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτήν, the force of the phrase 
is, then, I think, that it is acting alone by way of itself, alone in accordance with itself––
independently following its own path, not using anything else––hence, in short, alone by 
itself.” (Broackes 2009, 49). My reading accords with Broackes’ claim. 
24 Oxford Dictionary of English, Second Edition Revised. 2005. ‘by’ can mean “according to” 
(preposition-7) 
25 Vlastos 1991, 261. I learned this problem of translation from Broackes 2009, 49 n.21. 
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And doesn’t purification turn out to be the very thing we were recently 
talking about in our discussion, namely parting the soul from the body as 
much as possible and habituating it to assembling and gathering itself from 
every part of the body, alone by itself (αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν), and to living 
alone by itself (μόνην καθ᾽ αὑτήν) as far as it can, both now and afterwards, 
released from the body as if from fetters? (67c5–d2, emphasis mine) 
 
In this passage, Burnet thinks μόνην καθ᾽ αὑτήν is a synonym of αὐτὴν καθ᾽ 
αὑτὴν.26  Indeed, the phrase is used to emphasize the importance of habituation to 
make the soul distant from the body. Namely, the soul must be solitary. This point 
is emphasized clearly by the word “μόνην” which more directly means “alone.” 
Considering this passage and the definition of death, the phrase “αὐτὴν καθ᾽ 
αὑτὴν” should cover both a soul’s intellectual condition and that of being 
separated from the body. Therefore, the meaning of “alone” should be also 
included in the translation of the phrase.  
Ordinary people cannot see what a philosopher will accomplish by making 
his soul to be “alone by itself,” i.e. finding truth or wisdom. Philosophers recognize 




‘Then given all this,’ he said, ‘is it inevitable for those who are genuinely 
(γνησίως) philosophers to be struck by the following sort of belief, so that 
they also tell one another things like this: “You know, a sort of short cut 
may well be taking us with our reason towards the quarry in our inquiry, 
because as long as we have the body and our soul is fused with bodily evil, 
                                                        
26 Burnet 1911, 38. Rowe seems to agree with Burnet’s connection of these two phrases and 




we’ll never properly acquire what we desire, namely, as we would say, the 
truth…’ (66b1–7) 
But we really have shown that if we are ever to have pure knowledge of 
something, we must be separated from the body and view things by 
themselves with the soul by itself. The time when we will have that which 
we desire and whose lovers we claim to be (οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καί φαμεν 
ἐρασταὶ εἶναι), namely wisdom, will be when we are dead, as the 
argument indicates, and not while we are alive. (66d7–e4, emphasis mine). 
 
These passages also make remarkable points. First, Socrates mentions that a belief 
strikes those who are genuine philosophers. This belief tells them of the 
disturbance of the body in acquiring wisdom (φρονήσις). Curiously, Socrates does 
not clarify how the belief comes to them, or at least, he does not say that it comes 
through discussion. Conversely, it seems that the discussion between the 
philosophers takes place after the belief has struck. Furthermore, Socrates dares to 
mention genuineness in being a philosopher. Does he presuppose the possibility 
of there being true and fake philosophers? If so, who is a genuine philosopher? At 
this stage, Socrates does not clearly define who the genuine philosopher is. 
However, in my view, the second remarkable point is concerned with this 
genuineness: Socrates characterises wisdom as what “we desire and whose lovers 
we claim to be.”  Wisdom is not only truth or pure knowledge, but also the target 
of people who claim to be lovers of wisdom. Indeed, in the last part of the DD, 
Socrates claims that he has tried to be one of those “who have pursued philosophy 
correctly” and to do his best “in every way” (69d1–4). If this claim is a falsehood, 
that claimant would not be a genuine philosopher but a fake one. Following this 
interpretation, a belief warning of a bodily disturbance and encouraging 




The philosopher despises corporeal desires, desiring truth and wisdom as 
his absolute purpose. To this end, he makes his soul alone by itself. What is the 
concrete condition of the soul’s being alone by itself? Socrates identifies abstract 
concepts in stage 3, namely, “each real thing” that can be also called the Forms, 
and says that a person who uses his thought alone by itself and hunts down real 
things “alone by itself” will hit upon reality (66a1–8). We also realise that we 
understand these objects without perception when we are not disturbed by 
corporeal desires and sensations. Therefore, it is possible for us to achieve a 
purified condition in certain situations only. Plato seems to suggest that the 
cognition of the Forms is limited to these situations. Therefore, only a philosopher 
has the necessary experience to cause his soul to be alone by itself. While he will 
acquire wisdom through causing the soul to be alone by itself, he will have no 
reason to make the soul to be in such a condition without the desire to obtain 
wisdom. Indeed, ordinary people would not need to do that as far as they desire 
bodily pleasure.  
Remarkably, Socrates does not clarify how intellectual desire comes to a 
philosopher. However, this does not mean that having such a desire is a brute fact 
for a human being which does not need any explanation. Ordinary people are only 
concerned about bodily pleasure; therefore, they cannot understand the true 
conditions of a philosopher. Socrates just suggests that a belief comes to a 
philosopher, which leads him to separate the soul from the body, without 
clarifying its origin. As far as someone is a true philosopher, he would have 
intellectual desire. But Socrates seems to remain epistemically modest about the 
origin of the desire, and we do not know in Phaedo how that desire is given to a 
human being either. In that sense, while Socrates says that the philosopher 
discusses the belief after being struck by it in Text 9, we cannot say that the desire 
comes from those discussions. It seems that the discussion takes places after the 
belief’s striking. Socrates says that wisdom is a target “which we desire and whose 
lover we claim to be.” (66e2–3). He seems to presuppose that at least he and 
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Simmias have that desire. If Simmias agrees, death would be good for him as a 
way of making his soul to be alone by itself. Thus, I think Socrates presupposes a 
desire for wisdom that cannot be reduced to the products of discussion. It exists 
within the participants of the arguments before the discussions. 
  
3. Virtue and wisdom 
 
Socrates defends the idea that death separates the soul from the body and 
causes the soul to be alone by itself so that it can acquire wisdom. In this case, 
wisdom is the true goal of a philosopher. In the DD, he also presents a remarkable 
example of the relationship between virtue and wisdom. He explains the 
philosopher’s attitude towards pleasure, pain, and fear by contrasting it with that 
of ordinary people in the “exchange metaphor” (69a6–c3).  
Socrates first introduces the concept of “so-called” virtue regarding 
courage and temperance. These virtues mostly belong to philosophers (68b8–d1). 
Even when ordinary people appear abstemious, they are merely acting out of fear 
of being deprived of other pleasures; therefore, they abstain from one set of 
pleasures out of desire for another (68e2–69a5). A philosopher, however, is 
concerned with pleasure and other sensations in a different way. Here, I must 
make use of a comparatively long quotation with its original Greek text, since 
many scholars suggest various ways of reading the text to interpret its problematic 
contents:  
 
Text 10.     
For I suspect, my good Simmias, that for the purpose of virtue this is not 
the correct exchange, the exchange of pleasures for pleasures, pains for 
pains and fear for fear, greater for less, like currencies, but that just one 
thing is the correct currency, in return for which one must exchange all 
these: I mean wisdom. Now when all things are bought and sold for this 
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and with this—with wisdom—they really are, I suspect, courage, 
temperance, justice and in sum true virtue, regardless of whether pleasures, 
fears and everything else like that are added or removed. But when they 
are kept apart from wisdom and exchanged for one another, that sort of 
virtue is, I fear, a kind of illusion: it is really fit for slaves, and contains 
nothing sound or true. The reality is, I suspect, that temperance, justice and 
courage are a kind of purification from everything like this, and that 
wisdom itself is a kind of rite to purify us. (69a6–c3)  
 
Original Greek Texts  
[69a6]ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ᾖ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς 
[69a7]ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγή, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς 
[69a8]λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι,μείζω πρὸς 
[69a9]ἐλάττω ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ᾽ ᾖ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα 
[69a10]ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις· 
[b1]καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντa καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ 
[b2]πιπρασκόμενa τῷ ὄντι ᾖ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ 
[b3]δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀληθὴς ἀρετή, μετὰ φρονή- 
[b4]σεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ 
[b5]ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· 
[b6]χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων 
[b7]μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ᾖ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδρα- 
[b8]ποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ᾽ ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ, τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς 
[c1]τῷ ὄντι ᾖ κάθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ἡ σωφρο- 
[c2]σύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις  
[c3]μὴ καθαρμός τις ᾖ. 
 
Scholars have suggested two serious problems in this passage related to the 




1. How does a philosopher use the true currency, wisdom? According to the text 
(69b1–4; “Now when all things are bought and sold for this and with this—with 
wisdom—they really are, I suspect, courage, temperance, justice and in sum true 
virtue […]”), he seems to buy or sell all these things (pleasures, pains, fears) with 
or for wisdom. However, it seems strange if he should buy sensations with wisdom 
since the sensations are what he despises. On the other hand, wisdom should be 
his target. In that case, is the true currency spent and diminished?27  
2. Is wisdom a means or a goal?28 In Phaedo, wisdom is frequently mentioned as the 
object of the philosopher’s intellectual desire. However, in this metaphor, wisdom 
seems to be a kind of means or medium to be virtuous, since a philosopher must 
exchange something with wisdom. Is it possible for him to already have wisdom 
as a means of exchange, although it is his goal? In other words, how can a 
philosopher possess wisdom, which is his final purpose, while Socrates says that 
we acquire wisdom when we die, not when we are alive (66e1–6)?29  
 
Many scholars have suggested interpretations of these problematic sentences. One 
of the most drastic solutions was suggested by John Burnet. 30  He deleted καὶ 
                                                        
27 cf. Bluck 1955, 155–156. He suggests that we should not read the metaphor so strictly. 
According to him, Plato intended “τούτου καὶ μετὰ τούτου to suggest ‘if they are bought 
and sold for this or perhaps with the aid of this’ (i.e. under the guidance of wisdom).” (Bluck 
1955, 156.) 
28 cf. Hackforth 1955, 193. 
29 “The time when we will have that which we desire and whose lovers we claim to be, 
namely wisdom, will be when we are dead as the argument indicates, and not while we 
are alive” (66e1–4). 
30  Burnet is mainly concerned with the grammatical problem of ὠνούμενα and 
πιπρασκόμενα having a passive meaning: “I think it certain that this sentence is 
interpolated. […] it is hardly credible that Plato should use ὠνούμενα as a passive, or that 
he should use πιπρασκόμενα at all. For ὠνεισθαι in a passive sense, the grammars can 
only quote Xen. Eq. 8.2 ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐωνεῖτο, πειρᾶσθαι ἐκελεύομεν εἰ δύναιτο ὁ ἵππος 
ταῦτα ποιεῖν, but there it is clearly active, ‘at the time he was buying it.’ As to 
πιπρασκόμενα, Cobet’s remark is true: Neque Iones neque Attici ea forma utuntur, sed apud 
sequiores protrita est (Nov. Lect. p.158). It occurs only in one other place (Soph. 224a3), where 
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τούτου μὲν πάντa (69b1) and τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα (69b1–2), 
which correspond with “Now when all things are bought and sold for this” from 
the translation. This reading ignores the fact that this text is supported by the main 
manuscripts that constitute Phaedo. Furthermore, “ὠνούμενά τε καὶ 
πιπρασκόμενa” (“all things are bought and sold”) is exactly answered with “καὶ 
προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
πάντων τῶν τοιούτων” (69b4) (‘‘[…] pleasures, fears and everything else like that 
are added or removed’’). Considering these points, those phrases should not be 
deleted as Burnet did. 
Other scholars have tried to understand this passage without any deletion, 
which seems to be a more reasonable way to read the text. J. V. Luce adds the word 
“ἀλλατόμενα” to the sentence at 69b1.31 In this reading, τοῦτου depends on that 
ἀλλατόμενα, and therefore it has its genitive form. Following this interpretation, 
the translation of 69b1–2 will be as follows: “When all things are exchanged for 
wisdom and are bought and sold through the medium of wisdom …” Luce thinks 
that there are two steps in this exchange: 32  Step 1, Exchanging sensations for 
wisdom (this is different from the bartering of pleasures by ordinary people; 
wisdom is acquired in this step), and Step 2, all transactions are done with wisdom. 
                                                        
also it seems to be interpolated.” (Burnet 1911, 42–43). However, Luce criticizes Burnet’s 
suggestion efficaciously (Luce 1944, 60–61): Luce also admits that “there is not, it is true, 
any parallel in the passive sense.” (p.60). Both in Sophist 224b1 and Protagoras 313e1, the 
participles of ὠνεισθαι are active in sense. However, he points out that “both these 
participles are masculine and therefore naturally active in sense.” (p.61). This ὠνούμενά in 
Phaedo is neuter. Luce claims as follows: “If the neuter form of the participle were found 
more often, one would expect it to be passive, for ‘things’ cannot buy, but can be bought. 
For instance the perfect participle ἐωνημένα is found in the passive sense (it was 
conjectured here by Stallbaum), and in Laws 850a we find τὸ ὠνηθέν.” (p.61) As Luce 
claims, the last instance is important, since Plato uses the word αλλάττεσθαι (849e6) at a 
few sentences before ‘‘τὸ δὲ ὠνηθὲν ἢ πραθὲν’’ (850a1) (“the object bought or sold.” This 
translation by Trevor J. Saunders in Plato Complete Works) in the context of explaining 
“monetary transaction” (p.61) in the city.   
31 Luce 1944, 61. 
32 Luce 1944, 63. 
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However, this interpretation leads to several difficulties. 33  First, supplying the 
word seems to be a considerable change to the texts since this sentence is 
grammatically completed without the addition of “exchange.” Second, although 
the division into two steps would be a very important transition (if Luce’s 
interpretation is correct, and there is such a process), Socrates does not indicate 
this and just connects two distinctive transactions with the word “καὶ” (and). 
Roslyn Weiss interprets both “all these” (πάντα) in “in return for which 
one must exchange all these” (69a10) and “all things” in “when all things are 
bought and sold for this and with this” (69b1) as sensations.34 Additionally, she 
understands “for which’’ (ἀντὶ οὗ) in the meaning of “for the sake of which.” This 
form of exchange is preserved in sections 69b1–c3. She translates sections 69a9–10 
and 69bl–c3 as follows: 
 
(69a9–10) 
… but that sole right coin, for the sake of which all these things [pleasures, 
pains, and fears] ought to be exchanged [with each other] is phronêsis …35 
(69b1–c3) 
. . . when [pleasures, pains, and fears are] bought and sold for phronêsis, and 
with phronêsis [as one's value, aim, or concern], then is there really courage, 
temperance, justice, and, in sum, true aretê, that is, with phronêsis, whether 
pleasures and pains and all other such things are increased or 
diminished…36 
 
In her interpretation, sensations are bought and sold with each other, for the sake 
of and with phronêsis (wisdom). In other words, wisdom is outside the barter of 
                                                        
33 Weiss has already suggested the following difficulties (Weiss 1987, 61). I agree with her 
criticism. 
34 Weiss 1987, 58. 
35 Weiss 1987, 58. 
36 Weiss 1987, 59. 
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sensations, which is the purpose of the barter. In this case, a philosopher does not 
have to spend wisdom as a currency to buy or sell sensations, as this set of buying 
and selling means simply an exchange of sensations. Thus, a philosopher also 
exchanges sensations as ordinary people do, but he does so for the sake of, and 
with, wisdom, not to obtain other sensations. In this case, true aretê (virtue) consists 
in phronêsis. Moreover, Weiss suggests an interesting solution to the problem of 
whether wisdom is a means or goal, stating, “Phronêsis is indeed the means to aretê 
by being that for the sake of which all pleasures, pains, and fears are exchanged 
with each other, i.e., by being the goal of all transactions of pleasures, pains, and 
fears.”37  
Weiss’ interpretation seems to be efficacious, as it appears to solve the two 
problems mentioned above. According to Weiss, wisdom as the true currency does 
not have to be spent or diminished. It is both a means and goal at the same time. 
However, an issue arises in her reading that relates to the meaning of “for” (ἀντὶ). 
This “for” (ἀντὶ) is apparently linked with “to be exchanged”(καταλλάττεσθαι). 
We can easily find the usage of καταλλάττεσθαι as “to exchange one thing for 
another” in A Greek-English Lexicon38 and, in that case, the meaning of this sentence 
should be that “all these are exchanged for wisdom.” The subject is exchanged for 
another thing. It is not certain that the verb καταλλάττεσθαι (be exchanged) can 
be used in a situation where the sensations are exchanged for each other. Whether 
her reading is consistent with the rules of Greek syntax is open to question. We 
also find that Plato uses the phrase αλλάττω+ἀντὶ in the meaning of “exchange 
one thing for another” in Symposium 218e4 and Menexenus 237a4.39  
                                                        
37 Weiss 1987, 61. 
38 Liddell and Scott 1940, καταλλ-άσσω, A-2. 
39  “εἰ δὴ καθορῶν αὐτὸ κοινώσασθαί τέ μοι ἐπιχειρεῖς καὶ ἀλλάξασθαι κάλλος ἀντὶ 
κάλλους, οὐκ ὀλίγῳ μου πλεονεκτεῖν διανοῇ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντὶ δόξης ἀλήθειαν καλῶν 
κτᾶσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καὶ τῷ ὄντι “χρύσεα χαλκείων” διαμείβεσθαι νοεῖς.” (Symposium, 
218e3–219a1, emphasis mine). “And if on espying this you are trying for a mutual exchange 
of beauty for beauty, it is no slight advantage you are counting on –you are trying to get 
genuine in return for reputed beauties, and in fact are designing to fetch off the old bargain 
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Weiss’ reading suggests a peculiar philosopher’s attitude towards 
pleasures and pains, which should be distinguished from an ascetic reading of the 
text. Indeed, according to her interpretation of the text, even a philosopher 
exchanges pleasures or pains for each other, which does not deny the 
philosopher’s receiving those pleasures and pains. This reading would mean a 
reasonable management of those pleasures and pains. Woolf also criticizes an 
ascetic reading of the text and evaluates Weiss’ reading as follows: “Now the key 
phrase at A 10 (ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι) certainly fits better 
with the rest of the passage when translated, with Weiss (her brackets), as ‘for the 
sake of which all these things [pleasures, pains and fears] ought to be exchanged 
[with each other]’, the sense being (roughly) that the passions are a given and one’s 
‘traffic’ in them should be whatever most conduces to the acquisition of wisdom.” 
40  However, he also explains that the phrase “in isolation’’ is “more naturally 
translated ‘ascetically’ as ‘in return for which [i.e. wisdom] all these things should 
be exchanged’, and I suspect that one reason for the linguistic murkiness of the 
passage as a whole is precisely Plato’s desire to avoid closing off the possibility of 
an ascetic reading.”41 While Woolf agrees with Weiss’ general understanding of the 
metaphor, he also sees a problem with her interpretation of the phrase including 
ἀντὶ. 
I argue that we should not read ἀντὶ in the phrase (ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα 
ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι) as meaning “for the sake of.” This passage aims to draw 
a contrast between important things for ordinary people and a philosopher. For 
ordinary people, pleasures, pains, and fears are important things. Currency 
                                                        
of “gold for bronze”.” (Translation by H. R. Lamb, 1925, emphasis mine). “ἢ πόθεν ἂν 
ὀρθῶς ἀρξαίμεθα ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς ἐπαινοῦντες, οἳ ζῶντές τε τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ηὔφραινον 
δι᾽ ἀρετήν, καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν ζώντων σωτηρίας ἠλλάξαντο;” (Menexenus, 
237a1-4, emphasis mine). “Or how could we rightly commence our laudation of these 
valiant men, who in their lifetime delighted their friends by their virtue, and purchased the 
safety of the living by their deaths?” (Translation by R. G. Bury 1929, emphasis mine) 
40 Woolf 2004, 99. n.3. 
41 Woolf 2004, 99. n.3. 
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(nomisma) is a symbol of importance to ordinary people, characterised as “a money 
lover” (68c2) However, for a philosopher, those things have no importance. 
Wisdom is the only valuable thing for him. Therefore, if it is required, he should 
exchange those bodily affections for wisdom.  
However, we need to attend carefully to several points in this exchange. 
First, throwing away those affections does not mean immediately attaining 
wisdom. As we have seen in 65e7–66a8, a philosopher must use thought alone by 
itself to hunt down real things. Just giving up bodily sensation is not the core of 
his required action. Second, this exchange between sensations and wisdom does 
not mean ‘asceticism’ if asceticism means abstinence from sensual pleasure since 
Socrates says “all those” which include pains and fears should be exchanged for 
wisdom. Is it possible to be free from any pleasures and pains in this life? If we try 
to avoid the pleasure of eating, some pains of hunger will come to us. Indeed, when 
Socrates rubbed his fettered legs, he was interested in the peculiar relationship 
between pleasure and pain. He felt that there was a pain in his fettered leg, but 
pleasure comes “in its train” (60c7). He does not attempt to avoid feeling pleasure 
and pain. By experiencing them, he understands an interesting fact about pleasure 
and pain and evaluates them. Considering his statement about the pleasure and 
pain in his leg, it is not a focal point in this metaphor to throw away all sensations 
to obtain wisdom. Rather it suggests that only wisdom can be valuable while 
bodily affections can never be so. 
Bodily sensations are understood as currencies in this metaphor, and the 
currencies are usually understood as a tool for exchange. However, wisdom as a 
currency seems to lose this characteristic after 69b1. Rowe interprets τούτου as the 
genitive of price in “καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντa καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ 
πιπρασκόμενa’’42 All those things are bought and sold for the price of wisdom. 
However, this meaning “wrongly suggests that our store of wisdom will be either 
                                                        
42 Rowe 1993, 150. See also Smyth 1984. Greek Grammar, p.325, section 1372. 
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decreased (in ‘buying’) or increased (‘in selling’) […]”43 Therefore, this must be 
immediately “corrected by ‘in the company of this’.” 44  Based on his reading, 
wisdom is not used as a consumable currency, but as a kind of measurement, and 
this meaning is emphasized by a phrase “μετὰ τούτου” (in the company of this). 
In this sense, the function of wisdom is different from bodily sensations. Bodily 
sensations as currencies are objects that are spent in transactions. On the other 
hand, wisdom as a true currency works as a measure. Therefore, wisdom can never 
be spent for bodily affections, which solves the first problem in this metaphor. 
However, the second problem remains. If wisdom can be used as a measure, 
has a philosopher already acquired that wisdom? Wisdom is the target of the 
philosopher. Thus, he desires to be dead, because wisdom can be acquired when 
we are dead, not while we are alive (66e1–6). According to this exchange metaphor, 
if a philosopher cannot acquire wisdom, he cannot be truly virtuous in this life. 
How should we understand the relationship between wisdom and virtue? There 
are three different ways to interpret this relationship: 
 
1. A philosopher cannot acquire wisdom in this life, but he can be fully virtuous 
(Weiss)45 
2. A philosopher can acquire wisdom; so he can be fully virtuous (Bobonich) 46  
3. A philosopher cannot acquire wisdom; so he cannot be fully virtuous (Vasiliou)47 
 
According to Weiss, virtue is not wisdom but the love of wisdom; hence, one can 
be virtuous without being wise by devoting one’s life to the pursuit of wisdom. 
The truly virtuous man of the Phaedo is not said to be wise, but to love wisdom. He 
is contrasted with the lover of the body, money, or honour (68c1–2). However, in 
                                                        
43 Ibid., 150. 
44 Ibid., 150. 
45 Weiss 1987, 62–63. 
46 Bobonich 2002, 34–36. 
47 Vasiliou 2012, 21–26. 
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the section Weiss refers to, Socrates does not necessarily state that the philosopher 
is truly virtuous, but instead suggests that so-called virtues belong to a 




‘So, Simmias,’ he said, ‘doesn’t that which is called “courage” (ἡ 
ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία) also belong most to those with this attitude. (68c5–
6)  
 
And temperance as well –– that which even ordinary people call 
“temperance”, namely not being in a flutter about one’s desires, but rather 
being disdainful towards them and staying composed––doesn’t that 
belong only to those who particularly disdain the body and live in 
philosophy? (68c8-12). 
 
In the exchange metaphor, the virtue that comes with wisdom is called “true virtue” 
(ἀληθὴς ἀρετή) (69b3). Therefore, this point does not prove that a philosopher is 
truly virtuous.  
On the other hand, Bobonich explains the criteria of wisdom and accepts 
that a philosopher has wisdom and is fully virtuous. Wisdom is the knowledge of 
the Forms in the Defence as we see in section 1. Bobonich mentions that Plato 
admits that some people knows the equal itself (the Form of Equal) while never 
adequately or purely attaining wisdom. Based on that example, he defines a 
person who knows the Form of F by using these three criteria: 49  
 
                                                        
48 Vasiliou suggests this counterargument (Vasiliou 2012, 21). 
49 Bobonich 2002, 35.  
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1. A person who knows the Form of F “recognizes that the Form of F is not identical 
with sensible things or properties.” 
2. A person who knows the Form of F “is able to give an account of the Form of F.’’ 
Additionally, Plato thinks the following thing is “a very basic fact”:50 
“All sensible Fs are F in virtue of participating in the Form of F.” 
 
Bobonich thinks that a philosopher will have fulfilled these criteria in terms 
regarding the Equal itself. Indeed, Socrates and the interlocutors admit that they 
know the Form of Equal in the following Recollection Argument (74b2). However, 
as Vasiliou correctly mentions, even if we admit that a philosopher could fulfil 
these criteria with regard to the Form of Equal, we cannot say that he can do the 
same regarding other Forms.51 Specifically, it seems difficult to fulfil the second 
criterion concerning justice and good. Would Socrates say that he knows the Form 
of Justice, Beauty and Good? It seems improbable. At least, the Form of Justice and 
that of Good are hard targets of investigation in Plato’s Republic. How can a person 
be truly virtuous only by the knowledge of the Form of Equal, if he does not know 
any other ethical property? 
Considering these defects in the first and second interpretations, it seems 
that a philosopher cannot be truly virtuous as Vasiliou claims. Thus, neither a 
philosopher nor ordinary people are truly virtuous. Then, is there any difference 
between them? Regarding virtue, can a philosopher distinguish himself from other 
people? While Plato does not explicitly state this, the following difference can be 
assumed: true virtue with wisdom is an ideal state that a philosopher can 
ultimately achieve after death. If a philosopher acquires wisdom that he has 
desired through all his life, he would evaluate any sensations correctly with that 
wisdom and keep himself purified from them. The achievement of this ideal state 
is possible only for a philosopher since ordinary people cannot realize that their 
                                                        
50 Ibid. 
51 Vasiliou 2012, 23–24. 
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virtue is slavish and fake. A philosopher recognises both this ideal state and slavish 
virtue, which prevents him from participating in the wrong type of exchange. His 
acknowledgement of the ideal state will help him to live his life well and progress 
towards wisdom, which is the characteristic feature of a philosopher. 
However, if this assumption based on Vasiliou’s interpretation is correct, 
true virtue can only be accomplished by acquiring true wisdom, that is, after death. 
This appears to be a strange idea because it would not seem that courage and 
temperance are used in the afterlife. 52  Moreover, why must the soul manage 
sensations even after death, even though it is distant from the body? However, 
Socrates also adds the following mythical explanation to the exchange metaphor: 
 
Text 12. 
The reality is, I suspect, that temperance, justice and courage are a kind of 
purification from everything like this, and that wisdom itself is a kind of 
rite to purify us. So it actually seems that those people who established the 
rites for us are no ordinary people, but in reality have long been setting a 
riddle when they say that whoever comes to Hades without initiation and 
the rites will lie in filth, whereas someone who arrives there purified and 
initiated will dwell with gods. (69b8–c7) 
 
According to this mythical theory, virtue and viciousness seem to be preserved 
even after death, at which time they are truly significant. In that sense, Plato retains 
the possibility that true virtue is effective even after one has left this world and 
truly acquired wisdom. In the Affinity Argument (78b4–84b7), Socrates mentions 
that the soul’s tendencies or activities in this life have effects on its conditions even 
after death. As we have already seen in the explanation of the deceit of the body, 
sensations pin the soul to the body: “Because each pleasure and pain rivets and 
pins it to the body as if with a nail, and makes it corporeal, since it believes to be 
                                                        
52 Vasiliou also points out this problem (Vasiliou 2012, 25). 
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real the very things that the body says real.” (83d4–7). Moreover, the polluted soul 
“fall[s] quickly back again into another body” even after death (83d10–e3). Thus, 
sensations affect the soul even after it is distant from the body. After considering 
the bad effects of the body over the soul, Socrates inquires as follows: “So Cebes, 
it is for these reasons that the proper lovers of learning are composed and 
courageous. It is not for the reasons for which most people are so. Or do you think 
it is?” (83e5-7). At first glance, this passage seems to support Weiss’ reading since 
it clearly says the lovers of learning are courageous. However, this inquiry is stated 
after the passages in which Socrates explains that the bodily sensations affect the 
soul even after death. Additionally, he has also discussed that the purified soul 
“go[es] off into what is similar to it” and “can be happy, separated from wandering” 
(81a4–8). Thus, these virtues in the lovers of learning are stated after considering 
the soul’s conditions after death. Therefore, true virtues including courage and 
temperance have actual effects after death, which decide the destinations of the 
souls. Thus, a philosopher will find out whether he has really lived correctly after 
his soul departs from the body. A critical difference between a philosopher and 
ordinary people cannot be easily found in their virtues in this world. A 
philosopher’s distinctive feature is that they can recognize the difference between 
true and fake virtues and keep pursuing wisdom and aim at acquiring true virtues 
after death.53  
After this metaphor, Socrates concludes his defence of death. Remarkably, 
Socrates shows his epistemic modesty about his life. According to him, he does not 
know whether he has philosophised correctly:  
 
Text 13. 
                                                        
53 My interpretation accords with that of Vasiliou. He also finds the philosopher’s virtue in 




For in fact, as those involved in the rites put it, “many carry the fennel-
wand, but few are inspired”. The latter, in my opinion, are none other than 
those who have pursued philosophy correctly. In trying to become one of 
them I left nothing undone in my life, at least as far as I could, but did my 
utmost in every way. Whether I did so correctly and achieved anything, I’ll 
know for certain when I’ve got there, god willing, and I don’t think it will 
be long. (69c8–d7, emphasis mine).54 
 
Socrates believes that he has practised philosophy as far as possible, however, he 
is not sure about its absolute correctness. Whether he has improved himself or not 
will be clarified after his death. In that sense, the true evaluation of his life can be 
known only to Socrates. He has attempted to be a philosopher as far as possible 
and advanced discussion about the good life of a philosopher with the interlocutor. 
However, this result is not clarified within the discussion and will be known to 
Socrates alone.  
 
Conclusion of Chapter 1 
 
 In the DD, we see the significance of self-discovery of intellectual desire. A 
philosopher desires wisdom, and therefore wishes to be dead, because he needs to 
separate his soul from the body in order to obtain wisdom. In other words, he must 
make his soul “alone by itself.” Thus, death as soul’s separation from the body is 
defended on the basis of the desire for wisdom. If the interlocutor agrees that he 
also has the desire, the DD is meaningful. If he does not desire for wisdom, the DD 
                                                        
54 “εἰ δ᾽ ὀρθῶς προυθυμήθην καί τι ἠνύσαμεν, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, ἂν 
θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.” (69d4–7). εἰσόμεθα should be translated as 
“we will know.” Rowe states: “By the end of the following main clause, however, ‘we’ has 
become virtually equivalent to ‘I’, since it is natural in the context to take ὀλίγον ὕστερον 
as applying at least primarily to S [ocrates].” (Rowe 1993, 151)   
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loses its foundation, because it cannot suggest any advantage of death for the 
interlocutor. 
We also see that the DD also suggests a highly thoughtful way of argument 
regarding the goodness of death, which is not simply reduced to objective 
discussions. There are two subtle suggestions. First, the DD displays subjective or 
individual recognition of the desire. Second, Socrates retains epistemic modesty 
regarding wisdom. This epistemic modesty implies that the goodness of death is 
not suggested dogmatically.  
Regarding the first point, Socrates mentions an occasion in which a 
philosopher is encouraged to separate his soul from the body (section 2 in this 
chapter). That occasion is depicted as a belief’s striking that encourages the 
philosopher to separate his soul from the body (66b1–67b2, see Text 9). While 
Socrates does not explain the origin of the belief, the possession of philosophical 
desire is a critical criterion of receiving the belief. Moreover, it is remarkable that 
discussion is not the origin of the desire, but discussions about the belief arise after 
that belief’s striking (67b1–2). Thus, Socrates presupposes the individual 
possession of the desire for wisdom in the DD. Regarding the second point, 
Socrates retains epistemic modesty about wisdom and his conditions as a 
philosopher. A philosopher can obtain wisdom only after death (66e1–4), therefore, 
death can be defended as a method to obtain wisdom. Socrates also says that he 
will see soon whether he philosophises correctly or not (69c8–d7, Text 13). In other 
words, he retains epistemic modesty about whether his life is truly good or not. 
This point is concerned with the exchange metaphor (section 3). A philosopher 
does not have wisdom in this life, thus, he cannot be truly virtuous. However, he 
can recognize that ordinary people merely have fake virtues. He understands that 
wisdom is the final goal and that the true virtue can be obtained only by wisdom. 
By that understanding, he makes effort to get wisdom and live his life better than 
ordinary people.  
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The self-discovery of intellectual desire offers a guiding principle for a 
philosopher. However, it does not easily give wisdom in this life. Thus, the 
philosopher must do his best continuously to obtain wisdom following the desire. 
The DD suggests that requirement of a philosopher’s continuous effort by 
depicting subjective forms of recognition of desire and Socrates’ epistemic 
modesty regarding wisdom.  
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Chapter 2. The Soul and Self-discovery in Recollection 
––The Recollection Argument (72e1–77a7)–– 
 
Introduction to Chapter 2 
 
We have seen that the philosopher is defined by his desire to know the 
Forms. It is also important for the interlocutor to recognize that desire. We will see 
a similar importance in the Recollection Argument (hereafter shortened to RA). 
The RA is usually understood as an argument demonstrating our prenatal 
knowledge and the immortality of the soul based on the existence of such 
knowledge. However, we should note that the RA also suggests the importance of 
the actual practice of that recollection. We hear at the beginning of Simmias’ 
argument that he needs to experience recollection for himself (73b6–10). I. N. 
Robins interprets Simmias’ statement as signifying self-understanding.55 I agree 
with Robins’ interpretation of Simmias’ request. Moreover. I argue that the 
discovery of intellectual desire within the self is found by experiencing recollection. 
The RA employs two critical points in order to demonstrate the soul’s 
immortality. The first point is that the agent of recollection begins recollecting from 
sensible things, but the object of recollection cannot be obtained by the senses alone. 
The second point is that the sensible things have some insufficiency compared to 
the objects that the agent recollects. Based on these two points, Socrates proposes 
that the soul has knowledge that is independent of the body’s senses and that it 
must have acquired this knowledge before birth. 
  In terms of these two fundamental grounds, this chapter asserts that there 
are three implicit but notable ideas in the text which support the presence of the 
theme of self-discovery in Phaedo and furthermore bring out a specific means of 
this self-discovery. 
                                                        
55 Robins 1997, 438. 
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One is that Socrates, by offering the examples of recollection, defines the 
character of the person who recollects y from x as a “lover” (73d6–11). The agents 
can potentially recollect anything they have previously known it before. For 
example, when people see the portrait of Simmias, some recollect Simmias himself, 
but others recollect other person or things which are related to Simmias. However, 
I assert that if the person greatly loves Simmias very much, he would tend to 
recollect Simmias. The “love” in an agent influences his recollection. Moreover, a 
person recollects the original of the portrait because of his love of the original.  A 
philosopher is such a lover of the original.  
Second, Socrates seems to inquire into Simmias’ experience in terms of 
finding the difference between sensible things and what is recollected from the 
sensible things (74b4–c2). The equal things can sometimes appear as unequal; 
conversely, “the Equals themselves” never appear unequal. Socrates asks whether 
those cases emerge in Simmias’ experiences: “Well, have the Equals themselves 
ever appeared to you unequal, or has equality ever appeared as in equality?”56 
(74c1–2) 
Third, Socrates states that the sensible things “are eager to be” the Forms 
as if things have willingness (75b4–9). The agent of recollection realizes that the 
particular perceptible things are inferior to the recollected object, and thus “are 
eager to be” like the recollected object. To what does this “eagerness” refer? Some 
scholars think that it refers to the teleological or cosmic structure of this world. 
However, David Sedley attributes it to the agent’s motivation in recollection.57 I 
think the latter notion more correctly adheres to the context of this discussion; 
however, it is also necessary to explain why Socrates uses phrasing which gives 
the sensible things a kind of willingness. 
                                                        
56 τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης; 
57 Sedley 2006, 326. 
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These three points suggest that practising recollection reveals not only our 
intellectual ability to do so, but also our own subjective desire to make use of the 
ability. This revelation is a process of self-discovery.  
This chapter is divided into the following four sections: 
 
1. Practice of Recollection: what is Simmias’ intention in the RA? 
2. Conditions and examples of recollection. 
3. The willingness of sensible things to be the Forms. 
4. What aspect of our souls does exist before we are born?––The demonstration of 
immortality of the soul in the RA. 
 
 
1. Practice of Recollection: what is Simmias’ intention in the RA? 
 
The RA is introduced by one of the two main discussants, Cebes, (72e1–
73a3). He posits that Socrates’ previous claim in the Cyclical Argument (69e–72d), 
that living people emerge from dead people and the souls of the dead exist, is in 
accordance with the RA which defines our learning as recollection. According to 
the RA, we have learned in the previous time what we recollect, which suggests 
that we exist before we are born. Answering Simmias’ request to help him to 
remember the idea of recollection, Cebes adds further points that are similar to 
recollection as it is depicted in Plato’s Meno. When people are questioned 
appropriately, they answer accurately. If the knowledge was not in them, they 
would not be able to do so (73a7–b2). 
Socrates proposes a further argument supporting the claim that learning is 
recollection since Simmias seems to doubt Cebes’ explanation. However, Simmias’ 






‘No, I don’t doubt it, ‘said Simmias, ‘but I need to undergo the very thing 
that the theory is about: recollecting.’  (73b6-7, emphasis mine) 
Ἀπιστῶ μέν ἔγωγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὔ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι 
παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. (73b6-7, emphasis mine) 
 
Remarkably, Simmias divides recollection itself from the argument, and he 
wants to experience (παθεῖν) recollection himself. As Robins points out, Simmias 
differs from Meno, the main discussant in the dialogue Meno, who does not 
attempt recollection despite witnessing Socrates demonstrating it in a conversation 
with a slave boy (Meno 82b–86d). 58  This actual experience of recollection is 
important because it will persuade him that his own soul might have had the 
function of recollecting and therefore might have existed before this life.  
The Greek text in the Oxford Classical Text quoted above replaces μαθεῖν 
(to learn) at 73b7 with παθεῖν (to experience) following Heindorf, although 
μαθεῖν is supported in the main manuscripts of β, Τ, and δ. The translation of the 
original main manuscripts would be “I need to learn the thing itself that the theory 
is about, recollecting.”59 This reading also retains the important point that Simmias 
himself needs to recollect for himself, although it does so quite subtly. Socrates 
(and Cebes’ summary of Socrates’ RA) claims that the so-called “learning” is 
“recollection” (73b5), that learning is identical to recollecting. If this is correct, in 
order to “learn” the argument of recollection, Simmias must “recollect” the 
argument, since learning is recollection. Thus, if we adopt μαθεῖν in this passage, 
Simmias must do the recollection. If the RA is correct, Simmias already has 
knowledge of it. Merely listening to the argument and gaining the knowledge of 
                                                        
58 Robins 1997, 438–439. 
59 Dixsaut adopts this reading. She says Heindorf’s correction flattens the text and make 
the irony disappeared (“… mais elle aplatit le texte et en fait disparaître l’ironie”) (Dixsaut 
1991, 345. n.129).    
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recollection as new information will not suffice to persuade him. He must recollect 
it himself and confirm that he already knew it.  
  Considering Simmias’ request, we should note that the dialogue implies 
that the RA must not be just a castle in the sky, but something that Simmias himself 
can experience himself and that he must confirm for himself through the 
recollection. This individual and direct experience seems to be external to the 
discussion. 
 
2. The conditions and examples of recollection 
 
Socrates originates his new version of the RA. In this section, I argue that 
the RA also suggests the internal conditions of an agent of recollection by 
analysing the conditions and examples of recollection. Specifically, I will propose 
that the agent of recollection has the desire to recollect the Forms. In the previous 
section, we find the importance of Simmias’ experience of recollection. If he is to 
truly achieve recollection, he must have the desire as the suggested agent does. 
Simmias serves as a principal example of recollection in the RA. In this sense, it 
must be examined whether Simmias himself can be the agent of recollection.  
This reading prescribes a specific condition for the agent of recollection. 
Therefore, it rejects a reading asserting that the RA demonstrates learning of 
general concepts by everyone (e.g. equality).60 Dominic Scott also rejects such a 
reading. He claims the recollection belongs to philosophical thought and the agent 
of recollection is limited to philosophers.61  I agree with Scott that this recollection 
                                                        
60 Lee Franklin calls this type of reading “ordinary interpretations” (Franklin 2005, 289). 
The following commentators traditionally adopts this reading: Hackforth 1955, 75. Ackrill 
1973, 177. Bostock 1986, 67–68. However, Bostock carefully deals with this problem. He 
understands two possible answers, one is that everyone will know that the equal itself, the 
other is that only a philosopher can know that. He points out several interpretative 
problems in the latter reading and chooses the ordinary interpretation.    
61 Scott 1995, 53–73. Specifically, he claims as follows: “I hope to show that recollection is 
only involved in philosophical thinking, that the ‘we’ are the philosophical earnest and that 
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is not for ordinary people. However, I must also point out an additional aspect in 
the RA. Simmias seems to be a student of mathematics (or a Pythagorean)62  and 
follower of the theory of Forms, therefore, he is not an ordinary person. However, 
he is depicted as not fully understanding recollection and doubting Socrates’ 
argument for the soul’s immortality. Simmias discovers his intellectual ability and 
desire through doing accomplishing recollection. Moreover, he needs to speculate 
whether he can agree with the process of recollection suggested by Socrates 
through practising recollection by himself.  
 
The main argument of recollection is roughly divided into the following parts. 
 
  The conditions and examples of recollection 73c1–74a8 
  The Recollection in the case of equal: 74a9–75a4 
  The relationship between the equal things and the Equal itself (or the 
Equals themselves): 75a5–75b9 
  The demonstration of the pre-existence of the soul 75b10–77a7 
 
Moreover, 73c1–74a8 can be divided into four subsections: 
 
 First Condition of recollection (73c1–4): 
If a person recollects y from x, he knew y before. 
 Second Condition of the Recollection (73c5-d2): 
When a person perceives x, he notices y and knowledge of x and y are 
different. 
 Examples of the Recollection (73d3–74a1) 
 Third and Fourth Conditions (74a2–8): 
                                                        
there is a double origin theory at work in the Phaedo. I shall end by discussing the way in 
which the theory of recollection is epistemologically pessimistic.” (ibid., 54). 
62 He seems to be a student of Philolaus, who was a Pythagorean philosopher (61d6–7). See 
Sedley and Long 2010, xxiii and 47. n.10. 
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Third Condition: Recollection emerges both from similar and dissimilar 
things. 
Fourth Condition: Whenever a person recollects from similar things, he 
considers whether x falls short of y in terms of similarity. 
 
 I analyse these conditions and examples and emphasize the importance of 
intellectual desire in a philosopher. 
 
 2-1. First Condition of recollection 
 
Text 2 
We agree, I take it, that if someone is going to recollect something, he must 
know it at some earlier time. (73c1–3) 
 
This first condition is the most general one that Socrates gives to the idea of 
recollection. Recollection is not obtaining new information. The agent of 
recollection must have known it before. However, if knowing x includes knowing 
y, recollection cannot claim his earlier obtaining of y. Thus, Socrates sets out 
further conditions that specify the recollection in our epistemic acts. 
 
 2-2. Second Condition of recollection 
  
 Socrates establishes the second condition as follows: 
Text 3 
Now do we also agree that whenever knowledge comes in the following 
sort of way, it is recollection? What way do I mean? 63 I’ll tell you. Suppose 
                                                        
63  Socrates’ asking himself such a question might seem strange. Why does he need to ask 
himself what he knows, and is now attempting to tell? Indeed, Gallop suggests a different 
reading of the text following Verdenius: “I mean in some such way as this” (Gallop 1975, 
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someone sees or hears or has some other perception of one thing, and not 
only recognizes that thing, but also comes to think of something else which 
is the object not of the same knowledge but of a different one: aren’t we 
right to say that he recollected this second thing, the one of which he had 
the thought.64   (73c5–d1) 
 
This second condition includes distinctive steps of cognition. When we perceive a 
thing, we do not only recognize the sensible object, but also notice the other object. 
In addition, knowledge of the recognized object is different from that of the noticed 
object. Thus, there are two distinctive steps that begin from perception, namely, 
“to recognize” (γιγνώσκειν) and “to notice” (ἐννοεῖν). The objects of these two 
distinctive kinds of cognition must belong to different kinds of knowledge. The 
recollection must include a transition, both in the form of cognition and the object 
of that cognition. Socrates uses the word “whenever” in considering this condition 
of recollection. If cognition fulfils the condition, we can always call it recollection. 
Thus, it seems a sufficient condition for recollection. However, the meaning of this 
condition is not so clear to Simmias, who consequently asks “what do you mean?” 
(73d2), and Socrates provides some examples.  
 
 2-3. Examples of recollection 
 
Socrates uses the following examples to explain those two kinds of 
cognition and different items of knowledge according to the second condition. 
 
                                                        
20, 229). However, this self-asking rather fits the topic of recollection. Socrates needs to 
check his ideas in his mind by asking himself, recollecting correctly, and then telling it to 
his friend. The correct answer is not always at the front of our minds. Sometimes we need 
to search it within ourselves. 
64 “ἐάν τίς τι ἕτερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο 
γνῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ οὗ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλη, ἆρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο 
δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὗ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἔλαβεν;” (73c7–d1) 
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Example1. The knowledge of a person is different from that of a lyre. (73d3–4). 
When the lovers (οἱ ἐρασταί) of a boy see the lyre that their beloved boy regularly 
used, they experience the following. The lovers see the lyre and the boy’s 
appearance comes to mind. (73d6–10) 
 
Through this example, the second condition appears clearer. In Example 1, they 
use two kinds of cognition: perceiving the lyre and having the beloved boy’s 
appearance in their mind. Furthermore, the lyre and its possessor (the beloved 
boy) belong to different kinds of knowledge; we cannot gather any information 
about the possessor from perceiving the lyre. If someone sees the lyre and imagines 
the strings of the lyre, it is not recollection, because the strings are perceived as the 
lyre is observed, we cannot say that they belong to different kinds of knowledge. 
  These explanations not only clarify what is implied by the first and second 
conditions, but also add a new factor. Socrates states that the lovers have the 
appearance of the beloved boy in their mind from the perception of the lyre. This 
example fits the first two conditions: first, the appearance is not seen directly by 
the agents, and instead is seen in the form of memory. It is possible because the 
lovers knew the beloved boy. Second, seeing the lyre and imagining the boy are 
different both in terms of the contents of information and the epistemic form. The 
lyre and the boy are clearly different kinds of things, and the perception differs 
from the image in the memory. Furthermore, the example defines the subject of 
recollection as the lover, which is a new factor that is not included in the two 
conditions. If someone unconcerned with the boy sees the lyre, he would not 
necessarily recollect the boy. It is more probable that he will recollect, for example, 
his own lyre. We can recollect anything based on our perceptions when we follow 
the first and second conditions.  However, by defining the subject of recollection 
as lovers, Socrates suggests the probability that those people will recollect the 
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specific object, namely, the appearance of the beloved boy.65 In this sense, this 
example does not merely exemplify the conditions; it rather offers a new factor 
that specifies recollection: the subject of recollection has a tendency to recollect a 
specific object because of his love for what he recollects. 
Socrates suggests additional examples of recollection:  
 
(The object of perception) –––> (The object of recollection) 
Example 2. Simmias–––> Cebes (73d10–11) 
Example 3. The picture of the horse and the lyre–––> The picture of the person 
(who possesses them) (73e5–6) 
Example 4. The picture of Simmias–––> Cebes (73e6–7) 
Example 5. The picture of Simmias–––> Simmias himself (73e9–10) 
 
Furthermore, Socrates adds two more conditions: 
 
Third Condition: Recollection “happens from similar things” and “dissimilar 
things” in all of those examples. 66 
                                                        
65 Koike (2007) calls this kind of recollection an erotic linking recollection, positing that the 
agent of recollection has an erotic intention that link the paradeigma (or the absolute) with 
the image (138–142). My idea follows his thought. Koike also seems to see some erotic and 
dynamic power of recollection in the agent. Nightingale also emphasizes the importance 
of erotic desire in understanding the self in Plato’s concept, although she focuses on 
Phaedrus: “In order to attain self-knowledge, in sum, Socrates must not only examine his 
own arguments and actions (as in early dialogues) but also understand the nature of the 
soul and its cosmic peregrinations and transformations. To grasp the nature of the soul, 
Socrates must apprehend its erotic desire for the Forms (and feel this desire in his own 
soul) and also contemplate the Forms themselves” (Nightingale 2010, 23).  
66 “So, in view of all these, doesn’t it follow that recollection happens from similar things, 
but happens from dissimilar things too?” (74a2–3). 
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Fourth Condition: When one recollects something in the case of recollection within 
similar things, it is necessary that he thinks whether that thing falls short of the 
thing that he recollected.67 
 
Considering all the examples, Socrates suggests (in a form of question) that 
recollection happens from both similar and dissimilar things. As far as we see those 
examples, only the Example 5 (The picture of Simmias–––>Simmias himself) can 
belong to recollection from similar things. Recollection of Simmias from his picture 
of Simmias is based upon the similarity between those two objects. Alternatively, 
the other examples emphasize that the catalyst of recollection is the difference 
between the things perceived and the object of recollection.  
  At first glance, Simmias’ picture seems to always provoke people to 
recollect the original (Simmias himself), since the picture was originally created 
for that purpose. However, as Socrates has suggested in the case of recollecting 
Cebes from the picture of Simmias, some might instead recollect Cebes from the 
picture of Simmias. The appearance of Simmias must be provoked once in that 
person who recollect Cebes, yet the direct object of his recollection appears as 
Cebes. Even if the starting point of recollection is the same (the picture of Simmias), 
the direct objects of the recollection can be different for each person (some recollect 
Simmias, others recollect Cebes). Thus, the source of the difference of the objects 
recollected belongs not only to the thing provoking recollection, but also to the 
state of the recollecting person. Socrates’ definition of the agent of recollection as 
“lovers” in the example of recollection of the beloved boy by observing the lyre is 
concordant with this assertion. When people look at the picture of Simmias, some 
                                                        
67 “But whenever it is from similar things that one recollects something, is it not true that 
one inevitably has the following experience as well: that of thinking whether or not in its 
similarity it in some way falls short of the thing one has recollected?” (74a5–7). 
“Ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμιμνῄσκηταί τίς τι, ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε 




may recollect another person, but some may recollect the original of the picture, 
Simmias.68 The latter people are concerned with the original when they look at the 
portrait; in other words, they have a motive to recollect the original.  
The fourth condition––that the agent of recollection necessarily thinks 
shortcomings in the perceptible things––has caused many commentators’ queries. 
Is it really “necessary”(ἀναγκαῖον) that the agent thinks the shortcomings?69 In 
order to make this fourth condition intelligible, we must make some presumptions. 
First, this condition focuses on recollection from similar things, specifically here, 
Simmias’ image or portrait. If the object of perception is a portrait or a copy made 
to resemble the original, the agent will compare the copy with the original.70 
However, it is not necessary that the observer perceives the copy’s shortcomings, 
because, as Socrates suggested, another agent might recollect Cebes from the 
Simmias’ image. Yet, when the agent is eager to have the originals, he tends to see 
everything based on that motivation. As far as he desires for the originals, any 
images of them appear as shortcomings, because images are never identical to their 
originals. If we assume, for the fourth condition, that the agent of recollection is 
                                                        
68 Some people might tend to recollect Simmias because of their love for Simmias, not 
because of love of the original. This interpretation seems to fit the example of recollection 
of the beloved boy from the lyre. However, in the case of a picture, the relationship between 
an original and its copy is also emphasized except the character of Simmias. I think the 
phrase ‘‘Simmias himself’’(not just Simmias) in the Greek texts of Example 5 emphasizes a 
meaning of ‘original’ more than that of a specific person: “οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα 
γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου ἀναμνησθῆναι;” (73e9-10, emphasis mine)  
69 cf. Ackrill 1973, 184–185; Gallop 1975, 118; Bostock 1986, 65. 
70 Dixsaut expresses a different viewpoint. She thinks the example of portrait and the 
original belongs to the case of recollection from similar things. In this case, according to 
Dixsaut, the difference is not evident. Therefore, it might not fulfil the second condition.  
So in order to see the difference, the lack of resemblance must be sought (Dixsaut 1991, 345. 
n.134). Indeed, according to the second condition, the perceived objects and the recollected 
objects must be different. Dixsaut seems to claim that the differences in the case of the 
portrait appear as shortcomings. This interpretation is plausible. However, it is not clear 
yet whether we can use this interpretation in order to explain that necessity. According to 
the second condition, the agent must see differences between the two objects. But can we 
say that the difference necessarily shows shortcomings? I also think that the shortcomings 
originate from the differences. I consider together the role of agent’s love in his recollection 
of the original, which causes shortcomings to appear when comparing the different things. 
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motivated thus, and that only the cases of recollection of originals from copies are 
considered, we would observe a high probability that the agent thinks about 
shortcomings. 71  Such shortcomings can be investigated when there exists a 
standard or original by which to evaluate its copy. After establishing these four 
conditions and asserting the agent of recollection’s motivation, Socrates moves on 
to discuss the example of equality.  
 
 
  2-4. The Recollection in the case of equal 74a9–75a4 
 
  Recollection is investigated through the example of equal things. Socrates 




So, in view of all these, doesn’t it follow that recollection happens from 
similar things, but happens from dissimilar things too? 
Simmias: 
Yes, it does follow.  (74a2–4) 
 
Socrates divides recollection into two kinds; that from similar things and that from 
dissimilar things (the Third Condition). To what does Socrates refer by the 
distinction? This confirmation follows from the examples of recollection, 
recollecting Cebes from the picture of Simmias, and recollecting Simmias himself 
from the picture. We must concede that Simmias’ picture is similar to the original 
(Simmias), and that the picture of Simmias is dissimilar to Cebes. Thus, we can say 
                                                        
71 I must admit that it is not sufficient yet for “being necessary.” I need to weaken the 
meaning of “ἀναγκαῖον.” Rowe comments on this passage as follows: “Whether in such 
cases […] we always, and necessarily, think consciously ‘is this a good likeness?’ seems 
doubtful. But all that the argument will require is that we can do so…” (Rowe 1993, 167). 
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that recollection from similar things refers to the type of recollection of an original 
from its copy.  
  Socrates suggests an additional experience in the case of recollection from 




But whenever it is from similar things that one recollects something, is it 
not true that one inevitably has the following experience as well: that of 
thinking whether or not in its similarity it in some way falls short of the 
thing one has recollected.” 
Simmias: 
‘Yes, inevitably,’ he said.’’ (74a5–8) 
 
In the case of recollection from similar things, it follows necessarily that we 
consider whether the things by which we recollect something has some 
shortcomings with respect to its similarity to what is recollected. Indeed, when we 
see Simmias’ picture, we would expect to be aware of the picture’s shortcomings 
in its similarity to Simmias himself, since any picture cannot be perfect as far as it 
is a copy of its original. Confirming this additional experience in recollection from 




‘Consider then,’ said he, ’if this is the case. We say, I take it, that there is an 
Equal––I don’t mean a stick equal to another stick, or a stone equal to a 
stone, or anything else of the kind, but something else besides all these, the 




‘Indeed we should,’ said Simmias, ‘emphatically so!’ (74a9–b1) 
 
Socrates introduces the Equal itself which scholars also refer to as the Form of 
Equal.72 The term “the Equal itself” is not the same kind of equality as that found 
in equal sticks, stones or other such things. The Equal itself is something else 
besides all the equal things. We can say that the Equal itself is different from the 
equal things, and difference is the criterion in the second condition of recollection; 
thus it seems that Socrates asserts this case in order to fulfill the condition as a 
recollection. In the following short question and answer session (74b1–2), Socrates 
and Simmias admit that “we” know what the Equal itself is. This agreement 
addresses to the first condition, which asserts that we must know the object of the 
recollection when we recollect something.  
  Socrates then explains the difference between the Equal itself and the equal 
things in the following sentences, requiring us to consider the Greek texts because 





Having got the knowledge of it from where? Wasn’t it from the things we 
were just mentioning? Upon seeing that either sticks or stones or some 
other things were equal, wasn’t it from them that we came to think of it, 
different as it is from them? Or doesn’t it appear different to you? Consider 
it in this way as well. Don’t equal stones and sticks sometimes, despite 
being the same ones, appear at one time equal, at another not?” 
Simmias: 
Certainly (74b4–10, emphasis mine) 
 
                                                        




Well, have the Equals themselves ever appeared to you unequal, or has 
equality ever appeared as inequality? 
Simmias: 
No, not yet any rate, Socrates. (74c1–3, emphasis mine) 
 
Greek texts of Text 7 
Socrates 
Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, 
ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἄττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο 
ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἕτερον ὂν τούτων; ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ 
καὶ τῇδε. ἆρ᾽ οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα 
φαίνεται, τῷ δ᾽ οὔ; 
Simmias 
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. (74b4–10, emphasis mine) 
 
Socrates: 
Τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης; 
Simmias: 
Οὐδεπώποτέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. (74c1–3, emphasis mine)  
 
The reason that the difference emerges is that equal things can be unequal in some 
conditions but the Equals themselves never appear to be unequal. However, we 
must confront one of the most problematic texts in Phaedo in order to clarify the 
conditions. The sentence I have emphasized in Text 7 have two different possible 
readings. The Oxford Classical Text adopts the manuscript β, and the texts are 
suggested as (a) “τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ᾽ οὔ” (74b8). However, manuscripts T, 
W, P, Q, and Λ suggests the text as (b) “τότε ἴσα φαίνεται, τότε  δ᾽ οὔ.” 
If we adopt the first text (a), there are two possible readings: 
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The first reading, (a)-1, asserts that equal stones and sticks, while remaining the 
same, appear to one person to be equal and to another person to be unequal (τῷ as 
a masculine personal pronoun). 73  
The second reading, (a)-2, asserts that equal stones and sticks, while remaining the 
same, appear to be equal to one thing and not-equal to the other thing (τῷ as neuter 
pronoun). 74 
 
Conversely, adopting text (b) offers one reading: 
(b): equal stones and sticks, while remaining the same, appear to be equal at one 
time and unequal at another (Replacing τῷ with τότε, sometime or at that time).75 
 
All of the readings are grammatically possible and are supported in the 
manuscripts. In the passages above, Socrates also explains the characteristic of the 
Equals themselves to which those of the perceptible things are compared. Through 
the comparison, the difference between them is suggested. The text shows, in a 
very short sentence, that the Equals themselves “never” appear to be unequal. 
Considering the contrast between the equal things and the Equals 
themselves, I claim that the third reading (b) is the most apt. First, I suggest that 
there are problems in the first reading, (a)-1, which presumes different observers 
of the sensible things. Considering that the Equals themselves never appeared to 
be unequal for Simmias, he is fixed as the observer of the characteristics of the 
Equal themselves. Conversely, in the statements of the characteristic of sensible 
things, at first glance, Socrates does not seem to mention “you,” namely, Simmias. 
However, Socrates begins this question by asking, “Or doesn’t it appear different 
to you?’’ (74b6–7) Then, when describing both kinds of characteristics, Socrates 
supposes that Simmias is a fixed observer of the characteristics. Moreover, in the 
reading (a)-1, a significant problem arises when contrasting the sensible things and 
                                                        
73 Grube adopts this reading in his translation of Phaedo. Plato Complete Works. 
74 Rowe 1993, 169. 
75 Sedley 2007, 78–9. 
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the Form. If the characteristic of the sensible things is in disagreement amongst the 
observers of the property, the characteristic of the Form should also be evaluated 
using the same standard. That is, ‘everyone’ must unanimously admit that the 
Form of Equal never appears unequal in order to make a contrast. How is it, then, 
that Simmias alone can represent the unanimous agreement?76 It is possible that he 
just represents the one view of the opposing appearances of the sensible equal 
things.  
  Reading (a)-2 does not have the critical problem found in (a)-1, which 
causes the contrast to malfunction. Some sticks seem to be equal and unequal 
depending on the length of the sticks to which they are compared. However, as 
David Sedley notes, there is a different problem in the reading (a)-2.77 When we 
say “equal sticks” or “equal stones,” we assume that (at least) two sticks are equal 
to one another. If someone compares these equal sticks to additional items, the 
equality within the set still remains. The further item can be equal or unequal to 
each set of sticks, but their primary equality to one another does not cease.   
Considering these defects, readings (a)-1 and (a)-2 should be rejected. 
Reading (b) has an advantage concerning this contrast. In terms of the 
characteristics of the Equals themselves, Socrates clearly asks Simmias whether the 
Equals themselves “ever” (ὅτε) appear as unequal, and Simmias answers, “No not 
yet at any rate” (οὐδεπώποτέ). Socrates’ central point is the possibility of an 
occasion in which the Form accepts being its opposite. If we adopt reading (b), we 
can see a clear contrast: the sensible equal things sometimes appear to be equal and 
sometimes unequal, changing their properties in each occasion, which reveals their 
lack of stability. Conversely, the Equals themselves “never” appear to be unequal. 
                                                        
76 Sedley has already pointed out the similar problem (Sedley 2007, 78). 
77 Sedley 2007, 76. 
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It should be noted that Socrates asks about Simmias’ own observations of 
the characteristics of the sensible things and the Form in Text 7.78 Simmias certainly 
has seen that the equal sticks and stones easily can appear as unequal. However, 
the Equals themselves never appear to him to be unequal. This contrast between 
the sensible things and the Form is understood exactly in Simmias’ thought, not 
just as an objective theory. Based on his own admission, Simmias understands the 
difference between them. Yet, although that admission includes personal 
commitment, the stability of the Equals themselves is not just experiential. 
Simmias and other people can be persuaded objectively that Simmias will never 
experience the Equal itself appearing unequal, because such an occasion would 
demolish the definition of the Equal itself. It is like assuming a spherical triangle: 
even if we draw millions of triangles, we will never see a spherical one. 
Moreover, there have been controversies about the Equals themselves. 
Why does this argument describe them in the plural form?  The Just itself, the Good 
itself and the Beauty itself are introduced as the targets of a philosopher’s search 
(65d4–d7); the Equal itself should be considered on par with these entities. Indeed, 
within this RA, Socrates says that the argument is concerned with the Equal itself, 
the Beauty itself, the Just itself and the Piety itself (75c10–d2). In the passage at 
75c10–d2, each of these entities is described in the singular form. Therefore, the 
plural form of the Equals themselves at 74c1 is conspicuous.  
Some scholars think that this plural term indicates some special entity 
which is distinguished from the Form; for example, the mathematical objects 
(Burnet, Hackforth), 79  and the immanent forms or Form copies, which is 
introduced in the later argument of Phaedo (Bluck).80 However, Socrates does not 
                                                        
78 “Having got the knowledge of it from where? Wasn't it from the things we were just 
mentioning? Upon seeing that either sticks or stones or some other things were equal, 
wasn’t it from them that we came to think of it, different as it is from them? Or doesn’t it 
appear different to you?” (74b4–7). “Well, have the Equals themselves ever appeared to 
you unequal, or has equality ever appeared as inequality?” (74c1–2) 
79 Burnet 1911, 56. Hackforth 1955, 69.  
80 Bluck 1959, 5–11. 
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hint at introducing such new concepts in his compressed argument here. We 
should focus on the point he clearly expresses in the RA, which is Simmias’ 
experience of thinking about the difference. Simmias has certainly seen many 
equal things, for example, equal sticks, stones and so on, as Socrates suggests. 
Simmias might recollect the Equal itself on each occasion. However, these 
occasions have never shown him that the Equal itself appeared unequal and they 
will never do so. Thus, following Kurihara’s claim, I think this plurality of 
experience or occasion is best described in the plural form.81 The term “the Equals 
themselves” refers to the examples of the Equal itself which have been recollected 
from equal sticks, stones and other things. The Equal themselves are found in 
plural cases, sticks, stones and so on. However, on each occasion, they recollect the 
Form itself that can never be unequal. The metaphysical status of the Equals 
themselves is not different from that of the Equal itself, because the Equals 
themselves still belong to the kind of the Form. However, Socrates asks Simmias’ 
experiences to consider the Form, then, that context depicts “the Equals themselves” 
in the plural form.     
Socrates and Simmias have confirmed the difference between the sensible 
equal things and the Equal itself, but they have also admitted that the knowledge 
of Form comes from the sensible things: “‘But still,’ he said, ‘it’s from these equal 
things, though they are different from that Equal, that you have nonetheless 
thought of and got the knowledge of it?’” (74c7–9).  
They move to the next step, in which they discuss the deficiencies of the 
sensible things. Socrates suggests that they see shortcomings in the sensible equal 




                                                        
81 This interpretation follows Kurihara’s idea (Kurihara 2013, 142).  
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‘Well then,’ he said, ‘do we experience something like the following as 
regards what happens in the case of sticks and, more generally, the equal 
things we just mentioned?  Do they seem to us to be equal in the same 
manner as what Equal itself is? Alternatively, do they in some way fall 
short of it when it comes to being like the Equal? Or in no way?’ 
Simmias: 
‘They  fall far short,’ said Simmias. (74d4–8) 
 
In what way do they agree on the shortcomings? This is not clear from a literal 
reading of the text. This argument regarding the shortcomings immediately 
follows Socrates’ clarification of the differences between two kinds of equality 
(equal things and the Equal itself). Thus, as Nakagawa suggests, we should find 
the reason for the shortcomings in the argument about the difference.82 As we have 
already seen, Socrates says that equal things appear to be equal sometimes, but at 
other times they appear to be unequal. Conversely, the Equals themselves never 
appear to be unequal. In that sense, the equal things lack the stability to maintain 
their equality. As we see in Text 7, the equal things can easily become unequal. 
Furthermore, they depend on the Form of Equal for being equal (this point is not 
discussed in the RA. We will examine this causality in Chapter 5 of this thesis that 
analyses the Final Argument of Phaedo). 
  Socrates depicts the thought in the mind of the person who find the 
shortcomings. It shows a kind of inner subjective speaking about the relationship 





                                                        
82 Nakagawa 2000, 61. 
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Now do we agree that whenever someone, upon seeing something, thinks 
“What I am now seeing wants to be like some other real thing, but falls 
short and can’t be like it, and instead is inferior”, the person who thinks 
this must presumably have actually known beforehand the thing he says it 
resembles but fall short of? 
Simmias: 
Yes, he must. (74d9-e6, emphasis mine) 
 
Socrates: 
Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο 
ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται 
τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν 
τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησιν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι 
μέν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν; 
Simmias 
Ἀνάγκη. (74d9-e6, emphasis mine) 
 
  In this statement, Plato remarkably depicts a subjective thought or inner 
discourse in a person. This person thinks or realizes the shortcomings by himself, 
and he knows beforehand the Equal itself. This recognition of the shortcomings is 
the touchstone for deciding whether that person had prior knowledge of the Form.  
Christopher Gill interprets internal dialogues or monologues in Greek 
thought from the “objective-participant view”: 83  the monologues of heroes in 
Homeric works (i.e. those of Achilles and Hector) are presented as means-end 
deliberation.84 They are not concerned about self-awareness nor “I” as the locus of 
self-awareness, as Cartesian thought suggests. 85  Gill also reads the internal 
dialogue of the soul in the Republic from the objective-participant view point. He 
                                                        
83 Gill 1996, 59. 
84 Ibid., 53–55. 
85 Ibid., 58. 
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claims “… the Republic, as we have seen, presents intrapsychic activity as an 
internal dialogue: one part (or the person himself) ‘rules’ or ‘persuades’ other parts, 
which do or do not ‘agree’ with this rule. As elsewhere (in Homer as well as Greek 
philosophy), there is no reason to take this as indicating the (quasi-Cartesian) 
assumption that all intrapsychic activity is accompanied by a conscious inner 
dialogue.” 86 Therefore, Gill will not admit that the fact there is a monologue here 
is an evidence of a subjective aspect in Phaedo.  
However, in this text, it is important that Simmias admits that the agent of 
recollection thinks “What I am now seeing wants to be like some other real thing” 
(74d9–10), because this passage is a part of the demonstration of recollection that 
supports for the immortality of the soul. If Simmias is concerned about his own 
soul’s immortality, he must seriously consider whether he is really persuaded that 
he himself does have such a thought process in recollection. This is a specific 
context in Phaedo that is different from that of the Republic, although death and 
immortality can be an absolute topic for any human beings. It is important in this 
passage that Simmias considers whether the process in the agent of recollection is 
applied to Simmias himself. Simmias himself, as we have already seen in Section 
1 in this chapter, wants to experience recollection. The recognition of that what ‘I’ 
see “wants to be some other real thing” is also a necessary experience for him if he 
is to thoroughly experience recollection. 
  Moreover, it is important to note here that this discourse subtly introduces 
an important additional point that the perceptible thing “wants to be” 
(βούλεται...εἶναι) like the Form (or the real thing). Socrates continuously 
addresses this willingness in the following concluding passage about the pre-




                                                        
86 Ibid., 252–253.  
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In that case, we must have known the Equal before the time when we first, 
upon seeing equal things, came to think: “All these are seeking to be like 
the Equal, but fall short of it.” (74e9–75a3, emphasis mine) 
 
Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου ὅτε τὸ 
πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα 
εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως. (74e8–75a3, emphasis mine) 
 
  Socrates states that all equal things are “seeking to be like the Equal” 
(ὀρέγεται...εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον). In the previous argument, Socrates demonstrates 
the difference between the equal things and the Equals themselves, based on which 
he also suggests that the agent of recollection finds their shortcomings as 
compared to the Equal itself. We find that Socrates develops his argument about 
the relationship between the sensible things and the Form (or the object of 
recollection), through three steps: 1. Awareness of the difference between the 
sensible things and the Form. 2. Awareness of the shortcomings in the sensible 
things; and 3. Awareness of the willingness in the sensible things. However, the 
shortcomings do not necessarily suggest that kind of willingness. We can say that 
three is inferior to four by one, but cannot say that three is necessarily seeking to 
be four. Therefore, there must exist an implicit thought connecting the 
shortcomings and the willingness. How should we understand this willingness?  
 
3. The willingness of sensible things to be the Form 
 
Socrates explains the relationship between the perceptible things and the 






Then before we started seeing and hearing and using the other senses we 
presumably must in fact have possessed knowledge of what the Equal itself 
is, if we were going to refer perceived equals to it, thinking that all such 
things are eager to be like it but they are inferior to that. 87  (75b4–8, 
emphasis mine) 
Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τἆλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι 
τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὅτι ἔστιν, εἰ 
ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται 
μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ᾽ εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα. (75b4-
8, emphasis mine) 
 
What does it mean that the equal things are “eager to be” (προθυμεῖται… εἶναι) 
the Equal itself? Can things have such eagerness? There are at least three 
interpretations:  
 
1. The dynamic kinship between the sensible things and the Form in the cosmic 
structure (D. White). White says as follows:  
 
One answer, which must remain speculative at this point, is that if all 
sensible things are either alive or, if not alive, exist in relation to something 
fundamental that is living. If, that is, all things exist and interact with one 
                                                        
87 In terms of only Text 11, I follow Sedley’s translation in 2006, which applies “thinking” 
(he probably applies the participle of ἐννοεῖν [to think]) before ὅτι (that) at 75b7 (Sedley 
2006, 323). Franklin reads ὅτι as ‘because’ without adding any verb (Franklin 2005, 312). In 
this translation, the agent of recollection does not need to consciously compare those two 
kind of existence. The content in the ὅτι clause is the conclusion of “the philosophical 
discussion in which Socrates and Simmias compared sensible equals and Equality.” (ibid., 
313). However, even considering Frankiln’s claim, I retain my reading emphasizing the 
importance of recognition of the shortcomings, because I also claim the importance of 
Simmias’ own practice of recollection. As far as Simmias compares two kinds of equality 
following Socrates arguments, Simmias recognizes shortcomings in the sensible things in 
his experience of recollection.    
78 
 
another because of cosmic mind (nous), then all sensible things “strive” to 
reach a level of being––the Forms––which is much closer to the source of 
all activity––nous––than that occupied by the sensible things themselves. 88 
 
2. Description of tendency of things (Burnet) 
 
Burnet comments on the Greek word “wants to be” (βούλεται...εἶναι) at 74d10, as 
the phrase used to express a tendency.89 Furthermore, he sees ὀρέγεται at 75a2 as 
equivalent to βούλεται.90 In terms of προθυμεῖται, he says that it is “‘do their best,’ 
a still more picturesque way of expressing tendency than βούλεται and ὀρέγεται 
above.” 91 
 
3. The striving resides in the purposive agent in the case of geometry and portrait-
painting (D. Sedley)92 
 
Thus, there are two general directions taken in the interpretation of the words that 
suggest things’ willingness. The first and second options attribute the cause of the 
willingness to the perceptible things: the first option, in particular, more positively 
admits the idea of a universal cosmic structure, based on which the sensible things 
have dynamism to strive to be the Form. The second option also admits that things 
has tendency to be the Forms, although this option determines the cause of the 
things’ tendency less than the first option does so. On the other hand, the third 
option attributes this willingness to the agent’s intention in recollection.   
                                                        
88 White 1989, 93. 
89 Burnet 1911, 57. 
90 Ibid., 57. 
91 Ibid., 58. C. J Rowe also seems to take this interpretation. He understands προθυμεῖται 
as a variation of βούλεται at 74d10. He translates βούλεται as “‘aims to be’, i.e. ‘tends 
towards being’” (Rowe 1993, 172). 
92 Sedley 2006, 325–326. 
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The first and second options do not seem to correctly follow the context of 
Phaedo. In this RA, Socrates does not definitively address the cosmic structure that 
shows that sensible things want to be the Form, although, in the later part of Phaedo, 
he does suggest his ideal cosmology by criticizing the causal theories of natural 
science, including that of Anaxagoras (97d–99c). That cosmology should explain 
every phenomenon based on the idea of Goodness: “… they do not suppose for a 
moment that what is good and binding truly does bind and keep anything together” 
(99c5–6). However the theory that Goodness organizes everything is not 
necessarily identical to the claim that individual perceptible things want to be the 
Form. It is possible that the whole of universe is organized to be “good” while the 
individual, perceptible parts remain in an unstable condition without aiming to be 
good.  
The second option seems to be a slightly weaker claim compared to the first 
because it does not consider the theory of cosmology that is not mentioned in the 
RA. However, do equal things really strive to be the Equal itself? Socrates explains 
in detail that the core concept distinguishing sensible things from the Form is that 
equal things easily appear as unequal. 
  The third option has an advantage when we review the passages in which 
the words suggesting the willingness are placed (Texts 9, 10, and 11). The phrase 
“wants to be” (βούλεται...εἶναι)  at 74d10 in Text 9, “seek for being”(ὀρέγεται) at 
75a2 in Text 10, “strive to be” (προθυμεῖται… εἶναι) at 75b7 in Text 11 are all 
placed inside the conjunctive ὅτι-clauses, and thus all of the clauses are the objects 
of the verb “to think.” Therefore, those kinds of willingness are captured in the 
agent of recollection’s thought. When we consider the insufficiency of things, those 
things seem to us to be willing to be the Form. Our comparison makes them appear 
to have willingness in our thought. Considering that, the third option appears 
most appropriate in the contexts of this argument.93  
                                                        
93 Sedley emphasizes the fact that Plato uses the equal: “As I have emphasized, because 
equality functions for him as a size relation, geometry is the most obvious discipline in 
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However, one problem still remains. If we attribute the willingness to the 
agent, why does the dialogue depict the things in a way that they ‘want’ to be 
something? We might be able to consider the problem in this way: the willingness 
cannot emerge without the intention of the agent.  However, in the context that the 
agent investigates the recollection through the sensible things and the Form, he 
finds his own intention in their appearance. In other words, the cause of 
willingness is in the agent, but that willingness appears in the form of the 
relationship between the sensible things and the Forms. To use an analogy, the 
agent is a kind of projector and finds his own intellectual function and willingness 
to acquire the knowledge through the appearance of the things and the Form on 
the screen. In this sense, the agent clearly recognizes his own intellectual function 
and desire for knowing the Forms. The shortcomings of sensible things will appear 
vividly to one who espouses the Forms, revealing his own intellectual desire in a 
more persuasive way. As far as Simmias is an enthusiastic follower of the theory 
of Forms, this revelation would be persuasive to Simmias. I assert that this 
depiction of willingness suggests a conglomerate emergence of the insufficiency 
of the sensible things and the agent’s intellectual desire for knowing the Forms. 
Both the insufficiency and the agent’s desire can emerge individually. The sensible 
equal things usually lose their property of being equal, and a philosopher 
enthusiastically wants to know the Form. Recollection is a peculiar occasion in 
which the insufficiency of sensible things and the philosophical desire for the 
Forms can emerge at the same time in a philosopher or a candidate for the 
philosopher. 
 
4. What of our souls exists before we are born? 
––The immortality of the soul as demonstrated in the RA–– 
                                                        
which it would be studied” (Sedley 2006, 325). He also says as follows: “The reason why 
‘striving to be like’ makes sense in a context like geometry as well as in portrait-painting is 
that in both alike the striving resides in a purposive agent, working with or on a would-be 




Socrates continues demonstrating the immortality of the soul after 
confirming the conditions of recollection, the difference between the sensible 
things and the Forms, and the shortcomings of the things. First, Socrates suggests 
the prenatal acquisition of the knowledge of the Forms based on the fact that we 
perceived things from the moment that we were born. From the first condition, the 
object of recollection must be acquired before the perception. Therefore, according 
to Socrates, “it seems that we must have got it [the knowledge of equal] before we 
were born” (75c1–2). 
Here, Socrates seems to indicate a pre-existence of intellectual function 
within the soul that is independent from the body. However, he does not conclude 
the argument here, but instead expands upon it.  We must have acquired not only 
the knowledge of the Equal itself but also that of all of the Forms, the Beauty, the 
Good, and the Just itself. 
  In terms of these Forms, Socrates suggests a question with two choices:   
 
Alternative I. If we have not forgotten the knowledge after having obtained it, we 
must be always knowing it and must know it throughout our life. (75d7–e1) 
Alternative II. If we have acquired the knowledge and lost it when we are born, 
but later acquire the knowledge of the Forms, restoring our own knowledge would 
be what we call learning. That restoring is called as recollecting. (75e2–8) 
 
Simmias cannot choose one of these alternatives by himself. Socrates says that if 
we know things, we can offer an “account” (logos) of those things (76b8–9). But 
Simmias wonders whether he will have anyone capable of doing so “tomorrow” 94 
(76b11), he does not think that everyone knows the Forms. Socrates and Simmias 
choose the alternative II, and agree that our souls acquire the knowledge before 
human beings are born (76c6–10). Socrates then reaches a conclusion: 
                                                        





In that case, Simmias, our souls existed earlier as well, separate from bodies, 
before they were in human form, and they had wisdom. (76c11–12) 
Ἦσαν ἄρα, ὦ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου 
εἴδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον. (76c11–12) 
 
Why does Socrates suggest choosing between the alternatives to reach this 
conclusion, although he seems to have already demonstrated the existence of the 
prenatal knowledge at 75c1? In other words, what is the significance of the 
supposition that the knowledge has been forgotten? I think there are two 
important points in this conclusion which suggest that it is more than merely a 
demonstration of the existence of prenatal knowledge.  
First, Socrates’ conclusion is not concerned only with the immortality of the 
soul. It suggests that the soul exists before the body and has wisdom (phronesis) 
separate from the body. Phronesis appears 11 times before the RA in Phaedo.95 Ten 
of those cases appear in the part of Socrates’ Defence of Death (63e8–69e4), and the 
11th is in Cebes’ demand for proof that the soul is immortal and has “some power 
and wisdom” (70b3-4). In the Defence of Death, phronesis is clearly a target for 
philosophers. Moreover, Cebes needs both the immortality and wisdom of the soul 
in order to defend Socrates’ initial claim that death is good for human beings. 
Therefore, their mission to demonstrate the soul’s immortality cannot suggest only 
the continual existence of the soul, but it must show that the soul itself can 
originally have its own intellectual ability independently from the body. The 
argument of forgetting shows us that our having physical bodies deteriorates the 
soul’s original abilities. In this context, the argument about forgetting teaches us 
that we had wisdom which we have lost, but that we should improve ourselves in 
order to eventually obtain wisdom after death. 
                                                        
95 Phaedo 65a9, 66a6, 66e3, 68a2, 68a7, 68b4, 69a10, 69b3, 69b6, 69c2, 70b4.  
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The second point is that this conclusion distinguishes the soul from us or 
the human being, which is closely connected with the first point.96 The soul itself 
differs from a human being, since it existed prior to entering into a human form. 
Thus “we” lack some innate ability, and forget the knowledge of the Form by 
gaining the body. It is through recollection that we become aware that our original 
soul is distinguished from our current disposition, and we are forced to improve 
ourselves or separate some part of us from another. The argument of forgetting is 
beneficial to promoting such self-awareness and self-improvement. 
Simmias yet again objects to this conclusion regarding the existence of 
prenatal knowledge: 
 
Text 13  
Unless, perhaps, we get these items of knowledge at the time when we are 
being born, Socrates––that time is still left. (76c13–14) 
  
Socrates rebuts Simmias’ argument by stating that “Well, my friend, in what other 
time do we lose them? Because of course we are not born with them in our grasp, 
as we just agreed.” (76d1–3): if they admit Simmias’ suggestion, they cannot see in 
what time the soul loses knowledge. So Socrates inquires as follows: “Or do we 
lose them at the very time when we get them? Or can you tell me some other time?” 
(76d3–4). Simmias answers, “Not at all, Socrates––I didn’t notice that there was 
nothing in what I was saying.” (76d5–6). However, he could cling to the former 
option. 97 For example, he can claim that we receive the knowledge at the moment 
of birth, and immediately forget it. We can recollect it after the forgetting. This 
claim is still possible. However, as Socrates says, it is still troublesome to explain 
the manner by which we forget the knowledge. Socrates attributes this to birth, 
                                                        
96 Dorter correctly claims that there is a sharp distinction between us and our souls (Dorter 
1982, 63).  




namely, soul’s coming into the body. This accusation against the body coincides 
with the statements of the disturbance of the body that are suggested repeatedly 
within the discussions both in RA and the Defence of Death. Thus, the argument 
of forgetting is required to enable Simmias to re-acknowledge the detrimental 
effects of the body and the original intellectual ability of the soul.  
 
Conclusion of Chapter 2 
 
The RA offers the interlocutor remarkable self-awareness. Simmias 
recognizes his soul’s intellectual ability and desire to know the Forms. This 
recognition is as important as the demonstration of soul’s immortality. That point 
is also supported by the RA’s introduction in which Simmias says that he wants to 
experience recollection: it is thus implicitly inquired of him as to whether he agrees 
with the process of recollection. Socrates also mentions the love in the agent of 
recollection when he establishes the conditions and examples of recollection. The 
agent’s desire is presupposed in recollection of the Forms from sensible things.  
Socrates also describes an occasion where the agent recognizes the 
shortcomings of perceptible things, which is remarkably expressed in a form of 
internal dialogue. As I argue in this chapter, that internal dialogues suggest the 
agent’s self-awareness of the shortcomings. This point is emphasized by Socrates’ 
use of the word ‘I’ (ἐγώ) in the passage. This recognition is also depicted in the line 
of thought asserting that sensible things want to be the Forms. I argue that this 
willingness should be understood as belonging to the agent of recollection. In these 
ways, the process of recollection suggested by Socrates requires the agent’s desire 
for knowing the Forms.  
The conclusion of the RA shows Simmias both the soul’s original 
intellectual ability and the body’s disturbance of it. If Simmias experiences 
recollection and agrees with the argument, he must also admit that he himself has 
the intellectual desire and ability in his soul. Self-discovery of one’s own soul’s 
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intellectual desire has an indispensable element in the RA. Simmias is required to 
have that desire. Through his experience of recollection, Simmias is prompted to 




Chapter 3. The Encouragement of Self-improvement in the Affinity Argument 
(78b4–84b7) 
 
Introduction to Chapter 3 
 
We have seen in the Recollection Argument (RA) that the philosopher has 
a peculiar intellectual desire, and that the interlocutor Simmias actually 
experiences recollection and recognizes the desire. The RA is also persuasive to the 
interlocutors as a demonstration of the soul’s prenatal existence. However, as they 
point out, the argument does not show the soul’s post-mortem existence. Socrates 
sees their fear of soul’s dissipation after leaving the body, and offers the Affinity 
Argument (hereafter shortened to AA) in reply to the interlocutors. The AA posits 
the immortality of the soul based on its similarity to divine and indestructible 
existence. Some scholars have pointed out that similarity is not enough to connect 
the soul and immortality.98 Even if the soul is similar to divine existence, this does 
not necessarily ensure its immortality.  
In this chapter, I argue that the AA is not simply a demonstration of the 
soul’s immortality, but rather entails a pursuit of the essential characteristics of the 
soul and an encouragement of the interlocutor’s self-improvement. The 
interlocutors are required to make their soul’s conditions to be the essential 
characteristics. Furthermore, the AA also suggests recognition of distance between 
the characteristics and one’s own actual conditions.99 Namely, it establishes the 
ideal conditions of the soul and shows that the soul can be either good or bad 
depending on how it makes use of its intellectual ability and manages the body. 
                                                        
98 Rowe 1991, 165. Elton claims that the Affinity Argument is “to illustrate the pitfalls of 
analogical reasoning” (1997, 316). On the other hand, Apolloni claims that the Affinity 
Argument is a “deductive argument whose conclusion follows from its premises-premises 
whose truth Plato would have thought he had established” (Apolloni 1996, 7).  
99 In this sense, I also agree with Robins’ interpretation of the AA that emphasizes ‘‘the 
reflections of philosophers on the goals of the philosophy and the differences the pursuit 
of philosophy has made to the souls.’’ (Robins 2003, 1).  
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Thus, the success of the AA depends on agreement about the soul’s essential 
characteristics and on responding to that encouragement. In that sense, we should 
not underestimate the AA simply because of its weakness as a demonstration. 
Through the AA, Socrates and his interlocutors are trying to find better conditions 
of their soul. Immortality, however, is not the exclusive main topic in the AA.  
In considering self-improvement, we also notice another peculiarity of the 
AA compared with the RA and the Defence of Death (DD). This argument is 
concerned with the soul’s conditions after death. Even after death, according to the 
latter argument in the AA, the bodily habit clings to the soul, which makes it fall 
down to the earth (81d6–e4). If a philosopher has made his soul to be alone by itself, 
his soul would go to the divine realm (81a4–10). On the other hand, the RA and 
the DD are mainly concerned with the state of the soul and body before death. The 
soul’s good and bad conditions after death are considered as a focal topic in the 
AA. 
Socrates’ encouragement of self-improvement presents another 
fundamental problem concerning the objective of this argument, which is 
concerned with the general topic of this thesis, self-discovery: what is the soul of 
which Socrates attempts to offer the essential characteristics? Is that soul identical 
to the soul of Socrates and his interlocutors? According to Socrates, the purified, 
immortal soul is separated from the body and bodily functions, even though many 
people might tend to think of specific or personal emotion and memory as essential 
to life.100 However, the difference between the purified soul and the individual is 
not problematic to the AA, because Socrates recognizes the difference between the 
two, and thus proposes a way by which a person can make his soul close to that 
purified soul. In other words, Socrates encourages the interlocutor to agree that 
the purified soul should be their true soul. However, this process is not easy, 
because no precise definition of the soul is shared among Socrates and the 
interlocutors. They must start by examining themselves, in whom the soul and 
                                                        
100 cf. Bostock 1986, 35-39. 
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body are combined. As we have already seen in Chapters 1 and 2, they evaluate 
the soul’s good conditions in the DD and the RA according to their goal of 
obtaining wisdom. This direction is retained in the AA, but the argument also 
states more ontological characteristics of the soul. The AA suggests a division of 
existence between the ousia that is always the same and particulars that always 
suffer change. The soul’s good or purified conditions make it close to the divine 
and eternal existence; and moreover, the soul’s good or bad conditions acquired in 
this life affect the soul even after death. The soul’s conditions determine where the 
soul goes after leaving the body. In this sense, the AA also attempts to show the 
soul in a wider perspective than those in the DD and RA. 101   
In this chapter, I will first address the peculiar introduction to the AA 
(77b1–78b3), which suggests that those present need to chant away their childish 
fear of the soul’s dissipation. This section reveals that the AA needs to improve the 
interlocutors’ disposition. The demonstration of soul’s immortality is not the only 
mission of the AA. Second, I focus on Socrates’ division of existence and the 
detailed description of the soul’s characteristics (78b4–80c1). He establishes a 
division between ousia and particulars, in which he considers the soul’s position. 
He suggests an ideal state of the soul, which also accords with essential 
characteristics found in the ousia. He also offers a way of transforming the souls 
into the ideal purified ones. When the soul considers the Form alone by itself, that 
intellectual act also improves the soul’s conditions. Third, I examine Socrates’ 
statements that the soul goes to different realms depending on its way of living. A 
purified soul goes to the divine realm, while a polluted soul goes back again to the 
earth. This story explains two things: (1) the soul’s conditions in this world affects 
itself even after death; (2) based on the first claim, Socrates encourages the 
interlocutors to separate their soul from the body. Fourth, I analyse philosophy’s 
encouragement of the soul’s separation. Lovers of learning are “aware of” the 
                                                        
101  I agree with Woolf’s following evaluation of the Affinity Argument:  The Affinity 
Argument is “after all, the only one of the arguments for immortality in the Phaedo aimed 
at showing how the soul may commune with Forms after death.’’ (Woolf 2004, 118. n.38.) 
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encouragement of “philosophy” (82d9–83b3). This “philosophy” affects the soul 
as if it were another entity. Thus, it seems that the soul needs some aid to improve 
itself. However, it is not clear whether that philosophy is a kind of internal love of 
wisdom or an opportunity liberating the soul from outside. I think it important 
that Socrates defines those who recognize that encouragement as “the lovers of 
learning” (82d9). Moreover, we will also see that the philosopher’s soul judges a 
good life by itself after receiving philosophy’s liberation. 
The purpose of the AA is wider than simply to offer a theory of the soul’s 
immortality, since it also appears to encourage the interlocutors to improve 
themselves in line with Socrates’ suggestion. Furthermore, we see that Socrates 
depicts the philosophers’ self-recognition of goodness of their soul’s separation. 
  
1. Introduction to the AA (77d–78b) 
 
 After the Recollection Argument (RA), both Simmias and Cebes are 
concerned that it has not yet been demonstrated that their souls will exist after they 
have died (77b10–c5). This is because the RA suggests only that their souls existed 
before birth. However, Socrates contends that the existence of the soul after death 
has already been implied by the combination of the RA with the Cyclical 
Argument (CA) (70c–72d) in which they agree that “living people have come to be 
from the dead no less than dead people from the living.” (72a4–6). Socrates 
observes that they want to examine the argument because they have childish fear: 
that the wind dissipates the soul when the soul leaves the body: 
 
Text 1  
So what you both mention has been proved already. But none the less I 
think that both you and Simmias would gladly persevere with this 
argument too even more thoroughly, and that you fear what children fear–
–namely that what really happens is that when the soul leaves the body the 
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wind blows it apart and dissipates it, especially when someone happens to 
die not in calm weather but in a strong wind. (77d5–e3) 102 
 
 Cebes replies in a peculiar jocular manner with laughter: 103  
 
Text 2 
‘Try to convince us, Socrates,’ he said, ‘as if we do have that fear. Or rather, 
not as if we have the fear––maybe there’s a child actually inside us who’s 
afraid of things like that. So try to convince that child to stop fearing death 
as if it were the bogeyman. (77e4–8). 
 
It is ambiguous whether or not Cebes admits to this fear. Yet, at any rate, he asks 
Socrates to convince Simmias and himself, or a child within them. Socrates replies 
“Well, you must chant spells to him every day until you manage to chant it away.” 
(77e9–10). The fact that Cebes laughs at Socrates while mentioning the childish fear 
seems to imply that he does not seriously believe that either he himself or this 
“inner child” truly entertains such fear. This fear of the soul’s dissipation is 
suggested originally by Cebes before starting the demonstration of the soul’s 
immortality (69e5–70a7). He suggests it as a possible fear that people might have 
in light of Socrates defence of death. In that sense, Cebes does not say this fear is 
his own but rather a possible apprehension against Socrates’ argument. However, 
Socrates suggests the fear is actually in Cebes and they must chant the childish fear 
                                                        
102 ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν. ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας 
ἡδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν 
παίδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾷ καὶ 
διασκεδάννυσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμίᾳ ἀλλ’ ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ 
πνεύματι ἀποθνῄσκων. (77d5–e3) 
103 In the Defence of Death, Simmias also says laughingly that Socrates’ saying is that most 
people realize that death is just what a philosopher deserves (64a10–b6). However, Socrates 
immediately denies that people realize that correctly. He also starts the argument about 
how a philosopher tends to be misunderstood by people (64b7–c2). Simmias’ laughter 
consequently emphasizes his serious ignorance of the misunderstanding. Cebes also seems 
to be ignorant of the serious result when he preserves his childish fear. 
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away. Cebes is also concerned that they would lose the enchanter after Socrates 
leaves them. Socrates replies that they must try to find the enchanter in any place 
at any cost, and recommends that they find the enchanter among themselves 
(78a3–9). Contrasting with Cebes’ jocular attitude, Socrates seems to strongly 
encourage him to remove that fear at any cost.  
Socrates’ encouragement is beyond the demonstration of the soul’s 
immortality. Indeed, as far as believing Socrates’ words, they have been given a 
demonstration of both soul’s pre-natal existence and its existence after death, in 
the combination of the RA and the CA. The AA shows the more detailed 
characteristics of the soul, and if Cebes and Simmias are persuaded that the soul 
really has those characteristics, being dissipated will appear to be an inappropriate 
characteristic for the soul. As far as they adhere to the idea of the dissipation of the 
soul, they recognize the soul as a kind of physical thing that can be blown away by 
a strong wind. Thus, the introduction to the AA suggests a more subjective 
improvement in the interlocutors. Socrates manages to eliminate inappropriate 
fear of soul’s dissipation. This task goes beyond merely receiving the objective 
demonstration of the soul’s immortality. He must continue the effort and find an 
enchanter to take away that fear. 
Socrates starts by examining whether dissipation is a correct way to 
describe the soul’s destruction (78b4–80c1), which is examined in the next section. 
 
2. The meaning of soul and its destruction (78b4–80c1) 
 
2.1 A first setting of the inquiry 
 
To begin, we follow the development of Socrates’ argument using the 
concept of affinity. The main argument of the AA starts with the following 





‘Well then,’ said Socrates, ‘should we ask ourselves a question along the 
following lines? What kind of thing is liable to undergo this––that is, to be 
dissipated? What kind of thing, I mean, is such that we should fear that it 
will be dissipated, and what kind of thing is not like that? And should we 
then consider to which of the two kinds soul belongs, and on that basis be 
confident or fearful on behalf of our own soul? (78b4–9, emphasis mine) 
 
This starting point includes two important factors. The first is that Socrates 
attempts to examine the meaning of dissipation, replying to the childish fear that 
lies in the interlocutors. In the fear, the soul seems to be a kind of physical existence, 
which is dissipated by a strong wind as exhibited in Text 1. His proposal to 
examine this dissipation means that they should investigate whether the soul can 
undergo such suffering. Thus, Socrates must suggest two kinds of existence, one 
of which can undergo dissipation and the other cannot. The soul is considered in 
comparison with the two kinds of existence. The other important factor is that 
Socrates is concerned with “ourselves.” They must ask themselves about the soul’s 
dissipation. As a result of the inquiry, they must decide their attitude towards their 
own soul on considering to which of the two types of existence their soul should 
belong. This argument is not an empty theory or a thought experiment, but deals 
with the souls of Socrates and his discussion partners. This makes sense when we 
consider that his purpose in the AA is to chant away the inner child’s fear, based 
on the examination of the soul. On the other hand, if their fear is appropriate, it 
would be no longer childish. 
 




 Anything that is a composite and compound by nature is liable to be divided 
into its component parts. That which is a non-composite is not likely to be 
divided (78c1–5). 
 
 Things that always remain the same and in the same state are most likely not 
to be composites, whereas those that vary from one time to another, and are 
never the same, are composite (78c6–9). 
 
 
Socrates gives examples of the two kinds of existence. The first is “ousia” (οὐσία), 
the existence of which they are giving an account of in their questions and answers 
on what things are (78c10–d7). According to his explanation, this kind of existence 
embodies the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, and other such kinds of existence. 
The other is the particulars, which include, for example, individual people, horses, 
or clothes (78d10–78e4). The ousia is always the same and is never affected by 
changes, but the particulars cannot remain the same. Individual beautiful things, 
for example, are subject to changing perceptions and opinions. On the other hand, 
Beauty itself cannot be ugly and is always beautiful. 
After describing the division of existence and the criteria upon which this 
division is based, Socrates attempts to apply the division of existence to a human 
being. He asks his interlocutors to confirm that one part of a person is the body 
and the other part is the soul, and they admit that this is so (79b1–3). However, the 
essential point of this question rests not just on the fact of this division, but also on 
how the division is made. The meaning of body and soul depends on where the 
division between the two takes place. Without agreeing upon this matter, Socrates 
and his discussants cannot share an understanding of their souls. Thus, it is 
important how they distinguish the soul and the body, and what characteristics 




2.2 Three characteristics in the soul and its similarity to the ousia 
 
Socrates divides the soul and body by the following three criteria: 
 
1. Invisible or visible: The soul “is more similar to” the invisible (τῷ ἀιδεῖ) than the 
body and the body “is more similar to” the visible (τῷ ὁρατῷ). (79b4–c1) 
2. Constant or changing: The soul is more similar to that which always exists in the 
same state rather than that which does not, when soul thinks alone by itself.  This 
state of the soul (πάθημα) is called “wisdom” (φρονήσις) (79c2–e8) 
3. Governing or being governed: When the soul and the body are together, nature 
orders the body to be subject and to be ruled, and the soul to rule and master. The 
nature of the divine is to “rule and lead.” That of the mortal is to be ruled and be 
the subject. The soul “resembles the divine,” and the body “resembles the mortal” 
(79e9–80a9). 
 
Socrates suggests these three kinds of characteristics. Remarkably, in terms of 
visibility and invisibility, he does not directly say that the soul belongs to the 
invisible although it is admitted being invisible, but that the soul is “more similar 
to” the invisible than the body and the body is more similar to the visible (79b12–
13). This expression involves several interrelated problems. Why does Socrates use 
the concept of similarity? Why is the soul not simply similar to the invisible? In 
other words, what is Socrates’ intention in adding “than the body”? Why must 
Socrates say that the body is “similar to the visible” although the body seems to be 
obviously visible? 104 In other words, why cannot Socrates simply say that the body 
belongs to the visible?  
First, in terms of similarity, some scholars interpret it as a mark of weakness 
of the argument. Dorter understands that the AA is “frequently weakened by 
                                                        
104 Apolloni suggests this question (Apolloni 1996, 9) 
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qualifications and hesitancy”105 : Socrates’ intention in the AA is not to offer “a 
rigorous deduction” but “an appeal to analogies.”106  Rowe thinks that the soul can 
be visible and subject to change on certain conditions. Therefore, he claims “the 
most that it is so far prudent to assert is that the soul is more like the invisible than 
the body (in so far as it is itself invisible).”107 According to these interpretations, 
similarity is a kind of second-best predication of the soul when we cannot claim 
that the soul is identified with the invisible. I disagree with those interpretations 
that focus on the weakness of the idea of similarity. I assume that those 
interpretations reflect the expectation that Plato will provide a strict demonstration 
of the soul’s immortality, because the soul must be exactly identical with a kind of 
immortal existence if we want to have a thorough demonstration. However, the 
body is also given a predication of similarity. While the body is visible, why cannot 
we say that the body belongs to the visible rigorously? Even though we admit that 
Plato hesitates to offer a strong claim that the soul belongs to the invisible, we 
cannot understand his intention in expressing the body’s similarity to the visible.  
The AA clarifies several characteristics of the soul to the interlocutors, 
which is a different objective from the demonstration of the soul’s immortality. 
Considering the objective, we can interpret the similarity more positively, as 
expressing the soul’s peculiar condition, namely, a two-facedness that accepts two 
opposite kinds of characteristic.108 The soul is originally invisible, unchanging and 
governing. However, according to Socrates’ later explanation, a polluted soul can 
be visible as a phantom around tombs (81c8–d4), having lost its steadfastness by 
being disturbed by perceptions (79c2–8) and bewitched by bodily pleasures (81b1–
5). If the soul is alone by itself, it can retain its original characteristics. When it 
makes use of the body, it must accept non-essential characteristics.  This condition 
is clearly different from that of the ousia because the ousia always retains its 
                                                        
105 Dorter 1976, 295. 
106 Dorter 1982, 76. 
107 Rowe 1993, 185 
108 Bostock calls this condition as “a chameleon-like character” (Bostock 1986, 119). 
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characteristic and never suffers change. Yet, as far as the soul makes itself alone by 
itself, it retains its steadfast condition. For example, the soul is invisible and 
unchanging when it does not draw on any bodily characteristics and uses its own 
intellectual ability. Contrastingly, the body is usually visible and changing if it 
does not receive any special treatment. In that sense, the soul is clearly more similar 
to the invisible than the body. This interpretation of similarity also explains the 
reason why Socrates says that the body is similar to the visible, not that the body 
belongs to the visible. A typical example of the visible is a particular thing that is 
contrasted with the ousia. The class of particular also has a characteristic of being 
always changing. However, Socrates mentions an example: embalming the body. 
The body that is correctly treated keeps its quality for a while even after death 
(80c2–d3). Thus, even the body has characteristics that are contrary to its natural 
ones. The body is similar to the visible, therefore, it should have visibility and be 
always changing, but it can sometimes have exceptional characteristics. 
The latter part of the AA discusses the two directions of the soul depending 
on the soul’s characters (80c2–82d8). The purified soul goes off to the divine realm, 
whereas the polluted one must fall down to the earth and enter the bodies of 
animals. Therefore, the similarity is used effectively in order to describe the soul’s 
two-facedness. 
Moreover, we should notice that Socrates has put the division of existence 
before the discussion of similarity and enumerates these three characteristics here. 
He suggests several examples of the ousia, the Equal itself and the Beautiful itself, 
and generalizes those kinds of entity by a phrase “what each thing itself is” (78d3–
5). In the RA, Socrates emphasizes that they are not perceptible; in other words, 
they will never be visible. He also says that a philosopher looks to attain the non-
perceptible existence. In that context, invisibility must be a characteristic of the 
ousia that is mostly valuable for a philosopher, and therefore it is not a neutral 
predication. In the AA, he explains the ousia as a kind of existence that remains the 
same and never changes. This specific invisible existence is also unchanging. The 
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ousia is a real object with which the soul should be compared. Invisibility is a sign 
of ousia, although it is not a sufficient characteristic for being the ousia. Thus, 
invisibility is not a value-neutral attribution, and is a sign of the most valuable 
entity, ousia.  
Invisibility and being the same (or being constant) are both found in the 
ousia. The ousia cannot be attained by perception. It can be obtained when the soul 
considers them when being by itself, namely, when the soul uses its intellectual 
ability. As suggested in the RA, the Form or ousia never suffers the change that 
perceptible things do: equal things always can become unequal. However, the 
Equal themselves never become unequal and always are equal. The soul’s 
condition when the soul thinks of the ousia by itself is called “wisdom.”   
However, it is not clear that the ousia has the third characteristic, governing 
character, which is also called “divine.” The soul should naturally command the 
body, and the body naturally follows the governing soul. Can we find such a 
governing characteristic in the ousia? The third characteristic shows that the soul 
actively and dominantly works upon the body as nature orders. It does not seem 
that the characteristic is found in the ousia in the previous arguments. However, 
Socrates claims in his latter arguments that only the Forms can be causes of things: 
beautiful things come to be beautiful because of the Beauty itself (100e2–3). Large 
things are large because of the Largeness itself (100e5–6). These arguments suggest 
that the Form as causes makes things have specific characteristics. In that sense, 
we can say that the Form or the ousia governs things or particulars since they 
depend on it for their properties.109 Simmias and Cebes probably have not yet 
                                                        
109 This interpretation accords with that by Apollni (1996, 27–29). Specifically, he states as 
follows: “In a sense, it is also possible to think of the Forms as doing more than just this. 
Sensible objects cannot be what they are without being equal and unequal, large and small, 
thick and thin, beautiful and ugly in some way and in some degree. How could a stick have 
any of the other properties which sticks have if it could not be equal to other sticks and 
unequal to still others? How could it be a stick if it was not large in comparison with some 
things, small in comparison with others? If so, Plato might have thought that sensible 
objects like sticks are totally dependent for what they are upon the Forms, even though 
there are no Forms for sticks per se.” (ibid., 28) 
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understood this characteristic of the ousia that is called “divine” in the AA. Indeed, 
Simmias seems to have a different or ambiguous understanding of divinity in his 
next argument, the Harmonia theory, in which he describes the sound in a tuned 
lyre as “divine” (85e6). Conversely, the sound is governed by the material 
instrument. Therefore, we must admit that the meaning of divinity in the AA is not 
yet clarified in Simmias’ Harmonia theory.  
Considering those three kinds of characteristics in the soul, those are also 
found in the ousia, at least in Socrates’ interpretation. Thus, Socrates asserts that 




‘Consider then, Cebes,’ he said, ‘whether from everything that has been 
said our results are as follows: that soul is most similar to that which is 
divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform, and incapable of being 
disintegrated, and which always stays in the same condition and state as 
itself; but that body, on the other hand, is most similar to what is human, 
mortal, resistant to intelligence, multiform, able to be disintegrated, and 
never in the same state as itself. (80a10–b5) 
 
The soul’s indestructibility is demonstrated as well:  
 
Text 5 
If all this is the case, isn’t body the sort of thing to be quickly disintegrated, 
but soul, on the other hand, the sort to be altogether incapable of being 
disintegrated, or nearly so? (80b9–11) 
 
We should notice that the divine existence that the soul is most similar to has not 
only immortality but also some other characteristics. Those characteristics exclude 
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the destructibility of the soul and at the same time clarify the meaning of the soul’s 
immortality. The immortality of the soul is not only a matter of continuity but also 
a circumstance in which the soul can be a better and intellectual existence. This 
quality is implicitly illustrated by way of comparison with the embalming of 
bodies in Egypt (80c2–d3). Embalming gives the human body a kind of perpetuity, 
but it is completely different from the immortality for which Socrates longs. The 
soul has divine characteristics other than immortality. It is “most similar to that 
which is divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform, and incapable of being 
disintegrated, and which always stays in the same condition and state as itself” 
(80b1–3). Thus, the purified soul, arguably, must have those characteristics. This 
explanation of the soul is advanced compared with that of the RA, because it is 
concerned with many features of the soul, while the RA focuses on its recollecting 
ability and intellectual desire.  
However, in order to obtain immortality, Socrates and his interlocutors 
must agree to give up the aspects of their lives that are in conflict with the divine 
characteristics, because those aspects do not belong to the divine and immortal 
existence and therefore are not given immortality. Kenneth Dorter claims that the 
AA is persuasive since “Perhaps the most significant and fundamental reason why 
people have continued to believe in the non-finality of death and in their personal 
immortality is the sense of something eternal within us.”110 Indeed, this argument 
will have such a good effect on Simmias and Cebes as far as they admit the soul’s 
intellectual ability and governing function are essential for their being.  However, 
it also means that the AA is persuasive only for those who are prepared to make 
themselves purified without excessive attachment to the desires of the body or 
other bodily functions. Thus, it is appropriate in the AA that Socrates depicts the 
two directions of the soul after death, beginning with the preferred state of the soul. 
Consequently, his argument might make people to believe that they can be better 
even after death. In that sense, the argument forces the interlocutors to examine 
                                                        
110 Dorter 1982, 76. 
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their understanding of themselves. They need to understand that the essential core 
of the soul should belong to the intellectual and divine conditions and make 
themselves to be close to that core. If they think other things are indispensable for 
them, the AA never offers immortality to those changing things. As far as they 
admit the essential characteristics of the soul, the argument of the soul’s 
immortality is worthwhile and enables them to chant away their childish fear of 
the soul’s dissipation.  
 
3. The two directions of the soul after death (80c2–82d8) 
 
The latter part of the AA shows the two directions of the soul after death. 
Socrates depicts both purified and polluted souls and the corresponding directions 




 First, take a case where a soul is separated in a pure condition, bringing 
with it nothing from the body, because it did not associate with the body 
at all in its life, at least when it had the choice, but instead avoided the body 
and stayed gathered together alone into itself, since that was its constant 
practice. Such a soul is doing nothing but pursue philosophy correctly and 
practise to be ready for really being dead. Or wouldn’t this be practice for 
death? 
Cebes: 
 It certainly would. 
Socrates: 
So does a soul in this condition go off into what is similar to it, the unseen, 
the divine, immortal and wise, where after its arrival it can be happy, 
separated from wandering, unintelligence, fears, savage sorts of love and 
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the other human evils, and just as is said of the initiates, does it truly spend 
the rest of time with gods? Is this what we should say, Cebes, or something 
else? 
Cebes:  
‘We should indeed say this,’ replied Cebes (80e2–81a11) 
 
This discussion implies an important point. As some scholars have noted,111 only 
the purified soul can reach the divine existence to which it is similar and thus be 
happy. If we cannot make our souls pure and good in this world, we cannot get to 
a better world after death. Significantly, it is pursuing philosophy and being ready 
for death that make us happy after death. Insofar as we purify our souls in this life, 
we are able to achieve a better existence after death. Yet, Socrates does not merely 
import a religious dogma from outside, because he refers to pursuing philosophy 
and the practice of death in this discussion. Philosophical activity in this world is 




But that whenever the soul considers alone by itself, it gets away into that 
which is pure, always in existence, and immortal, and which stays in the 
same condition; that the soul, because it is akin to this, always comes to be 
with it whenever alone by itself and able to do so; that the soul is then at 
rest from its wandering, and in relation to those entities stays always in the 
same state and condition, because the things it is grasping have the same 
kind of stability; and that this state of the soul is called “wisdom”?  
Cebes: 
 ‘That's completely right and true, Socrates,’ he said. (79d1–9) 
 
                                                        
111 Bostock 1986, 35–39. Woolf 2004, 115. 
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Interestingly, wisdom is described as the soul’s state (παθήμα) while it is a 
purpose of a philosopher or the target of acquisition in the DD. In that sense, 
wisdom is no longer an object that the soul aims at, but is a condition within the 
soul. The soul can be alone by itself and therefore is in the same condition as the 
ousia that is always the same. Gail Fine thinks that the soul can be in this condition 
when it is incarnated based on her interpretation of this passage about wisdom.112 
If we follow Fine’s interpretation, when the soul has not been completely separated 
from the body, it can escape into that “which is pure, always in existence” (79d1–
2). The soul can conceive of eternal existence, namely, through Forms, even in this 
world. Thus, the soul itself can become stable and be drawn close to eternity.  
However, I think the AA addresses the soul’s condition on a wider view 
than that suggested in Fine’s interpretation. The AA considers the soul’s condition 
after death, which differentiates the argument from the DD and the RA. A 
philosopher attempts to separate his soul from the body as far as possible. If he 
could correctly pursue that separation, the soul would be truly free from bodily 
disturbance and alone by itself after death. This condition can be called wisdom. 
A philosopher cannot obtain true wisdom while he is alive as it is suggested in the 
DD. However, he must make his life focused on getting that wisdom. Without that 
pursuit, his soul cannot be in the condition that is called “wisdom” even after death. 
Therefore, philosophy is a sort of “practice of death,” serving as a junction 
between an individual person and his destination. This assertion means that 
philosophy helps people get to the divine world. Through philosophy, human 
beings can examine themselves and realize that they become better. 
Thus, what must philosophers do to achieve immortality and reach the 
divine realm? According to Texts 6 and 7, they must think about the Forms and be 
                                                        
112 Fine 2016, 565. “There is, however, an important difference between 65–7 and 79c-d: the 
wisdom at issue in 65–7 – at least, the wisdom described by the genuine philosophers– is 
attainable only when we are discarnate. Here, by contrast, Socrates describes a sort of 
wisdom we can have while incarnate. That this is so is suggested by the fact that he speaks 
of a soul considering forms ‘whenever it may do so’, which seems to imply that it cannot 
always do so.” 
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separated from the body as far as possible. To do so, they must seek to make their 
soul purified and give up all other things, for example, bodily desire. The polluted 
soul cannot stay apart from the body, and that soul is weighted down and drawn 
back into the visible region (81b–d). The soul of an individual may enter the body 
of an animal which accords with the quality of the life they have lived (81d6–82a10). 
Remarkably, the souls of people “who have pursued the common virtue of 
ordinary civic life” which “has come about from habit and practice without 
philosophy and intelligence” may enter the bodies of ants, bees or human beings 
again (82a11–82b3). However, this is not the target for philosophers, since it is not 
permitted (οὐ θέμις, 82c1) for those people to arrive at the divine as it is for the 
lover of learning (82b10–c6).  
Only after the interlocutors are persuaded that their true or better condition 
is in the purified soul, can they admit Socrates’ proof of the immortality of the soul 
as applicable to their own soul. However, as long as they live in this world, they 
cannot completely do away with our sensations and desires. So what does that 
separation mean in actuality? 
  
4. The Separation of Soul and Body––Encouragement of Philosophy–– 
 
In the AA, Socrates encourages the interlocutors to separate their soul from 
the body as he does in the DD. How can they separate the soul from the body when 
they live in this world with both the body and soul? In other words, what kind of 
life is the interlocutor required to live? It seems easy to interpret Socrates’ advice 
as advocating an asceticism wherein they should separate themselves from any 
bodily desire or sensation in order to devote themselves to thinking about the ousia. 
As some scholars affirm, an ascetic reading of the AA seems appropriate.113  
                                                        
113 Hackforth 1955, 48–49; Bostock 1986, 30. Gallop also mentions asceticism in the dialogue 
(Gallop 1975, 88). On the other hand, Bluck and Weiss reject the ascetic reading (Bluck 1955, 
149–150; Weiss 1987, 58–59). 
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However, Woolf points out several problems with this reading. 114  First, the 
separation of body and soul includes bodily sensation as its object in the Phaedo. 
We cannot escape our sensations entirely and, even to the extent that we can, such 
an effort is itself different from philosophy. In the first part of the Phaedo, Socrates 
himself talks about the pain and pleasure of his shackled feet and examines those 
sensations (60b1–c7). Second, as we can find in some of Plato’s dialogues, Socrates 
does not avoid occasions that bring about pleasure and pain. He drinks wine in 
the Symposium and has children. Therefore, separation does not mean simple 
asceticism. Woolf suggests an “evaluative reading” of Phaedo with regard to this 
issue: “The evaluative reading makes a weaker claim. Here the point is not that the 
philosopher refrains (or should refrain) in any strikingly austere way from those 
activities that require association with the body. It is, rather, that he should adopt 
a certain evaluative stance towards those activities.”115 In order to investigate this 
problem, we should examine the bodily problem against the soul in the text of the 
AA. 
Socrates explains the relationship between soul and body in this way: 
Text 8 
[…] the lovers of learning are aware (οἱ φιλομαθεις γιγνώσκουσι) that 
when philosophy takes over their soul, the soul really is bound thoroughly 
in the body and stuck to it, and is forced to consider the real things through 
it as if through a cage, and not on its own through itself, and that it drifts 
in utter ignorance. And philosophy observes the cleverness of the prison––
that it works through desire, the best way to make the prisoner himself 
assist in his imprisonment. […] Philosophy, they are aware, persuades the 
soul to distance itself from the senses, except to the extent that use of them 
is necessary, and encourages the soul to collect and gather itself alone into 
itself, and to trust nothing but itself, concerning whichever real thing, alone 
                                                        
114 Woolf 2004, 101-102 and 104–105. 
115 Woolf 2004, 98–99. Yet his main claim is that “we are not supposed to make a firm 
decision between” the ascetic and the evaluative reading (ibid., 98). 
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by itself, the soul has intelligence of, when the soul too is alone by itself. 
(82d9–e7, 83a5–b1, emphasis mine) 
 
Furthermore, Socrates explains the reason why the soul is especially bound 
tight by the body when it feels that most intense pleasures and pain are mostly 
clear and true (83c5–d2) as follows: 
 
Text 9 
Because each pleasure and pain rivets and pins it to the body as if with a 
nail, and makes it corporeal, since it believes to be real the very things that 
the body says are real. Since it has the same belief as the body and enjoys 
the same things, it is forced, I think, to come to have the same ways and the 
same sustenance, and to be the sort of soul never to enter Hades in a pure 
condition… (83d4–10)  
  
In Text 8, ‘Philosophy’ observes the real problem of the body. The body as a prison 
makes its prisoner (the soul) “assist in his imprisonment” through desire. It 
encourages the soul to “distance itself from the body” as suggested in the DD. Text 
9 shows that the body affects the soul’s way of thinking: the soul cannot think by 
itself and is driven to think through the body. Furthermore, the soul is forced to 
regard as true whatever the body perceives to be true. Text 9 includes revealing 
true and fake objectives of the soul, which shows us that one should be attentive 
to his way of thinking and the object of their thought. However, when a man 
merely devotes himself to controlling his desires and sensations but never thinks 
about the Forms, it seems that he can never be a philosopher or achieve a better 
life after death.116  
                                                        
116 Bluck also rejects the asceticism in the Phaedo on similar grounds (Bluck 1955, 150). 
Russell claims a conditional goodness of pleasure in a positive way. He claims, “Plato is 
not a hedonist, then, because pleasure is conditionally good, depending on what place one 
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The philosopher’s purpose is to make his soul think alone by itself and 
attain wisdom; separating oneself from desire and sensation is one way to do so. 
Socrates vividly feels the pain and pleasure from his shackled feet, and he can 
understand the vanity of sensation by observing the pleasure that came to his 
pained feet when they were freed from the shackles (60c). Therefore, according to 
the AA, the real way to make the soul purified is to keep thinking about the Forms, 
whatever desire or sensation we may be experiencing. Separation is not killing 
those sensations, but continuing to pursue philosophy within any distracting 
circumstance. 
Text 8 suggests a curious expression of encouragement of “philosophy.” 
The passage has remarkable points for my project to emphasize self-discovery in 
Phaedo: firstly, Socrates states that as the “lovers of learning” recognizes 
philosophy’s encouragement. This presupposition of the intellectual love or desire 
in the agent is also found in the DD and RA as we see that in Chapters 1 and 2. 
Moreover, the lovers of learning are “aware” (γιγνώσκουσι) that “philosophy” 
takes over and quietly encourages their soul as if philosophy is a separate entity 
(82d9, 83a1–3). The soul realises its miserable situation as the prisoner of the body 
                                                        
gives it in one’s life, and happiness depends on the unconditionally good––wisdom and 
intelligence––that brings the direction that a good human requires” (Russell 2005, 101). 
However, Plato is not ascetic either “since he clearly does believe that pleasure can be given 
the right sort of place in one’s life; and so there must be a form of pleasure that is reasonable, 
since the pleasures of a distorted sense of priorities can never take the right place in one’s 
life. And this, of course, is the joy that we see particularly in the Socrates of the Phaedo: he 
is joyful in the face of death because he recognizes that the goodness of his life consists in 
the goodness of his soul, which no one can take away. His joy, his contentment, his 
gladness––these are not the source of the goodness of his life, but rather his appreciation 
in his affective nature of the goodness” (101–102). We cannot find anything in the AA 
indicating that pleasure directly contributes to philosophical activity or encourages it. 
Socrates admits intellectual pleasure (114e3). However, it seems to be a result of the 
philosophical activity, not the cause or motivation of the activity. It is not clear whether we 
can call that kind of pleasure “good” even though it is conditional as Russell does. All we 
can say is that pleasure is not harmful by itself. Distortion of the mind is harmful, which 
can be caused by clinging to pleasure. However, I do not think merely ascetic attitudes 
(avoiding pleasure) can rescue the mind from that kind of distortion. 
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through philosophy’s encouragement. The cage cleverly forces the soul itself to 
assist in its own imprisonment through desire (82e5–7). That situation is explained 
again in the statement of the most extreme of all evils: “It’s that the soul of every 
human being, when it experiences intense pleasure or pain at something, is forced 
to believe at that moment that whatever particularly gives rise to that feeling is 
most self-evidently real (ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον), when it isn’t 
so” (83c5–8). The soul is forced to think of wrong things as the truth. 
It seems that a human being cannot free his soul from his body unaided by 
philosophy, because of the cleverness of the prison.117 However, it is not clear 
where that “philosophy” comes from. In the metaphor, philosophy seems to be 
another person or entity that affects the soul. Yet philosophy (φιλοσοφία) also 
means “love of knowledge.” Thus, it is difficult to decide whether philosophy is a 
kind of internal motivation or another person or entity who liberates the soul from 
outside. However, as discussed earlier, we should not ignore that Socrates defines 
the subjects recognizing that encouragement as “lovers of learning.” Without that 
love, the soul, arguably, cannot obtain or recognize the encouragement. In that 
sense, whether the encouragement comes from inside or outside, the internal 
intellectual desire for wisdom is still essential. Moreover, the lovers of learning are 
“aware” of philosophy’s encouragement. Even if the first occasion of the soul’s 
separation from the body seems to be from outside of the soul, the self-recognition 
of the lovers of learning is also salient. This awareness shows that the lovers of 
learning should reflect the ideas that are offered by philosophy’s encouragement.  
                                                        
117 Woolf also mentions this point: “It is noteworthy that the soul is also pictured as passive 
when it comes to intellectual operations (at least in the initial phase). […] How can a soul 
which (thanks to its embodiment) encounters only the corporeal come to be aware that 
there is something more? […] In more generalized form, it bears some resemblance to 
Meno’s paradox; and there is an overt parallel to be explored in the way the prisoners are 
portrayed in the Cave analogy of Republic 7. In that book information provided by the 
senses apparently helps to turn the soul towards Forms […] ; but the text is clear that the 
prisoners neither free themselves nor infer a world outside from their own circumstances 
(515C–E). Philosophical inspiration (perhaps prompted by a good educator) must strike a 
soul that could otherwise make no progress.” (Woolf 2004, 118. n. 40.) 
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  After the statements on philosophy’s encouragement, Socrates explains 
how the bodily sensations affect the soul badly (83c5–e4), and confirms that 
“proper lovers of learning” are virtuous for a different reason from that which 
many other people virtuous (83e5–7), as is also suggested in the DD (68b8–69a4), 
specifically by the idea of “shadow-painting” virtue (69b7). Thus, Socrates offers a 
concluding statement, which remarkably suggests a kind of self-judgement on life 
by the soul of a “philosophical man”: 
 
Text 10 
No, indeed. But that is how a philosophical man’s soul would reason. It 
would not suppose that, its own release being a job for philosophy, while 
philosophy is doing that the soul should of its own accord surrender itself 
for the pleasures and pains to bind it back inside again, and should 
undertake a Penelope’s interminable task by working at a sort of web in 
reverse. Instead such a man’s soul secures a rest from these things, 
following its reasoning and being always engaged in reasoning, viewing 
what is true, divine and not an object of opinion, and sustained by that, and 
supposes both that it should live in this way as long as it lives, and that 
when it meets its end it will enter what is akin and of the same kind, and 
will be separated from human evils’ (84a2–b3, emphasis mine).  
 
Οὐ γάρ· ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω λογίσαιτ᾽ ἂν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν 
οἰηθείη τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι ἐαυτὴν λύειν, λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης, 
αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις ἑαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ 
ἐγκαταδεῖν καὶ ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως 
ἱστὸν μεταχειριζομένης, ἀλλὰ γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, 
ἑπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὖσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ 
τὸ ἀδόξαστον  θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ζῆν τε οἴεται οὕτω 
δεῖν ἕως ἂν ζῇ, καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ 
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τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν. (84a2–b3, 
emphasis mine) 
 
The philosopher’s soul118 “would not suppose” that “its own release” is “a job for 
philosophy” and it “should surrender itself for pleasures and pain” while 
philosophy is doing that releasing. The soul would suppose that it should live 
following philosophy as long as it lives , while (1) securing “a rest from” those 
sensations, (2) “following its reasoning,” (3) “being engaged in reasoning,” 
(4)“viewing what is true,” and (5) “sustained” by that true and divine existence.  
Those soul’s actions are expressed in present participles: ((1) γαλήνην 
παρασκευάζουσα, (2) ἑπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ, (3) ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὖσα, (4) τὸ θεῖον 
καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη, and (5) ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου τρεφομένη). Therefore, it seems 
that the soul’s actions and suppositions are simultaneous.119 The philosopher’s 
soul should suppose that purification is required in its living while indeed doing 
that at the same time.  
In that action, the soul depends on “reasoning” (λογίσμος). Τhis noun 
appears three times in this dialogue including this passage (66a1, 79a3)120 and is 
closely connected with another similar meaning noun “thought”(διάνοια) in those 
passages. A philosopher’s soul makes use of reasoning and thought without 
perceptions in order to obtain wisdom (65e7–66a7). Furthermore, Socrates states 
in the previous passage of the AA as follows: 
 
                                                        
118 Socrates changes the subject in the concluding part from the lovers of learning to “a 
philosophical man’s soul.” When he depicts philosophy’s encouragement, “the lovers of 
learning” are aware that philosophy encourages the soul. In this concluding part, the soul 
can judge how it should live according to philosophy’s encouragement. Therefore, it seems 
that the philosophical man’s soul shows some progress from the condition of the soul of 
the lovers of learning.  Considering the different conditions of their souls, a philosopher 
might be superior to a lover of learning. 
119 Smyth. 1984. Greek Grammar, 419. n.1872a. “The action set forth by the present participle 
is generally coincident (rarely antecedent or subsequent) to that of the leading verb…” 
120 Its verb, λογίζομαι, (including participles) appears 9 times (62e1, 65c2, 65c5, 83b8, 83c3, 




Text 11  
Now isn’t it true that these you could touch, see and perceive with the other 
senses, but that when it comes to those that stay in the same state, you could 
never get hold of them with anything other than the reasoning of your 
thought (τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ), such things being unseen and not 
visible. (79a1–4, emphasis mine) 
 
Socrates presupposes that one should makes use of intellectual ability (λογίσμος 
and διάνοια) in order to obtain invisible things. Socrates does not explain those 
functions in detail, but in Republic Book 6, both terms are used for the cognition of 
mathematical objects (510c3, 511d3). Mathematical cognition is placed in the 
second level in the divided line analogy (509d–511e), which falls under the 
dialectical knowledge. Also in Phaedo, both intellectual functions seem to be in the 
class that is inferior to wisdom. The soul must use such intellectual functions to 
accept philosophy’s encouragement. Thus, that acceptance is not completely 
passive; rather it involves a kind of intellectual judgement. 
After the soul has received philosophy’s encouragement of separation, it 
supposes an appropriate way of life according to the encouragement. Text 10 
suggests that the philosopher’s soul does not think that it can submit its release to 
“philosophy” and make itself to be imprisoned again (84a2–7). Thus, it voluntarily 
decides to accept philosophy’s encouragement and independently supposes how 
they should live. In that sense, the soul does not just receive philosophy’s 
encouragement passively but voluntarily chooses good life. The judgement of 
good life is built in the soul. In other words, it has internalized the encouragement 
of philosophy. Such philosopher’s development is suggested to the interlocutor. If 
he agrees with the AA, he is required to digest the arguments and live his life 
following the argument. This requirement will lead him to discover his own actual 
conditions and improve himself by making use of his intellectual ability. However, 
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Simmias and Cebes do not agree with the AA and develop their counterarguments. 
We will discuss their counterarguments in Chapters 4 and 5. Nevertheless we 
should notice that the AA includes the philosopher’s voluntary decision of a good 
life.  
 
Conclusion of Chapter 3 
 
 The AA depicts self-discovery as a dynamic structure which includes 
various aspects of the soul’s activities. Each point emphasizes the soul’s dynamic 
transition to the better state. First, Socrates establishes an ontological map that has 
two poles, ousia and particular things. The soul is originally similar to the ousia, 
while it can be sometimes dragged to have non-essential characteristics when 
being polluted by the body. When the soul considers the Forms alone by itself, it 
can avoid being in an unstable state. Second, Socrates describes two directions of 
the soul depending on its way of life. As far as one pursues wisdom, his soul can 
be purified and go to the divine realm. Third, the soul of lovers of learning can be 
released from the body by philosophy’s encouragement. The body is a formidable 
prison since it makes the soul itself support its own imprisonment disturbing its 
judgement of what is true. Eventually, the soul of a philosophical man agrees with 
the encouragement of philosophy and chooses to live a good life following the 
encouragement. Socrates advocates this guidance for the soul’s dynamic 
improvement to the interlocutor. The interlocutor must remove his childish fear of 
the soul’s dissipation following the guide, as the introduction to the AA suggests. 
 Socrates also offers a cognitive method of self-improvement. He suggests 
several cognitive features in self-improvement: the lovers of learning should be 
“aware” of philosophy’s encouragement. Furthermore, a philosopher’s soul must 
accept that encouragement through its reasoning. As a whole person, the lovers of 
learning recognize the process of releasing from the bodily disturbance through 
philosophy. This situation is considerably contrasted with his soul’s imprisoned 
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condition. The imprisoned soul could not realize even that it was in a bad situation 
and supported its own imprisonment. The philosopher’s soul accepts the 
encouragement and chooses the good life by its own reasoning. Thus, the soul’s 
own decision is accomplished by the supports of the intellectual functions.  
 Self–discovery contributes to dynamic self–improvement. That process of 
self-improvement requires one’s self-recognition of philosophy’s encouragement 
and self-decision to accept intellectually the encouragement. Thus, the AA implies 
a complex method of self-improvement that presupposes individual self-








Chapter 4. Removal of the false theory in the soul 
––Criticism of the Soul-Harmonia Theory (85e3–86e5, 91c6–95a3)–– 
  
Introduction to Chapter 4 
 
Socrates attempts to chant away childish fear in the interlocutors in the 
Affinity Argument (AA), and after that “a long silence” arises (84c1). Socrates is 
absorbed in what has been discussed. Thus, does Socrates accomplish his goal? No, 
he does not. The interlocutors suggest counterarguments against the AA. Yet they 
are reasonable arguments, not just the childish fearsome images. In that sense, the 
interlocutors have been changed by the AA and now have a more intellectual 
apprehension. 
  Simmias suggests the Harmonia theory of the soul, which recognizes the 
soul as an attunement (“harmonia” [ἁρμονία] in ancient Greek) composed of the 
body’s elements (85e3–86d3). This theory presents a counter argument to Socrates’ 
proof of the immortality of the soul and represents the first definite view of the 
soul suggested by Socrates’ discussants. Socrates and Simmias agree in the AA that 
the soul is similar to divine existence, and therefore it can maintain its innate 
intellectual and divine characteristics. However, Simmias refutes this argument by 
stating that the soul can be mortal even while it has divine elements. He claims 
that the relationship between the soul and body is comparable to that between 
attunement and a tuned lyre. Although attunement is invisible, incorporeal, 
beautiful and divine, it cannot exist after the lyre and strings are destroyed. The 
soul is therefore not assured of its immortality after departing from the body. 
However, Socrates still attempts to criticize the Harmonia theory of the soul (91c6–
95a3).  
When interpreting Socrates’ criticism, modern scholars tend to concentrate 
on clarifying harmonia as a concept, as it can include a wide range of meanings. 
They are also concerned about the complicated structure of Socrates’ criticism that 
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is accompanied with the ambiguous meaning of harmonia. The relationship 
between the Pythagorean theory and this claim is also problematic, because 
Simmias is often regarded as a Pythagorean.121 Furthermore, one severe critique 
rests on Socrates’ vague use of the concept of harmonia, which reduces the theory 
to absurdity in the wrong way. 122  
These attempts to fix a distinct meaning for the concept, however, result in 
a lack of clarity on two important points. The first is that the Harmonia theory is 
abstracted not by Simmias alone, but rather in conversation with Socrates. 
Although Simmias abandons the Harmonia Theory as a result of Socrates’ first 
refutation, Socrates himself attempts to interpret the soul through this theory. In a 
sense, they construct the Harmonia Theory together, and finally this collaboration 
leads to their mutual rejection of it. The second important point is that Socrates 
repeatedly asks Simmias if the Harmonia theory accords with Simmias’ other 
beliefs (92c3, 95a1–2). Socrates requires not only that the Harmonia Theory should 
be true as an independent theory, but also that it coexists in harmony with Simmias’ 
other beliefs. In other words, Simmias is always required to examine whether or 
not his beliefs concord with each other, and therefore is constrained to claim only 
what can coexist with his other beliefs. Because of this restriction, Simmias cannot 
defend his harmonia theory as the modern scholars (Gallop and C. C. W. Taylor) 
suggest. One of Socrates’ refutations of the Harmonia theory is that the soul as 
harmonia must be equally harmonia and therefore the soul of all living things must 
be equally good although there are indeed good and bad souls (92e5–94b3). Those 
                                                        
121 H. B. Gottschalk investigated this topic in detail (Gottschalk 1971). He also points out 
ambiguous meanings of Simmias’ harmonia: “Thus the word harmonia changes its meaning 
between the simile with which Simmias begins and the theory he develops from it, and this 
shift of meaning corresponds to an underlying ambiguity in his account as a whole” (ibid., 
181). Other scholars also examine the relationship between Pythagorean ideas and the 
Harmonia theory: cf. Burnet 1911, 82, Gallop 1975, 148. Rowe 1993, 204–205. Gallop and 
Rowe suggest inconsistency between Simmias’ theory and the Pythagorean orthodoxy.  I 
agree with Gottschalk’s suggestion and argue that Simmias has an ambiguous view that 
includes various inconsistent beliefs about the soul. Therefore, I do not think that his theory 
can be attributed solely to his Pythagorean background.  
122 Gallop 1975, 164–165. C.C.W. Taylor 2001, 62–65. Wagner 2001, 80–82. 
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modern scholars refute Socrates’ use of reduction to absurdity by suggesting that 
the soul as harmonia can be harmonized in one aspect and not harmonized in 
another aspect at the same time. This interpretation of the soul as harmonia is not 
inconsistent with the fact there are good and bad souls, which invalidates that 
Socrates’ refutation of the Harmonia theory. However, I argue that Simmias’ other 
beliefs does not allow him to adopt that modern scholars’ way of refuting Socrates. 
Socrates’ refutation still accomplishes his goal of making to find faults in the 
interlocutor’s beliefs.    
In this chapter, I argue that the criticism of the Harmonia theory has a 
purpose: to reveal an unrecognised confusion in Simmias’ understanding of the 
soul. He thinks his Harmonia theory fulfils the criteria for the soul suggested in 
the AA. The Harmonia theory, however, reveals his insufficient understanding of 
the AA, and more importantly, implies his unconscious adoption of an incorrect 
perspective regarding causality, which cannot be concordant with his agreement 
in the Defence of Death (DD) and the Recollection Argument (RA). The criticism 
of the Harmonia theory reveals a hidden false belief in Simmias and suggests a 
process for removing it.  
  I argue for the importance of revealing and removing Simmias’ false beliefs 
mainly using two points. One point is suggested explicitly in the dialogue, but the 
other is suggested implicitly: Socrates’ counterargument appears to lack strictness 
because of the vague meaning of harmonia. Simmias, however, cannot use this lack 
of strictness to defend his theory because it comes from his definition of 
attunement, and therefore he would need to change the definition for the defence. 
The dialogue depicts Simmias’ admitting Socrates’ refutation in an explicit way to 
point out the inconsistency of Simmias’ beliefs. Moreover, the dialogue also 
implicitly reveals another problem in the theory; the absence of the tuner of the 
attunement (harmonia), which is concerned with a main target in the succeeding 
argument of the dialogue, namely, the proper theory of causation. In both implicit 
and explicit ways, this dialogue inquires into the problem of the Harmonia theory.  
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Related to my suggestion of self-discovery in the dialogue, the criticism of 
the Harmonia theory shows that the dialogue includes a clever way of finding 
faults within the interlocutor. He has not only inconsistent beliefs but also a 
problematic understanding of the soul. Specifically, understanding of the soul is 
closely connected with a fundamental conception, that of causality. The latter 
problem is not solved within this argument. Yet, when it is combined with Cebes’ 
counterargument (I will discuss that in the next chapter), the criticism ingeniously 
reveals a serious problem in Simmias’ ideas.123   
 
1. Simmias’ Harmonia Theory 
 
Simmias’ Harmonia theory responds to, and questions, the AA. Simmias 
says the followings: 
 
Text 1 
‘In the following respect, I think,’ he said. ‘One might say the same thing 
about attunement too, and a lyre and strings: that the attunement is 
something invisible, incorporeal, and utterly beautiful and divine in the 
tuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are bodies, corporeal, 
composite and earthy, and akin to the mortal.  (85e3–86a3) 
 
Ταύτῃ ἔμοιγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ᾗ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἄν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ 
χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὡς ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία ἀόρατον καὶ 
ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι καὶ  θεῖόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμοσμένῃ λύρᾳ, 
                                                        
123 We cannot tell whether Simmias recognizes this problem, but Phaedo clearly shows that 
Cebes escapes that fault and thus develops a further counterargument. Socrates offers the 
Final Argument in reply to Cebes. In the end of the demonstration of the immortality of 
the soul, Simmias admits that “on the strength of what has been said I too no longer have 
any room for doubt” (107a8–9). Therefore, we can at least assume that Simmias eventually 
agrees with the causal order between the soul and the body suggested by Socrates and 
abandons his previous view that the soul depends on the body for its existence. 
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αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ σύνθετα 
καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ συγγενῆ. (85e3–86a3) 
 
Defining attunement (ἁρμονία) in the lyre as in the quotation above, Simmias 
seems to apprehend that if the lyre and strings are destroyed, attunement could 
perish before the mortal things do (86a3–b5). He applies this analogy to the 
relationship between the soul and body:  
 
Text 2 
I think that you yourself are well aware that we take the soul to be 
something of precisely this kind, since our body is made taut, so to speak, 
and held together by hot, cold, dry, wet and certain other such things, and 
our soul is a blend and attunement of those very things, when they are 
blended properly and proportionately with one another. (86b5–86c3) 
 
Anyway, if the soul really is a sort of attunement, obviously when our body 
is loosened or tautened beyond proportion by illnesses or other evils, the 
soul must perish at once, however divine it may be, just like other sorts of 
attunement, both those consisting in sounds and those in all the products 
of the craftsmen, whereas each body's remains must last for a long time, 
until they are burned up or rot away. (86c3–d1) 
 
Simmias’ definition of the soul in the analogy has several problems. First, 
the meaning of harmonia is ambiguous. 124  There are several possible meanings of 
                                                        
124 C.C. W. Taylor discusses this problem in detail (C.C.W Taylor 2001, 52–58). He suggests 
four possible meanings of the soul as “harmonia” (52–53): 1. “the ratio or formula 
according to which the elements are combined to form the living man;” 2. “the mixture or 
combination of those elements according to that formula;” 3. “some entity produced by the 
combination of those elements according to the formula, but distinct alike from them and 
from the formula itself;” 4. “a state of bodily elements, viz., the state of being combined 
according to that formula.”  
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harmonia, and Simmias does not clearly explain how he makes each attribution 
(invisible, incorporeal, beautiful and divine). We can see various possible 
meanings of ἁρμονία in A Greek–English Lexicon: 1. Means of joining (I-1), 2. Joint 
(I-2), 3. Framework (I-4) 4. Agreement (II), 5. Musical scale (IV-1), and 6. Music 
(generally) (IV-2). In addition, Simmias also parallels “blend” (κράᾶσις) with 
“attunement.” Considering the definitions, harmonia can mean both an order or 
scale and an entity made by such ordering or scaling. For example, it can mean 
both (5) musical scale and (6) music made by a musical scale. In addition, it is not 
clear whether the harmonia is identical with the material constitution itself or is a 
different entity.125  Is the harmonia identical with the constitution of parts of musical 
instruments or musical sounds made by instruments? In the case of the soul and 
body, is the soul identical with the bodily parts or a different entity that depends 
on the body for its existence? Simmias’ attributions to the harmonia do not help us 
fix one meaning. As far as it is “invisible” and ‘’incorporeal,” it seems not to be a 
material entity but a musical scale or ratio. Yet he also says that it is “utterly 
beautiful and divine.” Can a musical scale be beautiful? It seems instead that music 
played by the scale should have that attribution. Indeed, Simmias mentions the 
“harmonia in sounds” later (86c7). However, music is a sensible thing and 
therefore it surely does not have the attribution of being “incorporeal” because 
sensibility is an essential mark of corporeal things according to the AA (79a1–2). 
We should consider that Simmias might see beauty in the incorporeal 
mathematical ratios or order on which music is based, because Simmias is a 
student of Pythagorean Philolaus (61d6–8). As C. C. W. Taylor points out, however, 
Simmias thinks that many people also hold the Harmonia theory.126 Can many 
people see beauty in mathematical ratios? Furthermore, Simmias dares to use the 
example of a musical instrument.  It is more probable that he finds beauty in 
musical sounds. Thus, although Simmias tries to give the characteristic of being 
                                                        
125 In C. C.W. Taylor’s options, we face difficulty deciding between options 2 and 3. See the 
previous footnote. 
126 C.C.W Taylor 2001, 54. 
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incorporeal to the harmonia, the attribution of beauty presupposes that it is a kind 
of sensible thing. In that sense, this analogy still retains an ambiguously 
materialistic understanding of the soul that is suggested in the introduction to the 
AA: a strong wind might “dissipate” the soul (77d7–e3).   
The term harmonia seems finally to be replaced by “blend” (κρᾶσις) in 
86b5–d3.127 A Greek–English Lexicon defines the meaning of κρᾶσις in this passage 
as a “combination” or “union.”128 It is not clear if the soul, as a blend of the bodily 
elements, is identical with the bodily conditions or is a different entity from them. 
When the soul is exactly the same as the bodily elements, it can also be a physical 
object, as when it is depicted as a fragile entity that can be dissipated by the wind 
in the AA. On the other hand, if the soul is a different entity, even though it 
depends on the bodily elements for its existence, Simmias suggests a kind of 
dualistic view: there are two different kinds of entity, but the soul cannot exist 
without the body. At any rate, Simmias’ definition of the harmonia is too vague for 
us to determine its ontological status. 
Second, while Simmias initially seems to follow Socrates’ argument, there 
are some differences between the two arguments. One is that Simmias’ comparison 
neglects some of the characteristics that Socrates attributes to the entity to which 
the soul is most similar. According to Socrates’ AA, the soul is most similar to “that 
which is (1) divine, (2) immortal, (3) intelligible, (4) uniform and (5) incapable of 
being disintegrated, and (6) which always stays in the same condition and state as 
itself” (80b1–3). However, Simmias depicts attunement as “something (1’) invisible, 
(2’) incorporeal, and (3’) utterly beautiful and (4’) divine in the tuned lyre” (85e4–
86a1).  The latter attribution ignores not only immortality but also (5) and (6) in the 
former attributions, which is a critical problem because it violates the context of 
                                                        
127 Theodor Ebert points out this replacement (Ebert 2004, 284). He also suggested the 
linage of this concept of mixture to the medical theories in Corpus Hippocraticum and those 
of Alkmaion (ibid.). 
128 The primary meaning of κρᾶσις is “blending.”  
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the AA. Through these six points, Socrates introduces one divine existence that the 
soul most resembles. That kind of existence includes all of those points, and 
therefore, they are not allowed to omit any of the points. All six characteristics are 
essential to show the ideal soul.129  
Third, the causal order of the soul and the body differs between the AA and 
the Harmonia theory. In the AA, the soul innately governs the body and works 
independently. However, in the Harmonia theory, the soul can be understood as 
a combination or derivative state of materials in the ambiguous definition. This is 
emphasized by the fact that Simmias also defines the soul as a blend (86c2). The 
soul as a “blend” clearly depends on the bodily elements for its existence. That 
blend is produced when the opposing bodily elements (hot and cold, dry and wet) 
are blended with each other (86c1–3). Following this definition, the soul as a blend 
seems to be produced when things are blended. It means that the soul is passively 
composed by the materials. Simmias summarizes his counterargument against the 
AA by assuming that someone has claimed that the soul is a blend of things in the 
body and is the first thing to perish in the so-called death (86d1–3). In expressing 
this claim, he omits the word “harmonia” and just uses the word “blend” (κράσις) 
to define the soul. Therefore, Simmias’ Soul-Harmonia theory seems to eventually 
suggest the idea of the soul as a blend, which emphasizes the character of the soul 
as a by-product of a combination of things. Simmias’ idea of the soul conceived as 
harmonia cannot be independent from the body as seen in the AA. Conversely, the 
soul is governed by its bodily constitution. 
                                                        
129  The character of (6) is especially important because it is also characteristic of ousia 
(οὐσία). Socrates starts his AA by suggesting a division of existence. One is what is 
composite and visible, the other is what is incomposite and invisible. He presents ousia as 
that which always stays in the same condition, and “particulars,” which can never be the 
same (78d–e). Ousia and particulars are in accordance with the division. They are 
foundational concepts theorized in the previous arguments (cf. 65d–e, 74a–b). Simmias also 
enthusiastically admits the idea of ousia at the end of the Recollection Argument (76e–77a). 
121 
 
Through these three points, we can see that Simmias does not follow 
Socrates’ argument correctly, and that he suggests another distinct view of the soul 
that includes serious ambiguity in his understanding of “harmonia.” 
Socrates’ criticism, however, is not directed at Simmias’ lack of 
understanding of the AA or his ambiguous definition of “harmonia.” Instead, he 
refers to a contradiction with Simmias’ other beliefs, which were previously 
presented in the Recollection Argument (RA) (72e–77b): according to the RA, the 
soul exists before it enters the human body. The Harmonia theory claims that the 
soul’s attunement comes together after all other traits, but is the first to perish. As 
such, those two theories cannot be compatible. Simmias agrees that this is a 
contradiction and withdraws his claim (92c11–e4).  
Simmias not only has an insufficient understanding of the AA, but also 
does not properly perceive what his theory includes. As we have already seen, his 
definition of Harmonia can have various meanings. Furthermore, that theory 
suggests a causal order between the soul and the body that opposes the RA, to 
which Simmias agreed. He could simply provide that problematic example of the 
harmonia in a lyre. Furthermore, he used the relationship between harmonia and 
material parts in the example in order to understand that between the soul and the 
body. However, this usage does not seem appropriate, since it is based on Simmias’ 
insufficient understanding of the AA; specifically he ascribes fewer features to the 
soul than those the AA requires. His claim did not include consistent definition or 
strict analysis of “harmonia” either. As a result of that, as we will see later, Socrates 
himself develops another Harmonia theory even after Simmias has given up on 
the theory.  
Socrates reveals that Simmias’ Harmonia theory is inconsistent with the RA. 
Simmias answers Socrates’ question about which he would choose, the RA or the 





The first one, Socrates’, he said, ‘by far. For the second has come to me with 
no proof but with a sort of plausibility and outward appeal, which is the 
basis on which most people believe it too. But I am aware (σύνοιδα) that 
arguments that give their proofs by means of what is plausible make 
hollow claims, and unless one guards oneself very well against them are 
utterly deceitful, both in geometry and in all other subjects. The argument 
about recollection and learning, on the other hand, has been provided by 
means of a hypothesis worthy of acceptance. Because it was said I think 
that it is as certain that our soul existed even before it entered a body as 
that there exists in its own right the being that bears the label “what it is”. 
And I have accepted that hypothesis, or so I convince myself, on both 
sufficient and correct grounds. So for these reasons, it seems, I mustn't 
allow myself or anyone else to say that soul is attunement. (92c11–e4, 
emphasis mine)130 
 
As we saw in section 1 of chapter 1 (the Defence of Death, 64b8-c1), 
ordinary people are ignorant of the philosophical motivations. Simmias’ fault is 
different from that of the ordinary people because it comes from an intellectual 
motivation to obtain the truth. However, it is still problematic since it shows 
conflict within his beliefs between the agreements in the RA and the idea of the 
Harmonia theory. As he recognizes himself, the Harmonia theory “comes to” 
Simmias “with plausibility and outward appeal” (μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ 
εὐπρεπείας), but the RA is demonstrated through a valuable hypothesis. 
Although Socrates does not point out the outward plausibility of the Harmonia 
theory, Simmias recognizes the danger of deceit probably thanks to his experiences 
“in geometry and in all other subjects” (92d5–6, see Text 3). So, what are the 
plausibility and outward appeal by which Simmias was deceived? He does not 
                                                        
130 This passage includes a kind of self-persuasion in Simmias: ‘‘or so I convince myself’’ 
(92e1). I will discuss this point in the concluding part of this thesis, comparing my reading 
with a different reading by Christopher Gill. 
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sufficiently explain plausibility; therefore, we need to assume what he intended. 
The term “plausibility” (εἰκός) is frequently used in the dialogue; it usually means 
likeliness or probability (62c9, 62e5, and in many points in the AA: 78c7, 81e3, 82a1), 
yet “outward appeal” (εὐπρεπεία) appears only once in the dialogue. A Greek–
English Lexicon defines the word as “goodly appearance” and “plausibility.” 
Simmias also says that those “plausibility and outward appeal” are the reason why 
“many people believe” the theory; therefore, that plausibility does not seem to 
depend on a high level of cognitive ability in philosophers or mathematicians. The 
Harmonia theory uses vivid examples such as the musical instrument and the 
blending of bodily hotness and coldness, and dryness and wetness. The theory also 
explains illness in a human being by reference to bodily conditions (86c3–6. See 
Text 2). Those sensible elements in the body (for example, a fever in the body) can 
be familiar and vivid to anyone. The Harmonia theory seems to be able to explain 
various phenomena with vivid images. However, such explanations merely depict 
specious reasons for the phenomena. Likely images are sometimes different from 
truth. In the dialogue Meno, Socrates interrogates a slave boy about the length of 
the lines in a square that has double the area of a square whose lines are two feet 
long (82d8–e2). The slave boy answers “Obviously double, Socrates”131 (four feet) 
(82e2–3), but this is wrong. As Simmias mentions geometry, it is specifically 
important that the subject does not depend on likeliness in producing a true 
answer.  
 On the other hand, the RA has “been provided by means of a hypothesis 
worthy of acceptance” to Simmias. The hypothesis of the Forms or “what it is” is 
certain to him. Furthermore, Socrates seems to use arguments that can never be 
denied by Simmias; for example, the Equal themselves can never be unequal while 
equal things always can appear to be unequal. The RA comes from a worthy 
hypothesis, and reasoning from the hypothesis is also undeniable for Simmias.  
                                                        
131 This translation of Meno’s phrase is from Sedley and Long 2010. 
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 Socrates explicitly reveals inconsistency between the RA and the Harmonia 
theory, to which Simmias has agreed. Furthermore, we can also see that the 
Harmonia theory includes critical faults: it cannot define the meaning of harmonia, 
and it does not correctly follow the AA and has a different understanding of 
causality. Interestingly, Socrates continues examining the Harmonia theory by 
defining that concept. This new version of the theory focuses on two kinds of 
relationship regarding harmonia: one is that between harmonia and its components; 
the other is that between harmonia and the way of harmonizing. This seems to be a 
more general explanation than Simmias’ version, because it does not rely on 
specific examples. I argue in the next section that it still retains some faults that 
come from Simmias’ original version of the theory, and we will also see that 
Simmias himself has inconsistent beliefs about harmonia. Socrates reveals the fault 
in the Harmonia theory in a clever way by suggesting the new version of the theory. 
 
2. Socrates’ Reconsideration of the Harmonia theory 
  
Socrates continues examining the Harmonia theory even though Simmias 
has already given up on it. This examination is divided into two arguments. 
 
(A) The relation between attunement (harmonia) and its components (92e5–93a10, 
94b4–95a3). 
(B) The relation between attunement and the way of attuning (93a11–94b3). 
 
Socrates suggests problem (A) first and then moves on to problem (B). In the 
conclusion to argument (B), Socrates and Simmias deny the premise that the soul 
is an attunement by reducing this idea to absurdity. Socrates then returns to 
argument (A) and confirms that the soul governs the body, even though the 
Harmonia theory states the opposite. Therefore, Socrates not only denies the 
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Harmonia theory, but also again suggests an opposing relationship of government 
between the soul and body. 
Argument (A) follows Simmias’ problem in terms of the fact that it deals 
with components and what they compose. Simmias is concerned with types of 
attunement which we can see in musical notes, products of craftsmen or bodily 
constitutions (86c3–8). In argument (B), Socrates departs from using a specific 
example and instead investigates the general meaning of harmonia by asking how 




Next, isn’t each attunement naturally an attunement according to the way 
in which it was tuned? 
Simmias: 
 ‘I don’t understand,’ he said. (93a11–13) 
 
Socrates asks about the general condition of attunement. Simmias cannot answer. 
This is a matter of course since his explanation of the Harmonia theory lacks 
sufficient consideration of the nature of attunement. His theory only suggests that 
attunement comes from its components through the examples and also includes 
ambiguity in the meaning of harmonia. Socrates criticizes the Harmonia theory by 
revealing its contradictions through argument (B) (93a11–94b3). 
 
(B1) An attunement, which is tuned to a greater or lesser degree, is a greater or 
lesser attunement (93a11–b4).132 (Premise 1) 
  
                                                        
132 “‘Isn’t it the case’, he said, ‘that if it were tuned more and to a greater extent—assuming 
that this can happen —it would be more of an attunement and would be a greater one, 




Simmias agrees with (B1) that attunement depends on the way of tuning. Thus, 
one must inquire whether this applies to the soul. This investigation also examines 
and reveals how the soul exists, using the following premises. 
 
(B2) No soul is more or less a soul than any other (93b5–8). (Premise 2) 
(B3) One soul “has intelligence and virtue and is good”, another “has 
unintelligence and wickedness and is bad” (93b9–c2). (Premise 3) 
 
These premises suggest the difference between the soul and attunement. In 
terms of attunement, there is a difference in degree depending on the degree of 
being tuned (B1). On the other hand, it is not assumed that a soul is “more or less 
a soul” compared to another (B2), while there are differences between the qualities 
of the soul; some are better, and some are worse (B3). Those who propose that the 
soul is attunement must explain those differences using the Harmonia theory.  
Simmias’ harmonia theory also implies a relationship between the bodily 
conditions and those of the soul in the example of illness: when the bodily elements 
are tensed or loosened “beyond proportion by illness or evils,” the soul must 
perish (86c4–6). However, it is not clear whether those conditions of the soul and 
body are identical or not. In other words, it is not clear whether the soul’s 
conditions are directly determined by body’s conditions. Socrates examines the 
quality of harmonia in a less ambiguous way, which shows a direct relationship 
between attunement and the way of tuning.  
Socrates then asks Simmias whether those making this argument might 
answer as follows: in terms of the soul’s virtue and vice, virtue is another 
attunement and vice is non-attunement. A good soul is tuned and contains another 
attunement, while a bad soul is not tuned and does not contain another attunement. 
Simmias admits that he cannot answer this question by himself, but says that it 
would be the answer of those who establish the Harmonia theory (93c3–10).  
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According to (B2), however, there is no difference in degree in terms of the 
soul’s being. Subsequently, the following premises emerge: 
 
(B4) If a soul is an attunement, then the attunement is not an attunement any more 
nor less than another one (93d1–5). (From B2 and admission of that the soul is an 
attunement) 
(B5) What is neither more nor less an attunement is neither more nor less tuned 
(93d6–8). (From B1) 
(B6) What is neither more nor less tuned has only an equal attunement (93d9–11). 
(Premise 4) 
(B7) No soul is more or less tuned (93d12–e3). (From B4 and B5) 
(B8) No soul could have any greater share of non-attunement or attunement (93e4–
6). (From B6 and B7)  
(B9) No soul could have any greater share of vice or virtue than another, if vice 
were non-attunement and virtue were attunement (93e7–94a7). (From B8. The 
content of the conditional clause regarding virtue and attunement is agreed at 
93c3–10) 
 
Based on these premises, and since a soul is attunement, the soul does not share 
any vice, as attunement cannot simultaneously has non-attunement. Therefore, the 
following matter is concluded: 
  
(B10) The souls of all living creatures will be good to the same extent (94a8–11). 
(From B9) 
 
We can see that (B9) conflicts with (B3), in which it is agreed that there are good 





‘Do you find it acceptable,’ said Socrates, ‘that this should be said, and that 
such should be the upshot of the argument, if the hypothesis that soul is 
attunement were correct? (94a12–b2). 
 
Simmias denies this, and it is confirmed that there is a defect in the Harmonia 
theory. However, several scholars have severely attacked argument (B). David 
Gallop’s comments get to the heart of the problem. He claims as following133:   
 
‘Attunement’ may be taken to mean either a tuning (attunement1) or a 
correctly tuned state (attunement2). It might be agreed that every 
attunement1 is an attunement1 equally, no one attunement1 more or less so 
than any other. But it may also be held that some attunements1 participate 
in attunement2 more or less than others, and that there is no contradiction 
in holding that an attunement1 participates in non-attunement2, i.e. lacks 
attunement2. Thus it could be admitted that every attunement1 is equally 
an attunement1, yet denied that every attunement1 is equally in a state of 
attunement2.  
 
According to Gallop’s criticism, any attunement can have a difference in degree in 
a different standard while holding its position as an attunement. Any kinds of 
attunement1 can be more or less attunement2. Therefore, the soul as attunement can 
be more or less tuned in terms of attunement2, although any soul exists as 
attunement1 all the same. In this case, it is not necessarily that (B3) conflicts with 
(B9), because souls have a difference of quality in terms of attunement2 although 
all of them hold their position as attunement1. 
C.C.W. Taylor also critiques Socrates’ argument (B) from a similar 
perspective. 134   He argues that ordering and being ordered are incomplete 
                                                        
133 Gallop 1975, 164. 
134 Taylor 2001, 62–65. 
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predicates and can be correctly completed by specifying the elements of ordering. 
Namely, phrases such as “… is a harmonia” and “… is ordered” should be corrected 
to “… is an ordering of elements of type E” and “… is ordered with respect to 
elements of type E,” respectively.135 Therefore, there can be, for example, two types 
of ordering: psychic and physical.136 It is possible for the soul to be ordered in one 
respect (viz. physically) but not in another (viz. psychically). Based on this view, 
soul can be attuned physically while it is not tuned psychically. Therefore, we can 
admit the difference of psychic quality in the soul as a physical attunement, and 
there is no necessity in contradiction between (B3) and (B9) either. 
Gallop’s and Taylor’s points are correct in the sense that Socrates’s 
argument is not based on a strict reduction to absurdity. However, Gallop’s 
argument cannot be used to defend Simmias’ claim, for Simmias calls the harmonia 
utterly beautiful and divine in his definition (85e4–86a1). Even if he admits that 
harmony is imperfect, it must nonetheless appear as ordered, beautiful and divine. 
Therefore, the meaning of Simmias’ harmonia vaguely includes both Gallop’s 
attunement1 and attunement2, and his definition of harmony would not allow their 
separation.  
Moreover, Simmias cannot use Taylor’s strict distinction of senses of 
attunement either. As I understand it, a focal point of Taylor’s criticism is that the 
same thing can be ordered and not-ordered at the same time in different aspects, 
but Simmias’ examples do not seem to allow such flexibility. In the example of the 
lyre, one can admit the degree of difference within attunement depending on its 
tuning. However, this does not entail that the sound of the tuned lyre is the 
diametrical opposite of the attunement–– namely, some chaotic sound. Insofar as 
it is tuned, it tends to be “beautiful and divine,” even if one can observe superiority 
and inferiority in each lyre. Therefore, when it is tuned materially, it must have the 
tendency to create a better condition. Following this example, Simmias must argue 
                                                        
135 Ibid., 62. 
136 Ibid., 63. 
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that a human soul should have a good or divine condition after being tuned. 
However, his view is careless and is not based on a strict analysis; he applies the 
example of the lyre to the case of the soul. Therefore, he cannot realize that souls 
can have two opposite faces: namely, good and bad. He assumes instead that if 
something is tuned using a certain method, the harmonia in it should be better or 
divine as a whole. If the sound of a lyre is bad, we cannot call it harmonia at all. In 
his understanding of the soul as a blend, when the bodily elements lose 
proportionate blending, the soul might perish at once. Bad blending entails the 
soul’s perishing. Thus, based on Simmias’ examples, if something is ordered 
physically, it should also be ordered as a whole, which cannot admit the condition 
that the soul as harmonia is ordered physically but not psychically at the same time. 
If Simmias were to use Taylor’s argument, he would have to withdraw his careless 
application of the example of the lyre to that of the soul and body.  
Therefore, even if Socrates’ argument does not constitute a strict proof, the 
dialogue Phaedo nonetheless correctly portrays Simmias as agreeing with Socrates’ 
criticism of the Harmonia theory.  
In their conclusion to argument (B), Socrates and Simmias return to 
argument (A) and clarify that the soul and body have a relationship that is the 
opposite of that between attunement and its components. They explain that when 
a body experiences heat, thirst, or hunger, the soul instead resists drinking or 
eating, as it rejects surrendering the body’s affections (94b7–c1). The soul governs 
every affection of the body, while “conversing with the desires, rages and fears as 
if it were the one thing and they another” (94d5–6). This situation is understood 
not only through specific technical arguments, such as the RA or the Harmonia 
theory, but also through general human behaviour. In the earlier parts of Phaedo 
(in the DD and the AA), the self-governing character of the soul is repeatedly 
investigated and agreed upon. Socrates also refers to Homer’s description of the 
sovereignty of the soul in the Odyssey (Phaedo 94d9–e1; Odyssey 20.17-18): “He 
struck his chest and spoke reproachfully to his heart: “Endure my heart. You once 
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endured something even more shameful”.” Through the arguments, Socrates 
concludes his criticism of the Harmonia theory: 
 
Text 6 
In that case, my excellent friend, it isn’t in any way right for us to say the 
soul is a sort of attunement. If we did, it seems we’d be agreeing neither 
with Homer, a divine poet, nor with ourselves. (94e8–95a2, emphasis mine). 
 
  Based on these considerations, I argue that the core of the criticism of the 
Harmonia theory exists in its discordance with Simmias’ own beliefs, and does not 
just depend on the strictness of reduction to absurdity. Socrates asks if the 
Harmonia theory is in accordance with (συνᾴδειν) Simmias’ other belief (92c3) and 
if it agrees with (ὁμολογεῖν) him (95a1–2). In fact, this theory cannot be compatible 
with either the RA or the soul’s governing character, which Socrates and the 
interlocutor have already agreed upon. The most important factor in Socrates’ 
criticism is the application of the Harmonia theory to their pre-existing beliefs, 
while its reduction to absurdity is a way to reveal the malfunction of this 
application. Thus, his conclusion also shows the importance of revealing the 
inconsistency of some beliefs about the Soul-Harmonia theory. If they cling to the 
theory of the soul as attunement, they cannot “agree with” themselves. Through 
these arguments, Socrates highlights a disagreement within themselves. In that 
sense, Socrates accomplishes his goal of making the interlocutor recognize his own 
problematic condition, namely, having inconsistent beliefs about the soul. By 
receiving Socrates’ examination, Simmias must inquire whether his beliefs 
regarding the soul are consistent or not. 
   
3. Further Problems within the Harmonia Theory 
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  Socrates undermines Simmias’ Harmonia theory by revealing its 
contradictions with the pre-existing beliefs held by Simmias in an explicit way. He 
also suggests another problem in the theory: the causal relationship between the 
soul and body. As we have already seen, Socrates deals with this problem in the 
latter part of argument (A), yet the dialogue also suggests it in a more implicit and 
clever way. As Dorter and Wagner suggest, the Harmonia theory is paired with 
Cebes’ argument against Socrates’ proof of the soul’s immortality. 137  His 
arguments is based on a metaphor of a weaver and a cloak (86e-88b). A weaver 
(soul) weaves many cloaks (bodies) and wears them out. Therefore, while a weaver 
(soul) survives longer than cloaks (bodies), the weaver eventually dies leaving the 
last cloak behind. In that metaphor, the soul is independent of the bodies. 
Moreover, it creates and wears them out until its own eventual death. This 
argument by Cebes emphasizes opposition to the causal approach of the Harmonia 
theory. Socrates realizes that he must more thoroughly study the cause of “coming 
to be” and “ceasing to be” in order to answer Cebes’ question (95e9–96a1). He also 
confesses that he was disappointed by the causal theories of natural science and 
Anaxagoras (96a–99d). Socrates’ Ideal Theory of causation (102a-107b) may 
therefore present one answer to Cebes’ argument in Phaedo.  
Moreover, I argue that Socrates suggests the problem of causation within 
the argument (B) of the Harmonia theory. As we have seen in section 2, Socrates 
defines the concept of harmonia (attunement) by himself in the argument (B): each 
attunement is naturally an attunement according to the way in which it was 
originally tuned. There is an implicit problem that we should recognize, which is 
that he never defines any agent who does the tuning, blending, or harmonizing. 
Specifically, in the example of the tuned lyre, one can easily assume that a tuner 
exists and holds the skills and maintains the standard for tuning. Even in the case 
of the soul as a blend of bodily elements, I think Socrates or his friends easily 
suppose an agent of blending (for example, gods). The agent of tuning is essential 
                                                        
137 Dorter 1982, 112; Wagner 2001, 82. 
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to understanding attunement. For example, even if the soul is an attunement 
composed of tuned bodily elements, if the tuner is the soul itself, the real cause of 
the soul is not the bodily elements. We should say that the soul as a tuner is the 
real cause of its own conditions. 
When looking for harmonia in other works by Plato, one might be concerned 
about the lack of an agent. For example, one can observe the harmonizing agent in 
the Laches, which is discussed as follows by the speaker, Laches: 
 
Whenever I hear a man discussing virtue or some kind of wisdom, then, if 
he really is a man and worthy of the words he utters, I am completely 
delighted to see the appropriateness and harmony existing between the 
speaker and his words. And such a man seems to me to be genuinely 
musical, producing the most beautiful harmony, not on the lyre or some 
other pleasurable instrument, but actually rendering his own life 
harmonious by fitting his deeds to his words in a truly Dorian mode, not 
in the Ionian, nor even, I think, in the Phrygian or Lydian, but in the only 
harmony that is genuinely Greek. 138 (188c6–d8, emphasis mine) 
 
ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἀκούω ἀνδρὸς περὶ ἀρετῆς διαλεγομένου ἢ περί τινος 
σοφίας ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντος ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἀξίου τῶν λόγων ὧν λέγει, χαίρω 
ὑπερφυῶς, θεώμενος ἅμα τόν τε λέγοντα καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ὅτι 
πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἁρμόττοντά ἐστι. καὶ κομιδῇ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς 
ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἁρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμοσμένος οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ 
παιδιᾶς ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι [ζῆν ἡρμοσμένος οὗ] αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τὸν 
βίον σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀτεχνῶς δωριστὶ ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ 
ἰαστί, οἴομαι δὲ οὐδὲ φρυγιστὶ οὐδὲ λυδιστί, ἀλλ᾽ ἥπερ μόνη Ἑλληνική 
ἐστιν ἁρμονία. (188c6–d8, emphasis mine) 
                                                        





According to Laches, a human should produce a harmony between himself and 
his words, and such a person is really a “musical” person. Laches clearly supposes 
an agent of harmony. Specifically, in the context of his speech, the object of the 
tuner is the relationship between the tuner (or speaker) himself and his words. 
Therefore, the dialogue supposes reflexive harmonizing here. The harmony does 
not seem to arise automatically or unconsciously, because Laches says that the 
person makes a concordance between “his deeds and words.” Furthermore, in the 
Republic, Socrates himself argues that justice allows the soul to determine its own 
business and govern and order itself, as well as to make friends with itself and 
harmonize its own three parts:  
 
And in truth, justice is, it seems, something of this sort. Yet it is not 
concerned with someone’s doing his own job on the outside. On the 
contrary, it is concerned with what is inside; with himself, really, and the 
things that are his own. It means that he does not allow the elements in him 
each to do the job of some other, or the three sorts of elements in his soul 
to meddle with one another. Instead, he regulates well what is really his 
own, rules himself, puts himself in order, becomes his own friend, and 
harmonizes the three elements together, just as if they were literally the 
three defining notes of an octave—lowest, highest, and middle—as well as 
any others that may be in between. He binds together all of these and, from 
having been many, becomes entirely one, temperate and harmonious. 
(443c9–e2, emphasis mine)139 
 
In this passage, Socrates supposes that a person harmonizes three elements within 
himself. That person is the agent of harmonization of the soul’s three parts which 
                                                        
139 Translation by C.D.C Reeve. 2004. Reeve’s translation is based on the text edited by S.R.S 
Slings. Platonis Rempublicam. 2003. Oxford Classical Texts, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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have different functions. As a result of that, he “becomes entirely one, temperate 
and harmonious” (… καὶ παντάπασιν ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ 
ἡρμοσμένον…) (443e1–2). There is also a difference between Laches and the 
Republic in terms of the object of harmonizing. While the person more holistically 
harmonizes his deeds in his life with his words in Laches, the person in the Republic 
influences or harmonizes the specific parts within his soul. Thus, the person in 
Republic approaches his inner conditions more directly. Both passages presuppose 
an agent of harmonization, which is clearly different from the Harmonia theory 
introduced by Simmias and reconstructed by Socrates.  
 As we can see in those two dialogues, the agent of harmonization and the 
way he harmonizes affects harmonia that is the result of harmonizing. Thus, the 
lack of a harmonizing agent in the Harmonia theory in Phaedo should not be 
overlooked. Indeed, we will see in the next chapter of this thesis that the life-giving 
agent has an important position in Cebes’ counterargument and Socrates’ Final 
Argument.  
The character of attunement differs depending on the agents. Neither 
Simmias’ Harmonia theory nor the refined version of the theory can correctly 
define harmonia without considering its agent. For example, the real cause of the 
tuning of a tuned lyre is not the materials that the instrument is composed of, but 
rather the tuner. Simmias’ theory is therefore insufficient as a causal theory, and 
Socrates’ reconsideration also identifies that flaw. Instead, Socrates discusses 
tuning by introducing the concept of sharing (μετέχειν). While reflecting that 
Plato’s other dialogues are clearly aware of the agent in harmonizing, we should 
consider the absence of the tuning agent in both Harmonia theories as Plato’s 
indirect suggestion of their defects as a theory of causation. 
Simmias could not find this problem of causation by himself. That 
ignorance is closely connected with his careless use of the term “divine” in his 
example of the attunement in the tuned lyre. This term is used in the AA in order 
to show the soul’s governing position over the body. Therefore, if he had followed 
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the AA correctly, he should have never used the term in that example since the 
attunement depends on the lyre. It is not a meaningless relapse that Socrates 
resumes argument (A) that deals with the relationship between the attunement 
and its components––even though Socrates has already revealed the contradiction 
in Simmias’ theory through argument (B)––because argument (A) once again 
emphasizes the causal relationship between the soul and the body. The soul 
governs the body and rejects disturbances from bodily desires. In addition, as I 
mention in the penultimate paragraph of section 2, Socrates quotes Homer’s work, 
which offers a vivid image of Odysseus restraining himself. Socrates gives 
Simmias, who is deceived by an outwardly plausible image of the Harmonia 
theory, the image of Odysseus that is endorsed by their examination of the soul. 
That image helps him to recognize again the soul’s governing function and the 
correct causal order between the soul and body. 
 
Conclusion of Chapter 4 
 
Socrates’ criticism of the Harmonia theory thoroughly reveals Simmias’ 
problematic beliefs regarding the soul. Simmias is forced to recognize that the 
Harmonia theory is inconsistent with his other agreements in the DD and RA. This 
inconsistency arises because of his insufficient understanding of the AA and the 
concept of harmonia. Socrates reveals this problem in both explicit and implicit 
ways. After Socrates explicitly reveals the inconsistency between Simmias’ 
Harmonia theory and his agreement of the RA, he clearly recognizes his own 
cognitive problem: he is deceived by outward plausibility and has inconsistent 
beliefs about the soul. Furthermore, the dialogue Phaedo suggests implicitly the 
absence of the tuner in the Harmonia theory, which may cause a critically 
problematic understanding of a governing order between the soul and body.  
Simmias is aware of a problem of his Soul–harmonia theory in the middle 
of the criticism (92c11–e4. See Text 3). It depends on apparent plausibility and does 
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not offer proof. Thus, the Criticism of the Harmonia theory saliently depicts 
Simmias’s self–discovery of his own false beliefs, and it also suggests a type of 
problematic discussion that deceives him. The criticism is specifically efficacious 
to Simmias, because it brings out his own experiences in geometry and all other 
subjects. Those experiences have taught him that arguments depending on 
outward plausibility are deceitful. Furthermore, Simmias recognizes that he is 
convinced of the RA, which is suggested by “means of hypothesis worthy of 
acceptance” (92d6–7). Thus, the Criticism causes him to find how he should trust 
arguments. 
The implicit revealing of the absence of tuner in the Harmonia theory urges 
the interlocutor to recognize his problematic mind-set in an ingenious way. The 
lack of a harmonizing agent in his theory does not seem to display a salient 
contradiction with other beliefs. However, that absence will consequently cause a 
serious problem in his understanding of the self, because it can deprive the soul of 
its control of the body or its ability of self-decision. The agent of harmonizing must 
be an indispensable factor in the concept of harmonia, which can be understood by 
the fact that Plato suggests an agent of harmonizing in his other dialogues. 
However, it is not clear how far the implicit suggestion of the absence of tuner 
causes Simmias to realize a fundamental problem in causation. In the next chapter, 





Chapter 5. Examination of the soul as the cause of life 
––The Final Argument of the immortality of the soul (102a11–107b10)–– 
 
Introduction to Chapter 5  
 
In the previous chapter, we have seen that Socrates reveals that Simmias’ 
Soul-Harmonia theory is inconsistent with his other beliefs in an ingenious way. 
Moreover, the soul-Harmonia theory implies a critical fault from the standpoint of 
causation. The tuner or agent of harmonizing should accompany harmonia. Both 
the theory and the articulated version of the theory suggested by Socrates, 
however, lack the agent or tuner. In other words, the Harmonia theory lacks 
reference to the true cause of harmony. The problem of causality is also 
emphasized when compared with Cebes’ counterargument. 140  Cebes uses an 
analogy in which the soul is likened to a weaver and the body to a cloak (87b3–e5). 
An old weaver wears out many cloaks and then weaves new ones again. The 
weaver exists much longer than do the cloaks; however, he will eventually die, 
leaving the final cloak. Therefore, the soul might finally perish after many births 
and deaths, and the body will also quickly disappear. In this analogy, since the 
soul makes the body, the body depends on the soul, which is in contrast with 
Simmias’ Harmonia theory wherein the soul depends on the body for its existence.  
Cebes follows the causal order of the soul and body suggested by Socrates 
and admits the soul’s other divine characteristics that are claimed in the AA. He 
seems to suggest a more reasonable understanding of the AA than does Simmias, 
who ignores some of soul’s essential characteristics and shows an error in his 
understanding of causality. Cebes, however, supposes that someone might refuse 
“to concede the further point that the soul does not suffer in its many births and at 
the end perish completely during one of those deaths…” (88a8–10). This statement 
                                                        
140 Ellen Wagner correctly points out this difference of causal order between the Harmonia 
theory and Cebes’ analogy (Wagner 2001, 82).  
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suggests a specific, different viewpoint on life. Those many births and deaths 
might be harmful to the soul. Considering that the weaver makes the cloaks and 
that the body that is likened to the cloak quickly disappears after the soul’s 
perishing, the soul arguably makes the living body.141 Therefore, Cebes seems to 
think that the soul is the cause of life. Nevertheless, the soul can suffer some 
damage through births and deaths. He inquires whether the soul as cause of life 
can suffer damage and finally perish. Socrates admits the seriousness of Cebes’ 
problem and states that they must “study thoroughly and as a whole the cause of 
coming–to-be and ceasing-to-be” (95e9–96a1). Thus, he suggests his hypothetical 
method via the theory of Forms (96a5–102a3) and the Final Argument (FA) 
regarding the soul’s immortality (102a11–107b10). Socrates must reply to Cebes’ 
view of the soul and life through those arguments. 
In this chapter, I argue that Socrates tries to improve Cebes’ understanding 
of life through the FA and his autobiography as a preliminary to the argument. 
The interlocutors have been greatly concerned about the soul’s death; however, life 
has not been fully discussed since the Cyclical Argument that suggested that living 
things comes from dead things (70c8–d1). In the FA, Socrates discusses life from 
the viewpoint of causation based on the theory of Forms.  
In Socrates’ approach, we should notice the following two points. First, 
while the FA might seem to be a completely abstract and general discussion 
because of its acute focus on language analysis within the theory of the Forms, this 
argument is strongly concerned with the interlocutor’s understanding of life: 
Socrates examines what it means to say that a thing has its own property. For 
example, one might say that Simmias is larger than Socrates. This expression must 
be corrected to be that Simmias is large by “providing to Socrates his largeness, 
                                                        




which exceeds Socrates’ smallness” (102c12–d1).142 However, if the interlocutor 
accepts Socrates’ perspective on life, this argument will change his understanding 
of life. He admits that the soul gives life to the body, but also assumes that this 
offering is harmful to the soul and eventually makes it perish (88a8–b2).  In Cebes’ 
understanding, the soul as the cause of life is consumable. Conversely, Socrates 
attempts to argue that soul’s animating function for the body cannot be harmful to 
the soul itself. Thus, Socrates replaces Cebes’ understanding of the soul and life 
with his version of the soul that excludes perishing.  
 Second, within the process of investigating life in the FA, Socrates retains 
his epistemic modesty both regarding the nature of the soul and the theory of 
Forms. This point is concerned with a method of philosophical investigation in the 
Phaedo. Socrates does not have a perfect foundation for the investigation. The 
hypothesis of the Forms is the strongest means for him in order to obtain wisdom; 
however, it still requires further examination. The soul’s essential characteristics 
are investigated based on the hypothesis (for example, in the RA) and through its 
affinity with the Forms (in the AA). Thus, without knowing the Forms, participants 
in the discussion cannot claim to know the nature of the soul. As we see in the 
previous arguments, Socrates and the interlocutors discover their soul’s 
intellectual desire for knowing the Forms. However, they do not discover the 
soul’s nature in Phaedo. In the FA, Socrates and the interlocutor discover that their 
soul must be the cause of their life. The body is not a cause of one’s life. Therefore, 
they must improve their soul as a real cause of their life but should not care about 
the body too much, since the body cannot be their core. At least, the body cannot 
retain its existence without the soul.  Socrates’ epistemic modesty implies that they 
must continue examining the Forms and their soul. Even though they discover 
some undeniable and essential characteristics of the soul (the intellectual desire 
and the animating function), it is insufficient to know its nature. However, based 
                                                        
142 Socrates says regarding this kind of expression “I seem to be on the point of talking just 
like a textbook, but anyway the reality is presumably as I say.” (102d3-4). He recognizes 
that this expression sounds like a highly technical one. 
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on their discovery of soul’s essential characteristics and the hypothesis of the 
Forms, they continue investigating the nature of their own soul. Socrates’ 
epistemically modest method of investigation in the FA suggests how one should 
continue investigating the Forms and the soul, following one’s intellectual desire. 
 Regarding interpretation of the FA, many scholars have considered the 
metaphysical status of the soul to be a focal point for the demonstration of the 
immortality of the soul, and the main controversy is about whether the soul is a 
Form or a substance.143 However, Socrates’ statements in the FA are often too vague 
for us to decide at the outset on a fixed status of this order. This might appear to 
be a weak point of this argument. Yet I emphasize that Socrates’ primary objective 
is to investigate the soul’s function as the cause of life. Socrates rather carefully 
retains his epistemic modesty about the metaphysical status of the soul. 
This chapter develops arguments as follows. First, I analyse Cebes’ counter 
argument and Socrates’ summary of it, which form the starting point of the FA. 
Second, I examine Socrates autobiography that suggests how the theory of Forms 
comes into being. This shows that Socrates begins considering causation from his 
own recognition of his own ignorance. In sections 3 and 4, I clarify the meaning of 
                                                        
143 Soul-Form view: Vlastos (1969, 318. n.70), Soul-substance view: Gallop (1975, 198), Frede 
(1978, 33-34), Rowe (1993, 261). Hackforth (1955, 165) sees a change of the soul’s 
metaphysical status within the FA. David Sedley has a different perspective on the soul’s 
metaphysical status. “Plato does not in this context show the slightest interest in 
distinguishing between metaphysically different kinds of thing: the thing considered as a 
candidate for the cause of some effect can just as well be a physical stuff like fire or bone, a 
mathematical process like addition, the good, a soul, intelligence, or a Form such as 
Largeness or Oddness. What determines the success or failure of the candidate cause is 
nothing to do with its metaphysical status, but purely, as we shall see, its logical or quasi-
logical relation to the effect” (Sedley 1998, 115). Sedley’s main objective in the article is to 
clarify the meaning of “cause” in Plato’s thought. Sedley thinks it is standardly “the thing 
itself, rather than some fact or event involving it” (ibid., 116). I agree with his focus on the 
function of cause rather than the metaphysical status of those causes. Yet my main target 
is to clarify how Socrates changes Cebes’ understanding of cause. In addition, I assume 
Plato recognizes the problem of status, considering the introduction of an anonymous 
person and Socrates’ replies to him at 103a4–c4 (I will discuss this issue in section 3 of this 
chapter). I assume Plato intentionally makes “Socrates” not determine the metaphysical 
status of the soul because Plato recognizes the seriousness of the problem. 
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the new concepts that are introduced in the FA; “the character in us” and the bearer 
of the essential character. The soul is depicted as the bearer of life, and therefore 
Socrates suggests that the soul cannot accept death. I argue that Socrates shows a 
different understanding of the soul and life from Cebes’ while retaining the correct 
epistemic modesty about the metaphysical status of the soul. Socrates’ perspective 
of life requires Cebes to change his understanding of the soul and life. In that sense, 
it promotes a correct pathway for Cebes’ self-discovery, showing that the soul 
must be his core and that it can never be damaged by its function of offering life to 
the body. Additionally, Socrates’ epistemic modesty regarding the nature of the 
soul implies that one should continue investigating the Forms and the soul. The 
FA suggests that self-discovery is not completed but requires further investigations. 
 
 
1. Cebes’ problem and Socrates’ summary 
 
Cebes offers a counterargument against the AA (86e6–88b8). His argument is 
different from Simmias’ Harmonia theory in that it admits the soul’s independent 
position, and moreover the soul’s function to make the living body.144 The last 
point is not clearly mentioned in previous arguments. Socrates summarises Cebes’ 
criticism after refuting the Harmonia theory and that summary is admitted by 
Cebes (95b8–e4). Compared to Socrates’ criticism of the Harmonia theory, he 
seems to treat Cebes’ counterargument more faithfully. Socrates immediately 
points out the inconsistency between the Harmonia theory and the RA, and 
furthermore he suggests his updated version of the theory. On the other hand, 
Socrates faithfully summarises Cebes’ counterargument and finds that it is a 
                                                        
144 Sarah Broadie claims a fundamental difference between “Plato’s soul–body dualism” 
and Descartes’ mind–body dualism (Broadie 2001, 295); she argues as follows: “The main 
difference, from which others flow, lies in Plato's acceptance and Descartes' rejection of the 
assumption that the soul (= intellect) is identical with what animates the body” (Ibid.).  
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serious problem. In that sense, Cebes’ argument appears more formidable to 
Socrates. Thus, we shall see the details of his counterargument.  
 
1.1 Cebes’ counterargument (86e6–88b8) 
 
Cebes initiates his refutation as follows:  
 
Text 1 
Well, the argument seems still to be where it was, and to be open to the same 
charge that we were making earlier. That our soul existed even before it entered 
its present form, I don't retreat from saying that this has been very neatly and, 
if it isn't tasteless to say so, quite sufficiently proved. But that it also still exists 
somewhere after we have died – there I don't think the point has been proved. 
Now I don't accept Simmias’ objection that soul isn't something tougher and 
longer-lasting than body, for I think it is far superior indeed in all those 
respects. (86e6–87a8) 
 
Cebes admits that the soul is “tougher and longer-lasting” than the body. This is 
crucially different from Simmias’ argument that the soul depends on the body for 
its existence: when the body perishes, the soul also perishes, just as the attunement 
in a lyre perishes when the lyre is destroyed. Admitting that the soul is tougher 
and longer-lasting than the body, however, does not indicate the soul’s 
immortality and imperishability. First, Cebes uses an example of a “weaver” and 
“cloaks” (87b2–87e5), and then he doubts the soul’ immortality from the 
apprehension that the soul’s coming into the body is the start of its destruction 
(87e5–88b8). Finally, as Cebes suggests, someone might say that if a person cannot 
demonstrate that the soul is completely “immortal and imperishable” (ἀθάνατόν 
and ἀνώλεθρον), it is necessary for the person, when he is about to die, to fear that 
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the soul should completely perish when disjoining the body (88b4–8). His 
counterargument includes two interesting points: 
 
(1) The weaver and cloak analogy (87b4–d3): 
Cebes interprets the relationship between the soul and the body by comparison 
with that between a weaver and cloaks. An old weaver makes many cloaks and 
wears them out. A human being is “longer-lasting” than a cloak. However, the old 
weaver dies earlier than the final cloak that he made. 
 
(2) Supposed opponent of the soul’s immortality 
Cebes imagines an opponent of the AA:145 the opponent admits our souls’ 
prenatal existence and that “after we have died, there is nothing to prevent the 
souls of some people from still existing and from being designed to go on existing, 
to be born many times and to die again, on the grounds that the soul is so tough in 
nature that it can endure being born many times” (88a4–8). Although granting that, 
he refuses “to concede the further point that the soul does not suffer in its many 
births and at the end perish completely during one of those deaths” (88a8–10) and 
says that “no one knows which death and which parting from the body make the 
soul perish” (88a10–b2). 
 
This analogy suggests two important things: (1) even though the soul is longer-
lasting than the body, this does not mean that the soul is eternal; (2) the soul makes 
                                                        
145 There is a textual problem at the passage introducing the opponent: “εἰ γάρ τις καὶ 
πλέον ἔτι τῷ λέγοντι ἢ ἃ σὺ λέγεις συγχωρήσειεν, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ 
γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχάς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ ἐπειδὰν 
ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνίων ἔτι εἶναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι 
αὖθις…” (88a1–6, emphasis mine). It is difficult to understand ἢ. Some editors delete it. 
Sedley and Long suggest two versions of the translation: “Let us suppose someone 
conceded even more to one who says what you are saying […]” (ἢ is deleted). “let us 




the body, which arguably means that the soul is the cause of the body’s being. As 
Gallop points out, the body “is causally dependent upon” the soul.146 The analogy 
part also says that the body “quickly rot[s] and disappear[s]” after the soul 
perishes (87e3–5).147 Thus, it seems that the soul animates the body and maintains 
its shape. In the second point, this argument admits the causal relationship 
between the soul and the body suggested in the AA and confirms the soul’s 
position as the cause. Even while admitting the soul’s independent and controlling 
position, however, Cebes suggests that the soul might perish after leaving the final 
body. The soul might grow old like a weaver, even though it has the characteristic 
of lasting longer. 
 The supposed opponent suggests a remarkable new interpretation of birth 
and death: repeated births and deaths might be harmful to the soul. Even though 
the opponent admits that the soul is tougher and longer-lasting, it might finally 
perish after numerous cycles of coming into, and departing from, the body. Cebes 
does not clarify how repeated birth and death are harmful. Yet we can assume the 
reason from the example. It states that the soul makes the body, which arguably 
means animating the body. In that case, the soul seems to offer life to the body, 
since the body quickly rots without the soul. In the AA, Socrates also says that the 
body is called “corpse” (νεκρός) when a human dies (80c2–3). After the soul 
departs, the body becomes a corpse that should be distinguished from a living 
body (σώμα). If life that the soul offers is finite, the soul would gradually lose it by 
providing life. If this assumption is correct, Cebes shows a peculiar view of the 
soul and life. The soul is exhausted in animating and departing from the body 
when the soul is the cause of life. This leads to a problem about whether the cause 
of life is an expendable existence. 
 In sum, I argue that Cebes suggests the following points. (1) the soul can 
be perishable although it is independent of the body and moreover the cause of 
                                                        
146 Gallop 1975, 150. 
147 “And, after the soul perishes, only then does the body show its natural weakness and 
quickly rot and disappear” (87e3–5). 
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life; (2) the soul can suffer through many births and deaths. Next, we have to see 
how Socrates summarizes Cebes’ argument. 
  
1.2 Socrates’ summary of Cebes’ argument 
Socrates summarises Cebes’ argument after rejecting Simmias’ Harmonia 
theory. I shall quote a long passage in order to show how faithfully Socrates 
summarizes Cebes’ argument: 
 
Text 2 
You think it must be demonstrated that our soul is both imperishable and 
immortal, if it is not to be unintelligent and foolish for a philosophical man to 
believe confidently, when he is about to die, that after his death he will fare 
better there than if he had lived a different life before he met his end. As for 
showing that the soul is something tough and godlike, and that it existed even 
before we became human beings—there is nothing, you say, to stop all of that 
being evidence not of immortality, but of the fact that the soul is long-lasting 
and existed somewhere previously for an unimaginably long time, and used 
to know and do a great deal. Anyhow, you said, that does not make it any the 
more immortal: on the contrary, the very fact of coming into a human body 
was the start of its perishing, like a disease. On this view, the soul really suffers 
as it lives this life and eventually, in what is called “death”, it perishes. Now 
whether it enters a body once or many times make no difference, you claim, at 
least as regards the fear each of us has. For anyone of any intelligence should be 
afraid, if they do not know that it is immortal and cannot offer an argument to 
show as much.” (95b9–e1, emphasis mine) 
 
Socrates’ summary seems to follow important points in Cebes’ argument 
faithfully, although some of his expressions are different from those used by Cebes. 
Specifically, as I emphasise in the text, there are three points that Socrates 
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apprehends from Cebes’ argument. They are: (1) the soul’s imperishability; (2) the 
tough and godlike characteristics of the soul; and (3) the soul’s entering the body 
like disease. 
(1) Cebes also admits that the soul is tougher than the body and endures 
numerous births and deaths. However, he is concerned that the soul could finally 
perish after surviving those births and deaths. Therefore, he requires the 
demonstration of both the “immortality and imperishability” of the soul. Socrates’ 
summary also adopts the word “imperishable” (ἀνώλεθρος) (95c1).   
(2) Cebes mentions the soul’s “tougher” characteristic but does not use the term 
“godlike” (θεοειδής); and moreover, this word is used only once in this 
dialogue.148 “Divine” is used in the AA and the Criticism of the Harmonia theory 
in order to depict the soul’s governing characteristic (80a3–4, 94e5). Cebes’ 
example of a weaver and his cloaks suggests that the soul makes the body, which 
emphasises that the body depends on the soul in terms of causality. The causal 
order in a weaver and cloaks moves in the same direction to that suggested in those 
previous arguments. The term “godlike” seems to refer to soul’s causality that can 
be found in Cebes’ example. Indeed, creation of a living body seems to be “godlike.” 
(3) Cebes’ argument shows that numerous births and deaths might be harmful 
to the soul. Socrates grasps that point and refers to the damage as “disease.” In the 
previous arguments, Socrates also emphasises that the soul is disturbed by bodily 
sensations. We have not seen, however, an argument that the soul damages itself 
in living or by animating the body. Socrates’ mention of disease covers the point 
that is newly introduced by Cebes, which is the soul’s suffering damage in births 
and deaths. 
 
Cebes’ argument and Socrates’ summary shows that Cebes has a peculiar 
understanding of the soul and life. Even if the soul is tougher and more long-
                                                        




lasting than the body as well as the cause of the living body, it might perish. 
Therefore, Socrates must investigate whether the soul as the cause of life can perish. 
This is indeed a tremendous problem concerning the nature of cause. Phaedo 
presents Socrates as follows: 
 
Text 3 
Now Socrates paused for quite some time and considered something by 
himself, and then he said: ‘What you’re seeking is no small matter, Cebes; we 
must study thoroughly and as a whole the cause of coming-to-be and cease-to-
be. So, if you like, I’ll recount my experiences concerning them; then, if you see 
something useful in what I say, you’ll use it to convince yourself about the very 
points you raise.’ (95e8–96a3).  
 
We cannot know directly what Socrates thinks silently. However, he is clearly 
concerned about cause, and his following argument’s objective is to offer an 
assertion by which Cebes convinces himself. Contrasting with Simmias’ argument, 
Cebes grasps focal points in the AA, especially in understanding the soul’s 
independence and priority in its causal relationship with the body. However, he 
reveals a critical problem in life concerning the soul as cause. Since he shares with 
Socrates some beliefs regarding the soul, this problem becomes more serious. 
Socrates must answer this final problem in order to retain their shared beliefs that 
include the soul’s immortality. Causality itself is a large and difficult topic; 
however, we should notice that Socrates is trying to offer a persuasive argument 
primarily to Cebes. Thus, Socrates confesses his own past problem in 
understanding causation in order to establish an introduction for their “Final 
Argument.” 
 




Socrates also confesses his past disappointment with the explanations of cause 
proffered by natural scientists, in that they did not seem to explain the true cause 
(96a5–99c6). He needed to investigate causation in another way, namely “the 
second voyage” (99c6-d2), which is an explanation of cause based on the theory of 
Forms (99d4–102a3).  
This confession is mentioned in Socrates’ autobiography, which shows how he 
found the theory of Forms that is used in almost all of the arguments in Phaedo. 
The autobiography can be divided into three stages: (1) Socrates found his 
ignorance regarding the cause of physical phenomena (96a5–97b7); (2) his 
disappointment in Anaxagoras’ explanation of cause (97b8–99c6); and (3) “the 
second voyage,” a new explanation of causation (99c6–102a3). 
 
2.1 Young Socrates’ recognition of ignorance 
 
In the first stage, Socrates confesses his enthusiasm for the wisdom which 
people called “natural science” when he was young (96a5–7). 149 It seemed “quite 
sublime” to him “to know the causes of each thing, why each one comes to be, why 
it perishes, and why it is.” (96a7–9). Thus, we find that young Socrates was also 
concerned with cause. Furthermore, his first example of questions in natural 
science suggests the cause of life, which is remarkable in interpreting the FA as a 
reply to Cebes’ counter-argument: “Is it when the hot and the cold start to 
decompose, as some people were saying, that living things grow into a unity?” 
(96b2–3). This inquiry seems to deal with the cause of living things in a 
                                                        
149 “ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἣν  
δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν” (96a5–7, emphasis mine). It is problematic to translate 
“περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν.” I follow Gallop’s translation of “natural science” (Gallop 1975, 
47 and 234). The word ἱστορία can be translated as “inquiry.” Indeed, C. J. Rowe translated 
“περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν” into “inquiry about nature” and Sedley and Long translate it into 
“research into nature” (Rowe 1993, 230; Sedley and Long 2010, 90). However, I think this 
phrase is a kind of label attached by other people. At least, Socrates does not define who 




materialistic view. From this investigation, Socrates tried to proceed to find the 
seat of perceptions, memory and opinion, and knowledge (96b3–9). However, he 
finally found himself facing a serious problem since he came to think he was 
“uniquely unqualified for this inquiry” (96c2–3). He states the reason why he 
thought that as follows:  
 
Text 4 
I was so utterly blinded by that inquiry with regard to the very things that, 
at least as I and others supposed, I had previously known clearly that I 
unlearned those very things that earlier I had thought I knew, on many 
subjects, but in particular why a human being grows. (96c3–8) 
 
This confession is important for two reasons. First, it depicts the exact moment 
when Socrates discovered his ignorance about what he knew. This occasion is often 
given to many other people by Socrates in Plato’s other dialogues (e.g. Apology, 
Gorgias, Meno). While we can see Socrates’ acknowledgement of his ignorance, for 
example, in Apology,150 this passage shows a specific occasion where he recognizes 
his ignorance about what he thought he knew. Second, Socrates dares to say that 
both he and other people supposed that Socrates knew something. Therefore, 
Socrates’ recognition of ignorance was not provided by other people. He found 
this problem on his own. In that sense, Socrates could not depend on other people 
to reveal his ignorance. 151  
He recognized his ignorance of what he thought he knew in several cases 
that concern growing.  
                                                        
150 “So I withdrew and thought to myself: “I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither 
of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, 
whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he 
to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know.” (21d2–8) Translation 
is by G.M.A Grube in Plato Compete Works 1997. 
151 c.f. A. G. Long 2013, 82: “In the Phaedo, as in the Hippias Major, we see that his self-




Text 5  
First case: Socrates thought the reason why a human being grows was “obvious to 
everyone” (96c8): 
[…] it is on account of eating and drinking. For whenever portions of flesh 
have been added from food to other portions of flesh, and portions of bone 
to portions of bone, and so too by the same principle stuff of their own kind 
has been added to each of the other stuffs, it is then, I thought, that that 
which was a small mass has gone on to become a big one; and that is how 
the small person comes to be large. (96c8–d5, emphasis mine) 
 
Second case: 
I thought my belief satisfactory when a large person standing by a small 
one seemed to be larger because of the head itself, and so likewise when 
one horse was compared with another. (96d8–e1, emphasis mine) 
 
Third case: 
[…] it seemed to me even more obvious that ten was more numerous than 
eight on account of there being two added to it, and that two cubits was 
larger than one on account of its exceeding the other because of a half. 
(96e1–4, emphasis mine) 
 
These three cases deal with different situations. The first case explains 
human beings’ growing by eating or drinking and by addition of physical 
materials. Thus, it is concerned with physiological growing. The second case deals 
with a quantitative relationship: a person is relatively larger than another person. 
This does not mean that the body of larger person is physically growing. The third 
explanation deals with a law of numbers and therefore is more conceptual than 
first and second cases. Dorter evaluates this difference as a progression of Socrates’ 
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interests: “Here Socrates’ interest has shifted from question of physiology to 
quantitative relationships […].”152 Moreover, he suggests that “the examples are 
carefully chosen to reflect a progression.” 153  The examples show progressions 
“from concrete objects […] to abstract quantities” and “from efficient causality to 
material causality.”154 I admit that there is a shift from a topic of concrete things to 
that of conceptual relationship. Yet we should also notice that Socrates mentions 
certainty in those cases. The first is “obvious to everyone”, and the second seems 
“satisfactory” to Socrates. Further, the third case is “even more obvious” to 
Socrates. Indeed, the law of numbers is undeniable. Understanding of the first and 
second cases arguably depends on understanding of the third case, since 
numerical relationships are fundamental and essential to the evaluation of 
largeness or smallness of both concrete things and quantitative relationships.  
Socrates thought those explanations were obvious. He found, however, a 
critical problem on a fundamental level: 
 
Text 6 
I don't allow myself to say even that, when somebody adds one to one, 
either the one it was added to has become two, or the one that was added 
and the one it was added to became two, on account of the addition of the 
first to the second. (96e6–97a2) 
 
Socrates finds a fundamental problem in growing. According to him, addition 
itself is a problematic concept. This concept can be applied to all of those three 
cases. When a particle of muscle is added to another, what becomes large? How 
can a person become larger than a smaller one by the head being added? If ten is 
larger than eight because two is added to the eight, what becomes ten? Does eight 
become ten by adding two? Or does two become ten? Socrates does not “allow” 
                                                        
152 Dorter 1982, 117. 
153 Ibid., 117. 
154 Ibid., 117. 
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himself to answer the problems regarding addition (Text 6). Socrates prohibits 
himself to think that he knows that answer. So what is the reason for the 
prohibition? He states his reason, in which we find that Socrates has serious 
difficulty finding a persuasive argument for himself: 
 
Text 7 
For I find it astonishing that when each of them was apart from the other, 
each turned out to be one, and they weren't two at that time, but when they 
came near each other, this supposedly became a cause of their coming to 
be two, namely the union that consisted in being put near each other. No, 
nor can I still persuade myself that if somebody divides one, this, the 
division, has now become a cause of its coming to be two. For then there 
comes to be a cause of coming to be two that is the opposite of the earlier 
cause. Back then, you see, it was because they were brought together into 
proximity with each other, and one was added to the other, but now it is 
because they are brought apart, and one is separated from the other. No, 
and I can no longer persuade myself that by using this approach I know 
why one comes to be, nor, in short, why anything else comes to be, or 
perishes, or is. Instead I throw together on impulse my own different kind 
of approach, and I don't adopt this one at all.155(97a2–b7, emphasis mine). 
 
                                                        
155 “θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἓν ἄρα ἑκάτερον ἦν 
καὶ οὐκ ἤστην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο 
τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι, ἡ σύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. οὐδέ γε ὡς ἐάν τις ἓν 
διασχίσῃ, δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι ὡς αὕτη αὖ αἰτία γέγονεν, ἡ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο 
γεγονέναι· ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι. τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι 
συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, νῦν δ’ ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ 
χωρίζεται ἕτερον ἀφ’ ἑτέρου. οὐδέ γε δι’ ὅτι ἓν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι, ἔτι πείθω 
ἐμαυτόν, οὐδ’ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἑνὶ λόγῳ δι’ ὅτι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον 
τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλά τιν’ ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ 
προσίεμαι.”(97a2–b7, emphasis mine) 
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Socrates is concerned about several things. Why does just being in proximity cause 
one to become two? If dividing one makes two, this explanation is opposite of the 
previous one. Both “union” and “division” are taken as causes to make two, 
although they are opposing things. It does not seem that Socrates criticizes each 
explanation; rather he is concerned that there are different and opposing 
explanations in one object. Although he does not explicitly say so, a true 
explanation of the cause of one object should be one. Furthermore, Socrates 
suggests a more fundamental problem: he cannot “persuade” himself that he 
knows the cause of being “one” in these kinds of approaches. We should say that 
oneness is a fundamental and simple concept. However, Socrates lost his 
confidence that he knows its cause. It is also remarkable that Socrates repeatedly 
mentions persuasion of himself.156 He finds the problem by himself without other 
people’s indication. Thus, Socrates says that “I throw together on impulse my own 
different kind of approach” (97b6–7).  
We have seen the process of young Socrates’ self-recognition of ignorance. 
It does not depend on other people’s indication but on finding his doubt of his own 
understanding of the concept of addition. He is concerned that the opposing 
explanations are adopted in one phenomenon. He could not persuade himself with 
those explanations, and he discovers a serious conflict in his own understanding 
of what is so fundamental a concept that it covers many other objects of his 
understanding. 
  We will see his solitary start of his investigation in his criticism of 
Anaxagoras’ theory and hypothesis of Forms in the following two sub-sections.    
 
2.2 Socrates’ disappointment with Anaxagoras’ theory 
                                                        
156 He also mentions requirement self-persuasion in the previous argument that discusses 
about “haters of arguments” (misologoi) (89d1). He distinguishes himself from “those who 
have spent time dealing with the arguments used in disputation (antilogikoi)” (90b9–c1). 
Socrates says “And I think that now I will differ from them only to this extent: I won't strive 
to make what I say seem true to those who are present, except as a byproduct, but instead 




 Socrates once had hope in Anaxagoras’ theory, since he heard from a man 
who read Anaxagoras’ book that “it turns out to be intelligence (νούς) that both 
orders things and is cause of everything” (97c1–2). Socrates was “pleased with this 
cause” (97c2–3) and thought it good that “intelligence should be cause of 
everything” (97c3–4), and supposed that “if this is the case, when intelligence is 
doing the ordering it orders everything and assigns each thing in whatever way is 
best”(97c4–6). Considering these statements, Socrates thinks that singularity and 
goodness are important factors for cause. These explanations of human growth in 
natural science are not concerned with goodness or why they should be so. 
Moreover, as Socrates himself apprehended, there were opposing explanations for 
one phenomenon. If intelligence can be the cause of everything, we do not need to 
establish plural and opposing causes to the one phenomenon. 
 However, Socrates was disappointed with Anaxagoras’ book, since he saw 
“the man making no use of his intelligence and not laying any causes at its door 
with regard to ordering things, but assigning the causality to air, aether, water and 
the like, as well as many other oddities” (98b8–c2). According to Socrates’ 
diagnosis, Anaxagoras’ causal theory is like explaining the reason why Socrates 
sits in the prison by his own bodily structure, namely as the physical mechanism 
of bones, sinews, flesh, and skin supporting his body (98c5–d2). The true cause of 
his sitting, however, should be that,  “the Athenians have decided that it was better 
to condemn me, on account of that I too have also decided that it is better to sit 
here, and more just to stay put and suffer whatever punishment they 
decree”(98e1–5). The bodily structure of a human being is not decisive in his action. 
Even if he does not have legs, if he decides to leave the prison, he would be able to 
ask someone to help him accomplish his hope. Indeed, Socrates says as follows:  
 
Text 8  
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For by the Dog, I think these sinews and bones would long have been in 
Megaera or Boeotia, transported by an opinion as to what is best, if I didn’t 
think it more just and honourable to suffer whatever punishment the city 
imposes, rather than to escape and run away. (98e5–99a4) 
 
Following Socrates’ interpretation of Anaxagoras’ theory, Anaxagoras describes 
how Socrates is when he sits in the prison, but he does not explain why he does so. 
For Socrates, causation must explain why it is the best to be or do so. In the case of 
Socrates’ sitting, the decision or opinion of Socrates is the cause.157 In terms of the 
explanation of cause in natural science, Socrates concludes that “they do not 
suppose for a moment that what is good and binding truly does bind and keep 
anything together” (99c5–6). Socrates reflects upon his action and thinks it better 
to stay at prison in order to receive the death penalty. His reflection upon good 
action should be the real cause in this case.  
 
2.3 The second voyage 
 
 After those investigations, Socrates found that he could not obtain that kind 
of cause and that he had not been able “either to find it myself or to learn it from 
someone else” (99c8–9). Therefore, he starts the “second voyage” (ὁ δεύτερος 
πλόος) (99c9–d1). He is worried that “I might be utterly blinded in my soul 
through observing things with my eyes and seeking to get hold of them with each 
of my senses.” (99e2–4). This is like that some of those who watch the sun in eclipse 
destroy their eyes, “if they don’t study its image in water or something of the kind” 
(99d7–e1). Thus, he must “take refuge in” theories (λόγοι) and then “look into the 
truth of things in them” (99e4-6). For that purpose, he hypothesizes the most robust 
theory and posits what harmonizes with the theory as true (100a3–5). Thus, we see 
                                                        
157  Neither of the following “second voyage” or the theory of Forms can offer this 
teleological causation. Plato might plan to unite all of the Forms under Goodness or the 
Form of Good. We might be able to seek for this project in his Republic.   
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here that he begins a hypothetical investigation after being disappointed by the 
existing theories of causality. This statement of Socrates is very important in 
understanding his method of investigation. Specifically, it is crucial to my project 
of clarifying self-discovery in the dialogue, since it implies how Socrates begins his 
investigation from a place where he cannot neither depend on other people in 
order to know the cause of growing nor find it himself.  
 It also includes several interpretational problems.158 For example, there are 
some terms or phrases whose meaning is not clear, for example, “the second 
voyage,” “take refuge in logos,” and to “harmonize with” the most robust theory. 
Now it is difficult to display all of the controversies encountered in seeking to 
understand these terms, but I attempt to show how the establishment of the 
hypothesis is connected to the FA. Beforehand, I explain the meaning of “the 
second voyage” in order to grasp the position of the hypothesis. First, “the second 
voyage” is sometimes explained as “the next-best way” (See A Greek-English Lexicon, 
Liddell and Scott, 1940). Indeed, it is introduced as the investigation undertaken 
after giving up direct observation of the growing phenomenon. So is the voyage 
the second best that is inferior to some direct understanding of causality? However, 
Socrates also denies the correctness of his own metaphor of the eclipse watcher in 
the case of his second voyage and he does not accept that “someone who, when 
studying things, does so in theories and arguments, is looking into them in images 
any more than someone who does so in facts.” (100a1–3) As Rowe points out, Plato 
sometimes suggests that the particulars are images of the Forms,159 and, as we 
specifically see in Chapter 2, the particulars have deficiency compared to the 
Forms. Thus, images include deficiency in some way. Considering this context, 
                                                        
158  Gallop suggests the interpretational problems in the second voyage in detail. He 
proposes three points: “(1)What is meant at 100a4 by ‘hypothesizing on each occasion the 
theory (logos) I judge strongest’ ? (2) How can the metaphor of ‘accord’ (a5) be interpreted 
in such a way that ‘putting down as true whatever things seem to me to accord with it, and 
as not true whatever do not’ will seem a logically defensible procedure? (3) How is this 
procedure related to its context, especially to the illustrations at 100b–101c?” (Gallop 1975, 
178) 
159 Rowe 1993, 240. For example, Phaedrus 250b3. 
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Socrates seems to deny that investigation in logoi suffers such inferiority to the 
actual facts. Thus, “theories” are not just images, and this hypothetical 
investigation is not inferior to the direct understanding of the cause of changing 
things. 
Socrates establishes the hypothesis as follows: 
 
Text 9 
Well, I’ll set about giving you a demonstration of the sort of cause which 
I’ve pursued. I’ll go back to those things that have been our frequent refrain, 
and start from them, first hypothesizing that there are such things as a 
Beautiful alone by itself, and a Good, a Large and all the rest. (100b3–7)   
 
Here, Socrates seems to hypothesise the Forms, which has been done in the 
previous arguments of Phaedo (65d4–e1; 75c7–d4; 76d7–e4; 78d1–5). Socrates says 
that if this hypothesis is accepted, he has hope to demonstrate the cause and find 
that the soul is immortal from those Forms (100b7–9). Yet it is not clear how these 
Forms can explain the cause. He then proposes another idea from the hypothesis: 
“It appears to me that if anything is beautiful other than the Beautiful itself, it is 
beautiful on account of nothing other than its having a share (μετέχει) of that 
Beautiful” (100c4–6, emphasis mine).  
 
Then Socrates announces his fundamental claim: 
 
Text 10 
[…] nothing makes it beautiful other than that Beautiful’s presence, or 
association (εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία), or whatever its mode and 
means of accruing may be. For I don’t go so far as to insist on this, but only 





The thesis that sharing the Beautiful itself is the cause of thing’s being beautiful is 
not deduced directly from the hypothesis of the Form of the Beautiful. Thus, I think 
we should think that both establishment of the Forms and concept of sharing are 
hypothetical theories. The latter cannot be deduced from the former, but depends 
on it, because without establishment of the Forms, that sharing is impossible. 
Additionally, they are not inconsistent with one another. I infer that Socrates 
establishes two hypotheses: (1) There are the Forms; (2) things have their 
properties on account of sharing the Forms. 
Establishing these hypotheses, Socrates does not admit existing 
explanations, even in a very simple case, such as that of something’s being large 
and that of a number becoming. So he does not permit the statement that one 
person is larger than another because of the head. It must be said that everything 
larger than something else is larger because of largeness (100e8–101a3). The former 
explanation is rejected because the head can be used as the reason for two 
opposing cases (101a7–8). For example, x is larger than y because of a head; y is 
smaller than x because of the head. Socrates also says that “even though the head 
is small, the larger person is larger because of it, and that this would be bizarre, 
somebody’s being large because of something small” (101a8–b2). Furthermore, in 
terms of two becoming, the cause of it is “getting share of twoness,” not the 
addition or division of one (101c4–6).  
 
2.4 The beginning of the Final Argument160 
 
Socrates establishes the aforementioned fundamental hypothesises from 
considering the faults in natural science, namely, the Forms and that things have 
their properties by sharing the Forms. The initial hypotheses are further confirmed 
                                                        
160 The rest parts of this chapter after this section are based on my forthcoming paper: Miura, 
T. 2018 (forthcoming). “Immortality and imperishability of the soul in the final argument 
of Plato’s Phaedo”  
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at the beginning of the FA. Two important points are agreed upon (102b1–3): (1) 
“each of the Forms exists” and (2) other things participate in the Forms, and are 
named after the Forms in which they participate. At this initial stage, we have 
acquired a foundational distinction regarding the Forms and particular things that 
will formalise our statements about things having characters. At this point in the 
dialogue, Socrates begins explaining how a thing becomes large or small. He 
introduces a new concept, ‘the character in us’, to explain how the character of 
large or small is present in us. 
Before moving to examination of the FA, I indicate a peculiar point in the 
second voyage. Socrates starts this voyage from the point where he cannot depend 
on himself and other people for investigating cause. This is a specific kind of 
puzzlement that is different from that which Socrates gives to other people. He 
found this difficulty and started the second voyage by himself. Furthermore, even 
in the process of the second voyage, Socrates implies a requirement of solitude 
clinging to the hypothesis: “[…] I no longer understand those other wise causes, 
and I can’t recognise them either. Suppose someone tells me why something or 
other is beautiful, and says that it is because it has a vivid colour or shape, or some 
other such thing. I ignore those other explanations, because I am confused when 
they are all around me, and I keep the following at my side, in my straightforward, 
amateurish and perhaps simple-minded way: […]” (100c9–d4). Socrates proclaims 
that he should cling to the hypothesis of Forms (100d4–8, see Text 10) and says, 
“[…] and I believe that if I cling to this I could never fall, but that it is safe to reply 
both to myself and to anyone else that it is because of the beautiful that beautiful 
things come to be beautiful” (100d8–e3). His investigation starts from a peculiar 
point in which he cannot depend on discussion with others. This should be noticed 
as a background of the Final Argument. Socrates thoroughly uses dialogue to 
examine himself or others, but he was forced to start his investigation from a doubt 
of existing theories of cause. Furthermore, he must cling to the hypotheses and 
reply “both to myself and to anyone else” (100d9) based on them. Those 
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hypotheses are foundation both in introspective speculation and discussion with 
others. 
 
3. The character in us 
 
Next, Socrates investigates the following problem: 
 
Text 11 
So if that’s what you are saying, whenever you say that Simmias is larger 
than Socrates, but smaller than Phaedo, don’t you mean that at that time 
both of these, both largeness and smallness, are in Simmias? (102b3–6) 
 
Cebes agrees with this. However, as Socrates says, the statement that Simmias 
exceeds Socrates is not true as a matter of fact (102b8–c1). Simmias does not 
naturally exceed Socrates because he is Simmias, but because of the largeness he 
happens to have. On the other hand, Simmias is exceeded by Phaedo because of 
the largeness that Phaedo has by reference to Simmias’ smallness. Therefore, 
Simmias is characterized as being large or small by being in the middle between 
them, “offering his smallness to Phaedo’s largeness to be exceeded, but providing 
to Socrates his largeness, which exceeds Socrates’ smallness” (102c11–d2). 
Furthermore, Socrates makes the following statement: 
 
Text 11 
For it seems to me not only that Largeness itself is never willing to be large 
and small at the same time, but also that the largeness in us never admits 
the small, and is not willing to be exceeded, but must do one of two things, 
either flee and retreat when its opposite, the small, is approaching it, or 




Socrates has introduced the concept of “the largeness in us.” We shall call this kind 
of character, ‘the character in us.’ Socrates recommends that the interlocutor 
changes their common expressions that “Simmias is larger than Socrates” or 
“Simmias exceeds Socrates” by saying that Simmias exceeds Socrates because of 
the largeness that he happens to have. He has proffered a new, more appropriate 
statement about that Simmias is large, in accordance with Socrates’ hypothesis. 
What happens then to the largeness or smallness in us, when Simmias is 
larger or smaller? Socrates avoids making a definitive declaration, and merely 
suggests possible options, to flee and retreat or perish. This alternative is applied 
to the subsequent concept of the bearer. If a thing can perish, it is difficult to admit 
this as a Form in the context of Phaedo; so this alternative is an important factor in 
deciding its ontological status. Hackforth claims that one of the alternatives, to flee 
or depart (103a1–2), is presented only to provide a case for the soul.161 Perishing is 
meant to apply to all other cases. According to Gallop, Hackforth’s interpretation 
would suggest that “the alternative is not meant as a real one in other cases.”162 
However, as Gallop says, considering its repeated application to plural objects, this 
alternative must retain its status as one of two options.163 Furthermore, we should 
notice that Socrates never declares which alternative occurs in any given case 
during the FA. In the case of both the perishability and the imperishability of the 
bearers, Socrates has reservations about their relationship with imperishability 
(106b1–c7). In the case of the soul, Socrates still suggests that an argument for its 
imperishability is necessary, if they cannot agree that the immortal must also be 
imperishable (106c9–d1). So, although this alternative retains its meaning, Socrates 
is undecided on whether the character in us perishes or retreats.  
After introducing the character in us, an intermission occurs when an 
anonymous person asks a question (103a4–10): although, in the Cyclical Argument, 
the opposites come to be from the opposites (e.g. the larger comes to be from the 
                                                        
161 Hackforth 1955, 148. n.3 
162 Gallop 1975, 195. 
163 Ibid., 195. 
163 
 
smaller), the FA suggests that the opposite cannot accept nor become its opposite. 
They seem to claim the contrary. However, Socrates claims that the anonymous 
person does not understand the difference between these two arguments (103a11–
c4);164 in the Cyclical Argument, Socrates claims that opposite things come to be 
from their opposites (the living thing comes to be the dead); on the other hand, the 
FA considers the opposite itself. In order to make the difference clearer between 
the opposite and the opposite by itself, Socrates adds the word “thing” (πράγμα) 
to the opposite to ensure that it is understood as “opposite thing” (103b3). This 
word, πράγμα, is also used in the Cyclical Argument (71a9–10): “‘So,’ he said, ‘we 
have a satisfactory grasp of this: all opposite things come to be in this way, from 
opposites?’”165 This one word (πράγμα) is important in implying that this section 
of the dialogue is not about opposite thing, but about opposites as they exists by 
themselves  
This intermission highlights Socrates’ characterisation of the peculiar 
character of the FA. In the argument, Socrates investigates the true cause of things, 
“the character in us” (e.g. heat, largeness, life), and this method differs from the 
Cyclical Argument. While the Cyclical Argument deals with living and dead 
things, the FA focuses on the true cause of life that makes things living. This 
difference suggests another problem regarding life and death. The definition of 
death is given in Socrates’ Defence of Death, as soul’s separation from death (64c4–
8). In this case, the separation happens in living things containing the soul and 
body. However, Cebes’ argument suggests another level of death. In his analogy 
of a weaver (86e6–88b8), Cebes admits the continuity of the soul after death as the 
                                                        
164  “Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας, Ἀνδρικῶς, ἔφη, 
ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. 
τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν 
δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ 
ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, 
ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὧν ἐνόντων 
ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα·” (103a11–c1, emphasis mine) 
165 “Ἱκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία 
πράγματα;” (71a9–10, emphasis mine) 
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separation; however, he points out the possibility that the soul can suffer 
destruction even after surviving the separation. In other words, Cebes’ counter-
argument suggests two levels of death whether he acknowledges that or not. One 
is the soul’s separation from the body, and the other is the destruction of the soul 
itself which is independent of the body.  
Socrates has already shown the soul’s endurance of separation through the 
three demonstrations of the soul’s immortality (the Cyclical Argument, the 
Recollection Argument, and the Affinity Argument). Then, he must deal with the 
second level of death and demonstrate the immortality to which it corresponds. In 
the Cyclical Argument, the dead and living things form a cyclical structure, and 
within it, the soul retains its continuity, enduring the separation. In the FA, 
Socrates deals with life itself which makes things live, and a central problem 
regards whether this life itself can accept death.  
Socrates introduces the character in us and suggests an accurate statement 
of things’ having some properties based on the hypothesis of Forms. If this part is 
considered carefully with the intermission, we understand how Socrates’ 
suggestion replies to Cebes’ problem concerning life and death. In addition, 
Socrates carefully retains his epistemic modesty in stating the ontological status of 
the characters in us, while Plato implies his recognition of the topic in the 
intermission.  His argument about the characters in us replies to Cebes with 
studious care. 
 
4. The bearer of the essential property 
 
Socrates introduces the notion of the bearer of the essential property that 
shares the same feature as the character in us: Socrates and Cebes agree that 
something is called hot and something else cold, and that these differ from what 
they call fire or snow (103c10–d4). Fire and snow are different from their relative 
qualities of hot and cold. However, fire cannot accept the cold, and snow cannot 
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accept the hot, as the hot and the cold do not accept their opposites. Snow retreats 
or perishes when heat approaches (103d5–8), and fire does the same when cold 
approaches (103d10–12). Socrates summarises the matter as follows: 
 
Text 12  
‘So is it true,’ he said, ‘concerning some things of this sort, that not only 
does the Form itself merit its own name for all time, but there is also 
something else that merits it, which is not the same as the Form, but which, 
whenever it exists, always has the feature (μορφή) of that Form.’ (103e2–5, 
emphasis mine) 
Ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, περὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος 
ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὑτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ 
ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἀεί, ὅτανπερ ᾖ. (103e2–
7, emphasis mine) 
 
This definition compares the bearer to “the Form itself.” The Form itself always 
retains its name, while the bearer retains its name only so long as it exists. It seems 
that the bearer cannot be a Form since the bearer is not the same as the Form. 
However, this definition is not decisive in terms of the ontological status of the 
bearer. This definition does not compare the bearer with any Form but with the 
Form itself. For example, the Form of hot itself can neither lose its character nor 
perish. Although fire is not the Form of hot itself, it retains the feature of the hot as 
a bearer of the hot. This statement does not say that a bearer is not a Form, but that 
it is not the Form itself that it bears. 
To clarify this definition, Socrates adds the example of threeness. Threeness 
is always called by its own name and by that of the odd, and likewise with twoness 
or fourness and the name of the even (104a5–b2). Socrates then proffers another 





[…] not only do those opposites evidently not admit one another, but there 
are also all those things that are not opposites of one another, but always 
possess the opposites, and they too seem not to admit whatever form is 
opposed to the form  (ἰδέα) inside them; instead, when it attacks, evidently 
they either perish or retreat. (104b7–c1, emphasis mine) 
 
It is noteworthy that in this passage “form” is referred to by the term ἰδέα, which 
is different from the term εἶδος that had been used in the general hypothesis. 
According to Gallop, these words can be used interchangeably. 166  However, 
considering that Socrates had already used the saliently different term “feature” 
(μορφή) to refer to the character of a bearer, we should not identify the two terms 
so easily.167  Moreover, the alternative used in the character in us is retained here 
(i.e. to perish or retreat). Although we tend to say that snow perishes when it meets 
heat, Socrates maintains his stance of retaining the alternative possibility for the 
bearer. In that sense, the ontological status of the bearer is still undecided. 
At the conclusion of his summaries (104c11–d3) Socrates defines the bearer 








‘Now Cebes’, he said, ‘would they be the following: those that, whatever 
they occupy, compel it not only to have their own form in each case, but 
                                                        
166 Gallop 1975, 236. n.72. 
167 These terms can have different meanings: the term ἰδέα is the immanent character and 
is perishable, while εἶδος refers to the eternal Forms. See Devereux 1994, 70–71. 
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also, invariably, the form of some opposite of something as well?’ (104d1–
3) 
 
The bearer gives things not only its Form (ἰδέα) but also some opposing Form. For 
example, fire gives not only its own Form but also the Form of hot in opposition to 
the cold. Since the bearer seems to give its own Form to what it occupies, the bearer 
itself seems to be the Form. However, this remains indeterminate, because it can 
mean both that a Form gives its own Form and that a thing which participates in a 
form does the same. 168   Socrates’ further explanation refers to the Form’s 
occupation: “[…] whatever the form of the three occupies, must not only be three 
but also be odd” (104d5–7). The Form (ἰδέα) of three, as a bearer of the odd, brings 
its oddness to things by its occupation. The reason that things become three and 
odd seems to be attributed to the Form of three. This example shows that the bearer 
at least can be a Form, but it does not follow that the bearer must be a Form. The 
Form can be given to the things even if the bearer itself is not a Form. This is 
because the bearer can give a Form that it participates in. 
Socrates then offers his second definition of the bearer:  
 
Text 15 
Not only does the opposite not admit its opposite, but there is also the thing 
that imports some opposite to whatever it itself attacks, and this further 
thing, the one that imports it, never admits the opposite of what is imported. 
(105a2–5) 
 
These bearers also have the function of denying the opposite of what they import. 
However, this function is not as direct as that of the Forms as the Forms never 
accept their opposing properties. For example, the Equal itself can never be 
unequal. The bearers do not admit that which is opposite to what they import. 
                                                        
168 D. Frede offers this reading of the statement about occupation (Frede 1978, 35). 
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Three does not admit the even when it imports the odd that is opposite to the even. 
Fire does not admit coldness when it imports the hot that is opposite to coldness. 
Understanding what bearers import allows us to realize what they must also deny. 
 
4.2 Being present in things 
 
Socrates gives another explanation how things get their characteristics. 
Moreover, he sees “another kind of safety” in this new answer (105b8). That 
answer is presented in terms of the bearer being in things: 
 
Text 16 
For if you were to ask me what it is that, when it comes to be present in 
anything’s body, makes the thing hot, I will not give that safe, ignorant 
answer — namely that it is hotness — but, thanks to what we now say, a 
more ingenious one: that it is fire. (105b8–c2) 
 
How can this explanation involve another kind of safety, and be called ingenious? 
We can see another kind of safeness in that this explanation also avoids committing 
some mistakes of natural science, e.g., as represented by Anaxagoras. As Fine 
suggests, fire cannot be used in explanation of opposite things in the same way as 
the head is used both for being large and small.169 The structure of Socrates’ body 
is not enough to explain why Socrates does not escape the prison.  However, as far 
as fire’s being present in the body is concerned, we can say that it will always be 
hot. 
Moreover, this new answer can deal with an item that is beyond the reach 
of the previous one. The previous one explains the cause by which x is f. It is 
because of the F itself. The new one explains that something causes things to be f. 
                                                        
169 Fine understands that this new answer provides sufficient conditions. The material 
explanation does not offer them (Fine 1987, 97). 
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Hence, it deals with a process. This is already implied in the statement about 
occupation. The occupying function explains how a bearer affects what is occupied 
by it. The function of being present explains the fact that some things are subject 
to change. 
Socrates suggests a series of considerably abstract arguments introducing 
the concept of bearer. We can see there that Socrates focuses on the peculiar 
function of the bearer, which has potential to reply to Cebes’ problem of life and 
death. According to his apprehension, the soul might be damaged through 
repeated life and death. In other words, this situation can be interpreted as 
meaning that the soul occupies the body and gives it life. Socrates generalizes such 
functions of the soul. In Cebes’ understanding, the soul can be damaged in its 
function as the life bringer. Socrates suggests a different kind of understanding of 
soul’s function. In the next section, we see that Socrates focuses on the soul’s 
function of occupation and being present.  
 
5. The soul as bearer of life 
 
The soul is introduced in terms of its being present; it is agreed that when 
the soul is present in the body, the body will be living (105c8–10). Then occupation, 
another function of a bearer, is credited to the soul: “In that case, whenever soul 
occupies anything, does soul always come to it bringing life?” (105d3–4).The soul 
always brings life to the body, so it cannot admit the opposite of life, namely death 
(θάνατος). We call that which never admits death as immortal (ἀθάνατος). 
Therefore, the soul is immortal (105e2–7). 
However, it does not simply follow from this that it is imperishable (106b1–
c7): if a character in the bearer is imperishable, that bearer might also be 
imperishable. If odd (uneven) is imperishable, then three is also imperishable. 
However, the odd can perish if the even approaches it, because the uneven is not 
imperishable. If the immortal is also imperishable, then the soul would be 
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imperishable as well as immortal. Otherwise, as Socrates says, they need another 
argument (106c9–d1). Cebes responds that this is not required, because “there 
would hardly be anything else that does not admit destruction, if the immortal, 
despite being everlasting, will admit destruction” (106d2–4). Socrates provides 
some examples of immortality, including God, the Form of Life itself and other 
immortals, and they would also be imperishable (106d5–7). Finally, they agree that 
their souls are also immortal and imperishable (106e8–107a2). Although the effect 
of these examples on the demonstration is not clear, D. Frede’s interpretation is 
efficacious in considering this point: 170 these examples are essentially alive. That 
which is alive can only pass out of existence by death. However, what is essentially 
alive cannot accept death. Therefore, there is no way that it can perish. 
We now need to confirm the position of the soul in this argument. The soul 
is introduced in the argument through the peculiar functions of the bearer, 
occupation and being present. Because the soul possesses these functions, it can be 
categorized as a bearer. However, the soul is introduced first from the perspective 
of being present, while the function of occupation is considered first in the 
definition of the bearer. This seems to be because of the peculiarity of the soul, 
which is that the essential property of the soul is not as self-evident as fire’s having 
hotness. Hence, they must begin examining what the soul “brings” to things. They 
can assume from their previous arguments that the soul’s essential function is that 
of imposing life: (1) an independent, governing function of the soul is agreed upon 
(e.g., 79a9–80a6, 94b–e). Furthermore, they assume that humans are constituted of 
soul and body (79b1–2). If we are constituted of those two and the soul is the 
governing entity, the status of being the cause of life should be given to the soul. 
(2) Death is defined as the soul’s separation from the body (64c5–8). If the soul’s 
separation constitutes death, the opposite of that (the soul’s presence in the body) 
must be the cause the life. Moreover, (3) Cebes’ example of a weaver and cloaks 
suggests that the soul as a weaver makes living bodies as soul’s cloaks. Thus, the 
                                                        
170 Frede 1978, 31–32. 
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statement that the soul is a bearer having this function results from previous 
agreements regarding the activities of the soul. 
The soul is categorized as a bearer having essential functions and is 
therefore declared to possess immortality. However, Socrates and his interlocutors 
do not know the ontological status or nature of the soul. This point seems to 
weaken the strictness of the FA. However, we must consider the FA’s purpose. 
Cebes’ argument to Socrates is that even a soul that undergoes separation from the 
body and makes the living bodies can be perishable. Socrates answers with the 
theory of Forms and the introduction of the concept of a bearer. By admitting the 
peculiar function of the soul as the bearer of life, we must also admit that the soul 
does not admit of death. Without death, it cannot have any way of perishing. If 
Cebes accepts this argument, he must give up his previous view that even a soul 
freed from dependence on a body must face perishing in the end. Socrates focuses 
on the soul’s function and suggests a more appropriate view of the soul. Even 
though many points in it remain undecided, it is still useful to reflect on Cebes’ 
inadequate view of the soul. Socrates’ completely different understanding of the 
cause of life makes Cebes’ presupposition in his understanding of life explicit. His 
perspective presupposes that the life that the soul causes might be consumable. 
Socrates suggests another possibility; the cause of life can never accept its 
deterioration.  
 
Conclusion of Chapter 5 
 
 The Final Argument offers a theory of the soul as the cause of life that is 
completely different from Cebes’ argument. In this theory, the soul would never 
be damaged by being the cause of life and giving life to the body. The FA is based 
on the hypotheses of the Forms and that things participate in them, which Socrates 
establishes because of his serious doubt regarding existing causal theory. 
Remarkably, Socrates recognized his ignorance of causation by himself. The 
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hypotheses are products of his solitary determination to investigate cause of 
generation and perishing. 
Although this argument is frequently called “Final” one and indeed this is 
the final demonstration of the soul’s immortality in the dialogue, it does not offer 
a final answer to the theory of the Forms or the soul’s metaphysical status. Socrates 
explicitly encourages the interlocutors to keep examining the hypotheses 
regarding the Forms (107b4–6).171 He also implicitly shows a very careful attitude 
in depicting the soul’s metaphysical status.  
In the FA, Socrates and the interlocutors discover that the soul should be 
the cause of life and that kind of life should not perish. Based on the discovery, 
they can agree at least that the body should not be their core because the body 
depends on soul’s animating function for its existence. Thus, their discovery of the 
soul’s function greatly affects their understanding of the core of themselves. The 
interlocutors had different perspectives of the soul and life, which ambiguously 
includes a materialistic view. Even in Cebes’ thoughtful counter–argument, the 
soul is an expendable type of the cause of life, which can be damaged by its offering 
life to the body. The soul in Cebes’ explanation looks like a kind of energy or spirit; 
it endures separation from the body and animates the material things, but it will 
perish eventually. Thus, the soul does not differ from the body regarding its 
necessary perishing. It seems to be a merely a stronger version of material things. 
Conversely, Socrates suggests a concept of the cause of life that can never accept 
perishing, which implies a critical difference between the soul and body. If Cebes 
clings to his perspective of the soul, every living thing perishes eventually. 
Conversely, in Socrates’ argument, the invulnerable soul requires a human being 
to improve continuously the soul itself even after death. Thus, the result of the self-
discovery affects one’s understanding of how one should live.  
                                                        
171 : “‘Yes, not only that, Simmias,’ said Socrates, ‘but you’re right to say so, and, besides, 
even if you all find the first hypotheses trustworthy, nonetheless you should consider them 
more clearly […]’.” (107b4-6) 
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The theory of Forms should be a foundation of the nature of the soul, 
because all the other arguments regarding the soul depends on the theory of Forms 
in Phaedo. Thus, that investigation of the Forms is also essential for knowing the 
nature of the soul. However, Socrates retains his epistemic modesty regarding the 
Forms and the nature of the soul: he suggests a requirement of further examination of 
the hypotheses concerning the Forms and makes correctly soul’s metaphysical status 
undetermined. When they continue examining the Forms, they also reinforce a 
foundation of their argument of the soul and can avoid being caught by a different 
perspective that presuppose a consumable type of the soul. 
The FA suggests a way of self-discovery focusing on the soul’s function, 
which is accompanied with Socrates’ modest and careful attitude for the 
investigation. It also implies that one’s way of understanding of himself suggests 




Chapter 6. Self-discovery through Socrates 
–– The meaning of Socrates’ deeds in the ending of Phaedo (115b1–118a17) –– 
 
Introduction to Chapter 6 
 
Socrates offers a way of self-discovery through the previous arguments on 
the soul, in which the demonstration of the soul’s immortality reveals to the 
interlocutors (and readers of this dialogue) the intellectual ability and desire 
within their own souls. In that process, Socrates also reveals interlocutor’s false 
beliefs in ingenious ways.  The dialogue also portrays Socrates as a whole person, 
with peculiarly positive, moderate, and sometimes joking attributes. In the very 
first part of Phaedo, the listener of this report from Phaedo, Echecrates, wants to 
hear about Socrates’ behaviour on his last day.172 He says “What then about the 
details of his actual death, Phaedo? What was it that was said and done, and which 
of his friends were with him?” (58c6–8).173 As for Echecrates, both of Socrates’ 
arguments and deeds are important for today’s reader. How do the deeds 
represent the philosophical topics depicted in this dialogue? Based on the interests 
and interpretations in the previous chapters, this thesis must ask whether or how 
Socrates’ deeds contribute to self-discovery. 
The ending of Phaedo includes rich descriptions of Socrates’ deeds. Yet 
some scholars have handled this part with indifference, seemingly avoiding 
addressing the text’s philosophical topics.174 On the other hand, other scholars 
                                                        
172  The dialogue in Phaedo takes the form of report from Phaedo to Echecrates about 
Socrates’ death. 
173 David White points out that the final part replies to Echecrates’ second question, namely, 
what Socrates did on his last day. White 1989, 283–284. 
174 Specifically, three famous commentaries seem to avoid considering this section seriously 
(c.f. Bluck 1955, Hackforth 1955, Gallop 1975).  Hackforth, for example, notes: “This final 
section needs neither summary nor comment” (p.187). His intention in this comment is not 
clear; however, I think we need to comment on that. 
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consider the meaning of the figure of Socrates. Should we find a kind of heroic 
figure in Socrates (Gill, Burger)? 175  Or is he a practitioner of philosophical 
purification (Dorter) 176  or “a laughing philosopher, moved by his desire for 
wisdom, appreciative of the pleasure brought by progress in understanding, 
unconvinced that there exists the need to choose between life and wisdom” 
(Stern)? 177  Notomi reads the realisation of selves in this whole dialogue by 
emphasizing some statements in the ending: “[…] dialogue becomes an essential 
medium for philosophy to enable us to realise our selves.”178 Socrates is “made into 
the ideal philosopher” 179  in the dialogue. Therefore, Notomi claims that “By 
recalling Socrates we are encouraged to become philosophers like him.”180  
I agree with Notomi’s emphasis on the topic of the self since the ending has 
important implications for self-discovery. Socrates’ final encouragement to his 
friends is to take care of themselves (115b5–8). Moreover, the text describes the lack 
of understanding of the self in Socrates’ best friend, Crito (115c2–d2). In addition, 
Plato describes in detail Socrates’ final deeds and the reactions of his friends, 
family, and a servant of the Athenian officers in the prison. In this way, the ending 
clearly depicts Socrates’ effects on others and explains how people reveal their own 
conditions through Socrates.  
However, it is still required to consider the position of Socrates who is the 
catalyst for self-revelation in the people around him. Is he an “ideal” philosopher 
whom other philosophers imitate? The answer cannot be so simple. This ending 
depicts a clear contrast between Socrates and his friends in their emotional 
expressions. Socrates displays a moderate attitude even at the moment of his death. 
In this sense, we find that he has settled himself by his own previous arguments 
that claim the goodness of death; thus he has internalised his understanding. 
                                                        
175 Burger 1984, 213. Gill 1996, 320, n.316. 
176 Dorter 1982, 177. 
177 Stern 1993, 178. 
178 Notomi 2013, 69. 
179 Ibid., 69. 
180 Ibid., 69. 
176 
 
Conversely, his friends cannot stop crying when they see him drink the poison. 
Through Socrates quiet and thoughtful deeds, his friends find a deficiency within 
themselves as philosophers. However, this chapter claims that Socrates himself is 
not in the best condition as a philosopher. Socrates does not have philosophers 
who are his equals and with whom he can have discussions as equals.181 Therefore, 
he is in a different condition from the philosophers in the ideal city depicted in the 
Republic, who are nourished and surrounded by similar comrades (540a4–b7). 
Socrates has a power to examine himself. This self-examination or understanding 
is also required, which I attempt to emphasize in this thesis. However, at the same 
time, objective discussions are also required to examine our beliefs sufficiently. In 
other words, we need both subjective and objective approaches in order to fully 
improve ourselves. In terms of the objective aspect, Socrates could not be in an 
ideal condition. Rather, the interlocutors are fortunate to receive Socrates’ 
examination. However, they cannot fully digest his examination nor manage their 
emotion. The Phaedo does not offer an ideal model of philosopher. We should look 
for a way to improve ourselves by making use of Socrates as a great stimulation, 
not as a perfect model. 
Considering the problems in interpreting Socrates’ deeds mentioned above, 
in this chapter, I argue that the final part suggests a way of caring for and 
discovering the self through Socrates’ deeds. This theme is discussed by mainly 
focusing on two aspects. One is that self-understanding is not completed by the 
interlocutors in the arguments. The other is that Socrates has internalised his 
understanding of what he should do as a philosopher. His deeds reflect his deeply 
                                                        
181 In his Parmenides, Plato depicts a young Socrates and great Eleatic philosophers sharing 
serious philosophical discussions as equals (or rather the old Eleatic philosopher seems to 
confront Socrates). However, there is a kind of anachronism in the fact that that young 
Socrates has come up with a theory of Forms which is developed in the middle period 
dialogue, the Symposium, Phaedo, and the Republic. In his autobiography in Phaedo, Socrates 
seems to rely on his own thought after losing hope in finding a correct theory of causality 
in the work of thinkers of natural science (99c–d). As far as we depend only on the 
information within Phaedo, we find that Socrates must have practised a solitary 
philosophical investigation for some time. 
177 
 
examined principles, which show Socrates as a peculiarly determined philosopher 
and therefore drastically different from his other friends in Phaedo. He discusses 
the characteristics of the soul, encourages interlocutors to take care of themselves, 
and his deeds amaze his friends. However, those arguments could not offer his 
friends the composed attitudes or confidence that are found in Socrates. His 
arguments and deeds will encourage them to improve themselves through self-
examination and to find their own weak points.182 
 This chapter analyses the details of the ending of Phaedo, in order to clarify 
the importance of Socrates’ deeds for self-discovery. I first examine Socrates’ final 
two requests where he asks his friends to cultivate self-awareness and to take care 
of themselves (115b1–116a1). He says that this will benefit Socrates, his family, and 
his friends themselves. However, Crito asks Socrates how he should bury him. 
This question implies that he still understands Socrates’ corpse as being Socrates 
himself, even though the previous arguments emphasised that the soul’s essential 
intellectual ability is independent of, and controls, the body. Then, Socrates asks 
the other friends to persuade Crito that ‘Socrates’ will leave this world and orders 
Crito to use correct terms, since speaking incorrectly has a bad effect on the soul. 
Second, I examine Socrates’ judgements in his deeds before drinking the poison 
(115a6–9, 115e7–116a1, 116a2–117a4), arguing that Socrates tries to do best even in 
small customary things. Third, I interpret the scene of drinking the poison and his 
last words, arguing that Socrates actively and carefully takes part in the process of 
his enforced suicide. His last words, asking Crito to offer a cock to Asclepius, 
shows gratitude for having accomplished the legal process of the death sentence 
                                                        
182 In Plato’s Charmides, Socrates criticizes the definition of self-knowledge as knowledge of 
knowledge (Charmides, 169a–b). In Alcibiades I, Socrates instead suggests that self-
knowledge is gained through seeing another soul. Just as we see ourselves through the 
images reflected in a mirror or another’s pupil, “Then if the soul, Alcibiades, is to know 
itself, it must look at a soul, and especially at that region in which what makes a soul good, 
wisdom, occurs, and at anything else which is similar to it” (133b7–10) (Translation by D.S. 
Hutchinson in Plato Complete Works 1997). Knowing ourselves is difficult, but Phaedo offers 
Socrates to us as a kind of mirror in order to support this process.  
178 
 
thanks to the poisonous drug. Fourth, I discuss two different evaluations of 
Socrates by a servant of the Athenian court officers and Phaedo. These two 
different appearances of Socrates also reflect their own conditions. According to 
their own dispositions, the quality of understanding of Socrates becomes different. 
The meaning of Socrates’ words and deeds are not completely or objectively clear 
to everyone. In order to understand Socrates, we should manage ourselves before 
or concurrently with that investigation. Finally, I examine Socrates’ position. It will 
show how his friends should deal with Socrates, and then suggest that the 
dialogue does not simply depict Socrates as an ideal philosopher. He has peculiar 
mightiness and disadvantage. Other friends must try to surpass Socrates if they 
are to follow Socrates’ encouragement to live better.  
 
1. Socrates’ two requests (115b1–116a1) 
 
 Replying to Crito’s question of what he wants his friends to do for him, 
Socrates requests two things. One is to take care of themselves, and the other is to 




‘Just what I always say, Crito’ he said, ‘and nothing particularly new. That 
is, that if you take care of yourselves, whatever you do will be a favour to 
me and mine, and to yourselves, even if you don’t undertake to do so 
now…’ (115b5–8) 
 
Socrates says that this legacy of taking care of themselves is not new. Indeed, 
through the demonstration of the immortality of the soul, Socrates claims that 
philosophers must make their souls “be alone by itself,” which can be seen as an 
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encouragement to purify their souls. Moreover, Socrates also encourages the 
Athenian people to take care of themselves in the Apology.183 
Yet, why will it be a favour to Socrates? It is easier to understand that the 
care will be a favour to themselves or to Socrates’ family, since it will make them 
good philosophers and good people which will benefit his family socially and 
philosophically. However, Socrates himself is leaving this world and parting from 
his friends. How does the care benefit Socrates?  
One possible answer for the question lies in the fact that his friends will 
also die and see Socrates somewhere in the afterlife. Socrates has already 
suggested that he hopes to see better people and gods in the afterlife. He is not 
particularly confident in his hope to see good humans there, but he affirms 
confidently that he will see better gods (63b9–c4). Thus, Socrates’ soul will look 
forward to doing philosophy with the souls of other philosophers. His friends’ 
souls can be good partners for him especially since he doubts that better people 
are waiting for him (63c1–2).  
However, this investigation will differ from their dialogues in this world, 
because they no longer have the body or perceptions. While Socrates does not (or 
cannot) clarify the actual condition of the investigation after life, his friends must 
continue to practise philosophy both for him and for themselves, since the 
purification of the soul is not completed by death alone and requires further 
philosophical investigation. This requirement is implied in the Affinity Argument: 
even after death, the polluted soul tends to come back to this world and inhabits 
animal or human bodies (81b–82b). Furthermore in the mythical story that vividly 
depicts the afterlife and the destinations of each soul, it is suggested that there are 
two stages even for philosophers (114b6–c6): “And of these, those who purified 
                                                        
183 “ […] but I went to each of you privately and conferred upon him what I say is the 
greatest benefit, by trying to persuade him not to care for any of his belongings before 
caring that he himself should be as good and as wise as possible, not to care for the city’s 
possessions more than for the city itself, and to care for other things in the same way.” 
(Apology 36c3–d1) G.M.A. Grube’s translation in Plato Complete Works, Hackett, 1997. 
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themselves sufficiently with philosophy live thereafter entirely without bodies, 
and enter dwellings fairer still than these, although explaining these dwellings is 
not easy, nor is there sufficient time in the present circumstances” (114c2–6). The 
souls of philosophers who live good lives will reach the upper part of the earth 
after death. Some who have purified themselves will go to a more beautiful place. 
Thus, Socrates seems to assume that there are two levels of areas for philosophers 
even after death.  
Philosophers need to keep purifying themselves in order to enter the higher 
area. In the previous parts of the dialogue, Socrates suggests that wisdom can be 
obtained only after death. This mythical story shows that the soul requires further 
efforts to reach the highest level even after death. These two perspectives 
regarding death are not inconsistent. The philosopher’s soul still needs death to be 
apart from the body, but also must continue purifying itself in the afterlife.  
Interestingly, in terms of the higher area, Socrates avoids stating any more. He 
cannot say anything about the conditions of the highest level for philosophers.    
Hearing about Socrates’ legacy, Crito asks him about burial: “And how 
should we bury you?” (115c3). Socrates says that Crito should do whatever he 
wants, “as long as you catch me and I don’t escape you” (115c4–6). He reprimands 
Crito’s statements, laughing:  
 
Text 2 
Gentlemen, I’m not convincing Crito that I am Socrates here, the one who 
is now holding a conversation––setting out remarks one by one. Instead he 
supposes that I’m that corpse which he’ll shortly be seeing, and he actually 
asks how he should bury me. (115c6–d2) 
 
 Crito’s question suggests that he does not understand Socrates’ arguments 
at all. According to a series of demonstrations of the soul’s immortality, the soul 
within us must be the true cause of our intellectual abilities and lives. Therefore, 
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the most essential part of us must not belong to the body and we should never call 
Socrates’ corpse ‘you’. In that sense, Crito still incorrectly considers Socrates’ body 
as Socrates himself, which fundamentally violates his assertion.  
We should also notice that Socrates uses a peculiar expression in text 2.184 
He does not say simply, for example, “I am my soul, not the body.” Rather, he says 
that he is the Socrates who holds the conversation. The real cause of Socrates’ 
intellectual ability must be within his soul. However, we are not sure whether the 
soul is identical with Socrates as a person. This reservation fits other passages in 




Socrates: “In that case, Simmias, our souls existed earlier as well, separate 
from bodies, before they were in human form, and they had wisdom.” 
Simmias: “Unless, perhaps, we get these items of knowledge at the time 
when we are being born, Socrates––that time is still left.” 
Socrates: “Well, my friend, in what other time do we lose them? Because of 
course we are not born with them in our grasp, as we just agreed. Or do we 
lose them at the very time when we get them? Or can you tell me some 
other time?” (76c11–d4) 
 
This passage distinguishes the soul from “we” or the human being. While the soul 
pre-exists, “we” are born by the soul’s act of inhabiting a human form. 
Furthermore, in the beginning of the Affinity Argument, Socrates makes a division 
within ourselves as follows: “‘Now,’ he said, ‘aren’t we ourselves part soul, part 
body?” (79b1–2). This division suggests that “we” are constituted of the soul and 
the body. Thus, there is still apprehension that ‘I’ or Socrates has not become a 
                                                        
184 Sorabji (2006, 33–35) interprets Socrates’ mention of “I” and “me” (115c4, 115c8) as 
indicating Plato’s interest in the individual and his recognition of “a contrast between the 
true self and individuality” (ibid., 35) 
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purified soul. Some of his personality still includes bodily factors. However, as far 
as Socrates makes use of his intellectual ability in having a conversation, this 
“Socrates” can include his core. However, his corpse can never be his own core. In 
that sense, what Crito is saying is absolutely wrong. 
Socrates attempts to examine the soul as the true core of a human being 
through the demonstration of the soul’s immortality; specifically, in the Affinity 
Argument, the Criticism of Harmonia theory, and the Final Argument. Through 
those arguments, Socrates attributes the essential functions of a philosopher and 
the cause of life to the soul. The purified soul must be the true self that they should 
aim to be, since only the soul possesses the essential intellectual ability of being a 
philosopher. All of the personal traits of a human in this world are not necessarily 
identical to the characteristics of the purified soul. Some characteristics of a person 
can be rejected or cut out in his true self. 185  Socrates also encourages the 
interlocutors to make their souls be alone by themselves. In that sense, he advises 
them to make them as close to their own core as far as possible. In order to 
accomplish this encouragement, they must understand what their own core 
should be. 
Socrates asks his other friends to correct Crito’s understanding. It would 
also encourage them to check their own understanding: 
 
Text 4 
                                                        
185 I think that the self is not a given and rather that the true self is the final target of our 
investigations. McCabe also seems to claim, from a wider viewpoint about Plato’s thought, 
that the true ‘person’ is not that which we can take for granted: “Socrates asked, “Who will 
you become [sc. if you visit the sophists]?” (Protagoras 311b). This formula, I shall suggest, 
captures something of Plato’s account of persons; and it shows him not lagging far behind 
Descartes. For he does have an account to give of the first person; but the context in which 
it is given pushes him toward the view that being a unified person is not something I can 
take for granted (once I start to focus on my own intellectual activities) but rather 
something to which I aspire. Being a unified person is for Plato an honorific title; hence, 
the proper question to ask is indeed, Who shall I become?” McCabe 1994, 264.  
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‘So you must give surety for me to Crito,’ he said ‘the opposite surety to 
the one Crito tried to give my jurors. For he guaranteed that I would stay 
behind, but you must give surety that I will not stay behind when I die, but 
will depart and be gone…’ (115d6–e1) 
 
Text 5 
‘For you need to understand, my excellent Crito,’ he said, ‘that not 
speaking correctly is not just a travesty of the point at issue, but also has a 
bad effect on people’s souls.’ (115e4–7) 
 
Through these statements, Socrates requests that his friends correctly understand 
who Socrates is according to the previous arguments. They should never think that 
the self of Socrates belongs to his body. The second request for correct 
understanding of the self also supplies the first one, to take care of themselves. As 
Socrates warns Crito, speaking incorrectly has a bad effect on the soul. In order to 
take care of themselves, they should understand and characterise the self correctly. 
 
2. Socrates’ judgement of deeds before drinking the poison  
 
 We find in this final part that Socrates has done various things before 
passing away. Furthermore, it should be noticed that he expresses his own 
judgments of traditional or customary things before his death. He does not simply 
ignore them, but does not follow the customs as they are either. There are three 
remarkable judgements: (1) the instruction to care for his bereaved family who will 
wash his corpse (115a6–9, Text 6); (2) a short order about how to bury him (115e7–
116a1, Text 7); and (3) the decision of the timing of drinking the poison (116e7–
117a3, Text 8).   
 
Text 6  
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The hour has more or less come for me to turn to my bath; for it seems 
better to take a bath before drinking the poison, and so not to burden the 
women with the job washing a corpse. (115a6–9, emphasis mine) 
 
Text 7 
No, you should cheerfully say that you’re burying my body, and you 
should bury it in whatever you like and consider most in accordance with 
the rules. (115e7–116a1, emphasis mine) 
 
Text 8 
‘Yes, Crito, the people you mention do these things with good reason ––
they think that they gain from having done them, you see–– and I myself 
won’t do these things, likewise with good reason. For I think I’ll gain 
nothing from having drunk it a little later, except making myself a 
laughing-stock in my own eyes by clinging to life, and by being tight-fisted 
when there’s nothing left to keep. No, come on’, he said, ‘do as I say and 
don’t refuse.’ (116e7–117a3, emphasis mine) 
 
David White correctly points out that Socrates thoughtfully chooses his actions in 
order to do what is good for him and other people “even if it is good only according 
to the fluctuating dictates of custom.”186 In terms of (1), Socrates arguably knows 
the custom of body washing after death and he tries not to trouble his family with 
bathing his body by doing it himself since this seems to him to be “better.” 187 He 
admits the custom but does not follow it exactly in a traditional way, since he 
                                                        
186 White 1989, 273. 
187 White says as follows: “According to custom, the body was bathed the day after death, 
so it would appear that Socrates’ request is somewhat unorthodox.” (White 1989, 301. n.1). 
He refers to Greek Burial Customs by Donna. C. Kurtz and John Boardman, Cornell 
University Press, 1971. Robert Parker also states that “The women of the household 
prepared the corpse for the ceremonial laying-out and viewing; it was washed, anointed, 
crowned, dressed in clean robes, generally white or red, and laid upon a bier strewn with 
branches and leaves.” (Parker 1983, 35) 
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wants to take away that work from his family. (2) Socrates himself does not care 
about his corpse, but he allows Crito to follow the custom. In that sense, Socrates 
does not ignore the custom nor does he intend to violate it, although he does not 
place much importance on the details of the burial itself. It is important that 
Socrates follows the customs, while he does not care about the way that his body 
is buried. (3) As Crito says, Socrates does not have to drink the poison for a while 
as other condemned people usually enjoy their final hours (116e1–6). However, he 
rejects Crito’s suggestion since he thinks that it would make himself “a laughing-
stock in my own eyes” (117a2) Socrates does not explain why he thinks that he 
would be a laughing-stock or ridiculous. One might think that it seems to be still 
worthwhile for Socrates to continue philosophical discussions even if he does not 
care about pleasant entertainment before his death. Yet we can assume his reason 
that he does not choose to cling to life or continue philosophical discussions with 
his friends; they have reached a conclusion in their discussions for the time being. 
Of course, it would require further discussion by themselves, as Socrates himself 
emphasizes that even the hypothesis of the Forms requires further examination. 
However, Socrates has argued that the soul will obtain wisdom after death in his 
Defence of Death and the Affinity Argument. Thus, for his own philosophy, 
leaving this world has an advantage, and as such it is absurd to cling to life when 
he is so close to being in a better place. Clinging to life would betray his own claims 
of the goodness of death. 
Socrates’ attitudes towards the customary things in (1) and (2) show that 
he makes all his decisions based on his understanding of goodness, even though 
the customs are not necessarily his main concern. His thoughtful decisions are 
exercised not only in philosophical topics but even in small customary things. In 
that sense, his friends and the readers of the dialogue can guess that his 
philosophical thought is present in every part of his life. As Socrates warns Crito 
to take care of even his short statements, all his deeds are organized and 
thoughtfully chosen. We can assume through the depictions of his deeds that his 
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arguments and his encouragement of the philosophical life are deeply internalized 
within him.    
Point (3) shows that Socrates evaluates his own deeds in a peculiar way. 
Neither his friends nor any custom would rebuke him if he postponed his death 
for a while. However, he thinks that he would mock himself if he clung to life. A 
reflective thought or inner judgment is at work here, since he cannot hope to be 
examined by friends, customs, or laws. This decision seems to be an individual one, 
since the evaluation of this deed is not necessarily clear to his friends and this will 
not benefit other members in the prison or any other people in this world. Rather, 
this evaluation is based on his own hope for a better afterlife. Therefore, this series 
of decisions shows Socrates’ concerns for both the goodness in this world and his 
own strong desire for departing to a better world.   
 
3. Socrates’ drinking the poison and his last words: 117a5–118a14 
 
 Socrates’ deeds in drinking the poison and his last words are peculiar and 
mysterious, since his attitude is strangely positive, and his intentions are not 
clearly specified. He accomplished the process of drinking the cup of poison in an 
active and calm way. However, the meanings of his deeds and last words are not 
so clear. In contrast to Socrates’ attitude, his friends’ reactions to seeing him drink 
the poison are very intense, and the reason for this is clear. They lose control of 
their emotions and cannot stop shedding tears when looking at Socrates’ drinking 
the poison. Phaedo clearly states that the reason for the outburst of emotion in his 
case is that he is lamenting his misfortune, not that of Socrates. Furthermore, 
descriptions of Socrates’ symptoms after drinking the poison are not violent, as 
Socrates and the jailor confirm that the effects of the poison are surprisingly calm 
ones. Christopher Gill points out that modern and ancient reports of hemlock 
poisoning includes more symptoms than appears in Plato’s description, for 
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example, nausea and unsteadiness of movement.188 According to his view, Plato 
choses which symptoms to describe in this scene to illuminate his argument.189 
Indeed, Plato seems to intentionally contrast the calmness of Socrates with the 
chaotic behaviour of the others. I focus on the following three texts: 
 
Text 9 
When Socrates saw the man190 , he said: ‘Very well, my excellent friend. 
You’re the expert. What should I do?’ (117a8–10, emphasis mine) 
 
Text 10 
As soon as he’d said this, he held the cup to his lips and drank it all, utterly 
coolly and contentedly. So far most of us had been pretty much able to hold 
back our tears, but when we saw him drinking and draining it, we couldn’t 
do so any longer, but at least in my case the tears came flooding out in spite 
of myself, and so I covered my head and wept for myself––not for him, you 
understand, but for my own fortune, that I’d lost such a friend. (117c3–d1, 
emphasis mine) 
 
Text 11  
By now it was pretty much the parts around his abdomen that were going 
cold, when he uncovered his head––as it had been covered––and said his 
last words: ‘Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius. All of you must pay the debt 
and not overlook it’ (118a5–8, emphasis mine) 
 
 In texts 9 and 10, Socrates shows his active and calm participation in the 
forced suicide. He voluntarily asks the jailor how to drink the poison, and finally 
                                                        
188 Gill 1973, 25–28 
189 Gill 1973, 28. 
190 The jailor preparing the poison. 
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drinks it in an utterly calm manner. He seems to be interested in the process.191 
However, faced with Socrates drinking the poison, his friends cannot hide their 
emotions and tears. Everyone except Socrates breaks down in sorrow (117d4–6). 
Phaedo directly confesses the reason for his tears, which is not for the misfortune 
of Socrates, but for his own misfortune in losing Socrates (117c9–d1). This 
confession shows that Phaedo is persuaded by Socrates that death is good for 
Socrates. His confidence in Socrates’ happiness is also suggested at the start of the 
dialogue, in which Phaedo says that Socrates seemed to be happy and that he 
thought Socrates would “fare well” when he reached Hades (58e3–59a1). However, 
in terms of his own future, Phaedo cannot stop lamenting his misfortune like an 
orphan who loses his father. In other words, he does not have sufficient confidence 
that he will be able to live a good life without Socrates. 192  Even after many 
discussions with Socrates, he could not acquire the equilibrium exhibited by 
Socrates. Socrates must therefore reproach his friends for their crying and urge 
them to have courage (117d7–e2). 
These last words in text 11 make two interesting points. First it is “we” who 
owe a debt to Asclepius, not just Socrates.193 Second, Socrates mentions a definite 
material item (a cock) that they must offer. Socrates takes the trouble to uncover 
his head in order to leave this final request. Therefore, Socrates seems to do so with 
a definite intention. There have been many controversies in interpreting Socrates’ 
                                                        
191   Phaedo depicts Socrates immediately before drinking poison as follows: “Socrates took 
it very gladly indeed, Echecrates, without any fear and with no change to either his colour 
or his expression. Eying the man with a characteristically mischievous look, he said: ‘what 
would you say about pouring a libation from this drink in someone’s honour? Is it allowed 
or not’” (117b3–7). This “eying … with a mischievous look” (ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας) is 
literally translated as “looking like a bull,” which can refer to looking angry. Yet Burnet, 
Rowe and Sedley and Long interpret this word as mischievous (Burnet 1911, 145; Rowe 
1993, 294; Sedley and Long 2010, 114). I think the latter meaning fits with Socrates’ attitude, 
considering his positive attitude before the description of ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας. 
192 David White suggests that “Their weeping tangibly evidences their lack of bravery at 
the prospect of facing life without Socrates.” White 1989, 283. 




last words. We can find the following interpretations: (1) Socrates was truly and 
historically in debt;194 (2) His last words offer gratitude for Plato’s recovery from 
illness;195 (3) This shows gratitude to the god of medicine for curing Socrates from 
life as if it were an illness;196 and (4) His last words offer gratitude for recovering 
from the illness of being a “misologos” (a hater of arguments). 197 
 I think, as Gill claims, Socrates’ words and deeds are intentionally chosen 
by Plato based on his own purpose in describing philosophical topics. 198  The 
historical reading in (1) does not seem to be sufficient to cover Plato’s intention if 
it claims that these details are merely to record historical facts. Similarly, reading 
(2) seems to claim that Plato wishes to record Socrates’ actual mentioning Plato’s 
recovery from illness at the last moment. We must ask why Plato chooses to depict 
those facts even if they are historically true. Moreover, against (3), death is not a 
specific medicine to recover from the illness of life, even though a philosopher 
requires death to go to the next step. According to the Affinity Argument, human 
souls retain their own pollution or contamination even after death. He is required 
to pursue death correctly and keep purifying his soul even after death. It is too 
early to thank Asclepius. Furthermore, regarding (4), the medicine for being 
“misologos” should be philosophy itself, therefore it does not seem to be proper to 
thank Asclepius for that. Socrates should thank philosophy itself. In addition, I 
wonder whether a cock is the proper offering to give thanks for the philosophical 
benefits.199 This material item seems to be a customary offer. 
Considering these interpretations above, I think his words convey his 
gratitude for the cup of poisonous medicine (pharmakon) which enables Socrates to 
execute his death sentence as a legal procedure. Here it is difficult to ignore the 
close relationship between the god of medicine, Asclepius, and the pharmakon 
                                                        
194 Gallop 1975, 225 
195 Clark 1952, 146. 
196 Archer-Hind 1883, 180. Bluck 1955, 143.  
197 Crooks 1998, 117–125. 
198 Gill 1973, 25–28 
199 Cf. Euthyphro, 14e–15a. Socrates wonders whether sacrifice is really good for gods.  
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which can mean both healing medicine and poisonous drug. The pharmakon is 
mentioned repeatedly in Phaedo. In the first part of the dialogue, Socrates receives 
a warning from a jailor to stop talking so much, since talking too much increases 
the body’s temperature which has a bad effect on the poison. If he keeps talking 
he will need to drink more cups of poison (63d6–e2). Socrates ignores the warning 
and continues his philosophical discussion. In other words, he takes a risk to 
endanger this legal procedure for the sake of his philosophical duty and the desire 
for continuing discussion. However, thanks to the help of the poison (it is probably 
a larger than normal amount, considering the jailor’s warning and the length of 
the discussions), he can accomplish his death. Readers of Crito may find that 
accomplishing this death sentence is also an important task for Socrates (Crito, 54b–
c), and indeed Socrates actively participates in the execution. Moreover, as we see 
in Socrates criticism of Anaxagoras’ book (section 2.2 of chapter 5 in this thesis), he 
mentions the cause of his staying in the prison, which is that “I too have also 
decided that it is better to sit here, and more just to stay put and suffer whatever 
punishment they decree.” (98e2–5). Socrates judges that following the legal 
procedure decided by Athenians is better and more just. Thus, following his own 
judgement is also important since it is concerned with goodness. At the final 
moment, Socrates confirms firmly that the poison offers death to his body without 
hindrance and that he has completed both his philosophical and legal duties. Since 
his friends also joined in the discussion, they were therefore accomplices in taking 
that risk. For that reason, they also owe a cock to Asclepius. Based on the 
speculation above, his last words can be interpreted as Socrates’ proclaiming that 
he has accomplished every duty of an Athenian citizen as far as possible, while he 
has also had time to finish his philosophical activities in this world. 
 
4. The final description of Socrates 
 





That, Echecrates, was the end of our friend, a man who was, as we would 
say, the best of those whom we came to know in those days, and also the 
wisest and most just. (118a15–17, emphasis mine) 
Ἥδε ἡ τελευτή, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἑταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς 
ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως 
φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου. (118a15–17, emphasis mine) 
 
This is the final sentence of the Phaedo. It is remarkable that the dialogue is finished 
with an evaluation of Socrates as a whole person, considering that this dialogue is 
sometimes referred to with the subtitle “On the soul.”200  As Echecrates’ question 
and curiosity shows, the soul is not the only essential topic of the dialogue, Socrates 
himself is too.  
While Phaedo evaluates Socrates with three superlative adjectives, a 
servant of the Athenian court officers, who came to bid farewell to Socrates 
immediately before he drank the poison, also interestingly describes Socrates with 
three superlative adjectives. 
 
Text 13 
I’ve come to know in other ways too during this time that you’re the noblest, 
kindest and best man ever to come here. And now in particular I’m quite 
sure that you aren’t angry with me, for you know the people to blame, and 
are angry with them. So now, since you know what I’ve come to tell you, 
                                                        
200 Lorenz, Hendrik, “Ancient Theories of Soul,” The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
(Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 
 URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/ancient-soul/>. 
This is likely based on the statements in Plato’s Epistolae XIII: “You are probably familiar 
with the name of Cebes, for he figures in the Socratic writings as taking part with Simmias 
in a discussion with Socrates about the Soul” (363a5–7). Translation by Glenn. R. Morrow 
in Plato Complete Works.  
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good bye, and try to bear the inevitable as best you can.” (116c4–d2, 
emphasis mine)  
σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ 
πρᾳότατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ 
δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, 
ἀλλὰ ἐκείνοις. νῦν οὖν, οἶσθα γὰρ ἃ ἦλθον ἀγγέλλων, χαῖρέ τε καὶ 
πειρῶ ὡς ῥᾷστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. Καὶ ἅμα δακρύσας 
μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῄει. (116c4–d2, emphasis mine)  
 
These two kinds of evaluations are different from each other. The servant’s 
evaluation of Socrates includes being the noblest and kindest man instead of being 
the wisest and most just in Phaedo’s final statement. He mentions that many 
prisoners curse him in anger when he instructs them to drink the poison. However, 
he knows that Socrates is not angry with him since he has come to know Socrates’ 
disposition through spending time with him and knows that he understands who 
is responsible for this death sentence (116c7–8). The servant focuses on how fairly 
and reasonably Socrates has dealt with him. His evaluation is based on the contrast 
between Socrates and other prisoners who have lost control of their emotions. In 
that sense, it is plausible that being the noblest or kindest is more important to the 
servant than being the wisest and most just. Socrates’ calmness of emotion and 
mild temper are important for the servant’s job and their relationship.  
On the other hand, for a philosopher or philosopher candidate, being wise 
should be the most important theme. Socrates’ moderate attitude, which shows 
him internalizing his arguments in his deeds, is proper for the qualification of 
being the best. Being the best is a common adjective in both kinds of evaluations. 
However, their perspectives are slightly different. For the servant, Socrates’ 
character is revealed in the way in which he deals with the servant. For Phaedo, 
his goodness is revealed in Socrates’ attitudes in confronting death by following 
his beliefs. Thus, why does Phaedo say that Socrates is the most just? His friends 
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and the readers of Crito know that Socrates actively carries out the death sentence 
without escaping prison. Moreover, we can see in this ending that Socrates 
thoughtfully completes that legal procedure based on his notion of justice. In that 
sense, Socrates is mostly loyal to the judgement made by the Athenian jury and 
that made by Socrates himself. Phaedo knows that Socrates fulfilled his 
philosophical and legal duties as far as possible; thus he can say that Socrates is 
the most just. 
Those two versions of evaluation reflect the conditions of the characters. In 
a sense, they use a kind of personal perspective to evaluate Socrates. They have 
shared their time and had discussions with Socrates. Phaedo and the servant have 
their own interests, based on which they try to understand and evaluate Socrates. 
Yet these versions of evaluation also include objective aspects. They have their own 
reasons for their respective evaluation, and if required, would be able to state these 
reasons. The servant sincerely clarifies the reason for his evaluation.  
However, their evaluations still reflect their own concerns and it seems 
difficult that they share their different evaluations at the same time, because they 
seem to have different interests in understanding Socrates. The servant is 
concerned with Socrates’ mild temper, while Phaedo is primarily interested in his 
philosophical arguments (although Phaedo is also impressed with Socrates’ 
positive attitude on the last day). Can the servant be persuaded by Phaedo’s 
evaluation of Socrates that he is the most just person? Socrates is still a criminal 
and in that sense is not different from other prisoners for the servant. On the other 
hand, Phaedo would not agree with the possibility of Socrates’ being angry 
towards the Athenian authorities mentioned by the servant, since Phaedo 
understands through the previous arguments that death is good for Socrates, and 
they cannot harm him by the death sentence. It is therefore impossible that Socrates 
could get angry in his final moment, and we find that the servant does not 
understand Socrates’ true attitude towards death.  
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Those people around Socrates try to interpret Socrates’ deeds and 
arguments based on their own experiences and thought. From the viewpoint of 
readers who have gone through all the arguments, Phaedo’s evaluation seems to 
show a better comprehension of Socrates than the servant’s since it includes the 
character of being “the wisest” which is an essential characteristic for a 
philosopher and it does not include a clear misunderstanding as is the case in 
servant’s evaluation. Yet Phaedo’s uncontrolled emotion shows that he cannot 
acquire the same disposition as that of Socrates although he shares with him the 
same argument and belief in the immortality of the soul. Phaedo could not 
internalise his agreement with those arguments, which suggests a severe gap 
between himself and Socrates. Thus, both characters have their own deficiencies in 
achieving the perfect understanding of Socrates’ deeds and arguments.  
What kind of perspectives do the servant and Phaedo have in evaluating 
Socrates? Their perspectives seem to include both subjective and objective aspects. 
While they draw on their own experiences to understand Socrates, they will be 
able to explain their reasoning to others in an objective form. Indeed, the servant 
states partially the reason of his evaluations.  However, the servant grasps Socrates 
kindness and nobleness by his experience of meeting other harsh prisoners 
without understanding Socrates’ real attitude towards death. Phaedo agrees with 
Socrates’ arguments and evaluate him as the wisest. However, he cannot manage 
his emotion following Socrates’ arguments regarding the soul. In that sense, he 
cannot sufficiently digest Socrates’ encouragement to improve his soul. In other 
words, their understanding of Socrates is not reducible either to the subjective and 
first-person perspective or the objective and third-person perspective. 
In recent years, the second-person perspective has been also seriously 
considered in the area of philosophy of psychology. According to Michael Pauen, 
that second-person perspective has an independent position and benefit, and it is 
not reducible to the first or third person perspectives. The difference between the 
three perspectives is defined in terms of epistemological access: “While the first-
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person perspective is subjective because it is based on, and directed at, the 
epistemic subject’s experiences, the third-person perspective, which is based on 
objective evidence and gives access to all kinds of entities, is objective. The second-
person perspective, by contrast, is intersubjective because it is a relation between 
an epistemic subject and another sentient being’s mental states.” 201  Pauen 
emphasises that the second-person perspective replicates mental states.202 Socrates 
and the servant or Socrates and Phaedo shares some arguments and experiences. 
Depending on their abilities, the servant and Phaedo attempt to understand 
Socrates. The Phaedo depicts their thoughts in the objective perspective. However, 
we can also assume that those characters would have to take up the second-person 
perspective in their attempts to evaluate Socrates, since they in fact confront 
Socrates face-to-face and have discussions with each other. This point is clear 
especially in the case of the servant. According to his own experiences, he assumes 
that Socrates is not angry with him and must be angry with the authorities. 
Readers of Phaedo might easily find that this assumption is wrong. Socrates’ 
thoughts and organised emotional disposition are beyond his understanding due 
to his own limited experiences with other prisoners. This is the servant’s attempt 
to understand Socrates.  
 When looking at Socrates, his friends see his peculiar characteristics and 
how he differs from them. This can be a step of self-discovery. In his arguments, 
Socrates shows the interlocutors that there are divine and intellectual abilities 
within their own souls. Although they share Socrates’ thought, his friends do not 
control their emotions and as such they are able to recognise Socrates’ peculiarity. 
Understanding this gap between themselves and Socrates will be beneficial to 
them as it reveals their own conditions, and this process comes from their sharing 
Socrates’ arguments and observing his behaviour. 
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5. The position of Socrates 
 
Socrates’ deeds show us his peculiar power as a philosopher. Does it mean 
that he is an ideal philosopher? Moreover, is he the best example that philosophers 
should directly imitate? The answer to this question is not simple. I think Phaedo 
depicts both Socrates’ peculiar power and his disadvantage as a philosopher. He 
has himself recognised his ignorance, received divine orders in dreams, and has 
steadfastly held onto his belief in examining everything, all of which makes him a 
powerful philosopher. However, he has also had misfortune in that he does not 
have a “Socrates” or someone who is equal to him. He cannot live and practise 
philosophy in conditions that are as good as that of the philosophers depicted in 
the Republic, who have organised education and comrades.203 He is a powerful but 
solitary philosopher. This solitude is not merely emotionally problematic. It 
represents a real problem in that it might lead to the danger that Socrates cannot 
undertake a sufficient examination of himself. Phaedo laments that he would lose 
Socrates. However, from the beginning, Socrates cannot have Socrates as a 
discussion partner. His rebuke of his friends for losing their emotions also implies 
his solitude. 
One might claim that Socrates can practise the perfect examination of 
himself on his own. Indeed, we find that he has a prominent ability to recognise 
his ignorance in Phaedo (Chapter 5, section 2). As we see in chapter 5, Socrates 
confesses his experience of becoming ignorant about what he had thought he knew 
in the natural science (96c), namely, how a human becomes large. In a more 
                                                        
203 Republic, 540a4-b5: “Fifteen years. Then, at the age of fifty, those who have survived the 
tests and are entirely best in every practical task and every science must be led at last to the 
end and compelled to lift up the reading eye-beams of their souls, and look toward what 
itself provides light for everything. And once they have seen the good itself, they must use 
it as their model and put the city, its citizens, and themselves, in order throughout the 
remainder of their lives, each in turn. They will spend the greater part of their time doing 
philosophy, but, when his turn comes, each must labor in politics and rule for the city’s 
sake, not as something fine, but rather as something compulsory.” Translation by C.D.C 
Reeve. Republic. 2004. 
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conceptual form, he inquires how one becomes two by being added with one. He 
could not find sufficient explanation of the cause (96d–97b). No thinkers of natural 
science, including Anaxagoras, could offer Socrates any correct and sufficient 
theory of causation (99c–d). Therefore, he started his own investigation. He started 
his “second voyage” by putting the strongest hypothesis, namely, the hypothesis 
of Forms. Raphael Woolf says that “No one interrogated him to reveal that his 
pretentions to knowledge were misplaced. The challenge to his supposed wisdom 
was provided by himself.” 204 However, Woolf also refers to the problem of first–
person authority and suggests that Plato was willing to convert it into the third-
person perspective. He calls that problem as the “problem of distance,” namely, 
that self-examination requires distancing oneself from one’s own beliefs.205 These 
beliefs are sometimes what constitute the self.206 Indeed, we find in Phaedo that 
Socrates himself admits that his strongest hypothesis requires further examination 
and that he has been pleased with the counterarguments from the interlocutors in 
this dialogue. Socrates could, uniquely, execute his investigation in the first-person 
perspective. However, he is also willing to meet better people and gods in the 
afterlife (63b5–c7). His solitary investigation is not perfect nor the best method, but 
he still needs to use the method in Socrates’ standpoint when he cannot have an 
objective discussion. Thus, I think Socrates retains a subjective way of investigation 
while he also needs an objective examination. Furthermore, as we see in chapters 
1 and 2 of this thesis, I argue that the self-recognition of intellectual desire is also 
important. While Socrates always wants to have productive discussions with 
others, he also retains this kind of subjective aspect, namely recognition of an 
individual motivation, in his investigation. Moreover, while Socrates mentions his 
hope to see better gods and people after life, he does not say that that meeting 
directly leads to obtain wisdom. Rather, he claims that wisdom is obtained when 
the soul becomes alone by itself (in the Defence of Death and the Affinity 
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205 Ibid., 102–103. 
206 Ibid., 104. 
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Argument). The discussion or dialogue is indispensable way to get close to 
wisdom. However, wisdom itself is a state of the soul, which arguably can be 
understood introspectively. 
How should Socrates’ friends go about their philosophical investigation? 
In the middle of the dialogue, Socrates himself encourages the interlocutors to look 
for an enchanter to persuade them about the immortality of the soul (77d5–78a9). 
Socrates sees that the interlocutors have a childish fear that the soul should be 
dissipated when it parts from the body, then recommends that they chant spells to 
their inner child every day until they put away that fear. Cebes asks Socrates where 
they will find a good enchanter when Socrates leaves. Socrates replies that they 
should look for the enchanter all over Greece and foreign countries, sparing neither 
money nor effort. Furthermore, as he says, they must try to find the enchanter 
within themselves, “because you may not easily find others more able to do this 
than you” (78a8–9). They must be enchanters by themselves after losing Socrates, 
which can also mean that they should look for the encouraging examiner of 
philosophy within each other. Socrates’ friends in Phaedo should keep practising 
philosophy by themselves and go further than Socrates with the advantage of 
having had him as a philosophical midwife.  
They must also recognise their own childish fear and overcome their 
weakness by themselves. Examining each other through discussions is an 
indispensable way for it. However, it does not mean that merely listening to the 
discussion is sufficient for improving themselves. They need to continuously and 
actively participate in the self-recognition of their intellectual desire for the Forms. 
Without that motivation, they cannot truly purify their soul. If they just keep 
discussing without desiring for knowing the Forms, they cannot get close to know 
them. As a result of that, they cannot acquire a better mind-set regarding the soul, 
because the theory of the Forms is a foundation to know the soul’s nature. This 
would cause inconsistent beliefs about the soul in the interlocutors, which force 





In this thesis, I intend to clarify the significance of self-discovery in Plato’s 
Phaedo. The requirement of self-discovery is suggested by two agents, a 
philosopher depicted in the arguments and the interlocutors who participate in the 
arguments. Self-discovery is implicitly suggested in the dialogue and is as 
important as explicit demonstrations of soul’s immortality. Self-discovery has 
specific objects and a complex method.  
 
 
Objects of self-discovery 
 
The objects of self-discovery are intellectual desire for the Forms, the governing 
function and false beliefs in the soul. The interlocutors must recognize their own 
desire for the Forms and their independency from the body. Their false beliefs or 
problematic mind-sets regarding the soul must become apparent.  Specifically, I 
attempted to clarify this desire in Chapters 1 and 2 (the Defence of Death and the 
Recollection Argument). Moreover, the governing and animating functions of the 
soul over the body are discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 (the Affinity Argument, 
the Criticism of the Harmonia Theory and the Final Argument). I analysed the 
revelation of the interlocutor’s false beliefs in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 (the final part of 
the Phaedo). Chapter 3 also includes both a recognition of the soul’s essential 
dispositions and the encouragement of avoidance of bodily disturbances. The 
worst kind of disturbance is characterised by its ability to cause the soul to 
misunderstand what is true. Thus, in a comparatively ontological argument, the 
Affinity Argument suggests the discovery of a close relationship between the soul 
and the Forms as well as revelation of a serious disturbance stemming from 
erroneous beliefs.  




Chapter 1.  
In the Defence of Death (DD), we saw that the goodness of death or the soul’s 
separation from the body is based on a desire for wisdom (Ch.1, sections 1 and 2). 
Through this intellectual desire, a philosopher manages his life by evaluating 
pleasures and pains (Ch. 1, section 3). The interlocutor, Simmias, is required to 
agree with the philosopher’s desire and self-management. He also needs to 
discover the desire in his own soul. 
 
Chapter 2. 
In the Recollection Argument (RA), I argued that the interlocutor’s practice of 
recollection is important (Ch. 2, specifically section 1). Simmias discovers his own 
intellectual desire to know the Forms by recollecting them from particular things. 
In this case, he also finds that perceptible objects in this world seemingly reveal 
shortcomings (Ch. 2, section 2). Although these shortcomings are apparent to the 
agent of recollection, they are not necessarily observable by everyone. Only those 
who desire to know the Forms perceive the objects’ shortcomings (Chapter 2, 
sections 2 and 3). The RA causes the interlocutor to experience intellectual desire 
and discover the shortcomings of perceptible things. Additionally, we are able to 
observe how the agent of recollection develops a cognitive function that is 
independent from the bodily perceptions. In that sense, the argument propels the 
interlocutor to the point at which he is able to discover his own intellectual desire 
and cognitive function through the experience of recollection.  
 
Chapter 3 
We observed Socrates’ treatment of his interlocutors’ unfounded fears and 
beliefs in the Affinity Argument (AA). The introduction to the AA describes its goal 
as the act of dispelling the interlocutors’ childish fear of the soul’s dissipation after 
death (Chapter 3, section 1). Socrates and the interlocutors determine the essential 
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characteristics of the soul: it is invisible, it “considers alone by itself,” and it 
governs the body. Through these characteristics, Socrates declares the soul’s 
affinity with the divine entity (Chapter 3, section 2). Socrates and the interlocutors 
also recognize that ‘philosophy’ provides an encouragement for the soul’s 
separation from the body (Chapter 3, section 4). The discussion of the AA would 
also improve the interlocutor’s soul because he could then develop more accurate 
beliefs about his own soul and free himself from inappropriate fear. The 
interlocutor is encouraged to cultivate his soul to be compatible with a divine 
existence and must remain separate from the bodily disturbance. The worst 
disturbance of the body is to make the soul misunderstand what is true. Thus, the 
interlocutor should distance himself from such a false belief about truth. 
 
Chapter 4. 
The criticism of the Harmonia theory is made in response to Simmias’ 
counterargument against the AA. Simmias’ Harmonia theory suggests that the 
soul is a kind of attunement consisting of material parts. According to the theory, 
the soul seems to be a derivative of the body. This theory ambiguously mixes 
inconsistent beliefs about the soul. Socrates reveals this issue in both explicit and 
implicit ways. Socrates explicitly highlights the inherent inconsistency of Simmias’ 
multiple beliefs about the soul (Ch. 4, sections 1 and 2), while also implicitly 
suggesting the culpability of the Harmonia theory for its lack of harmonizing agent 
(Ch. 4, section 3). This latter point also implies the importance of causation in 
considerations related to the soul. As we see in the AA, the soul governs the body 
and it must therefore be a causal factor. The body must not be credited with the 
ability to sustain or give rise to the soul. Simmias recognizes his false beliefs 
regarding the soul and also reaffirms its governing function. 
Simmias finds critical faults in his own beliefs, at least regarding Socrates’ 
more explicit statement. The problem related to the lack of a harmonizing agent is 
not resolved through the criticism of the Harmonia theory. However, Cebes’ 
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counter-argument considers the soul as the cause of life, which is more improved 
than Simmias’ argument regarding an understanding of causation. Thus, 
discussions of Simmias’ problematic beliefs involve two arguments. The criticism 
of the Harmonia theory strongly encourages Simmias to discover his faults in these 
complex ways.  
 
Chapter 5. 
Cebes’ criticism correctly grasps the AA, especially concerning the soul’s 
essential characteristics and its causal relationship with the body (Ch. 5, section 1). 
However, he has the following apprehension: even if the soul is stronger than the 
body and animates the body, it may perish after its many births and deaths (87d3–
88a1). Cebes acknowledges the soul’s animating function and its position as the 
cause of the living body.  
Socrates takes Cebes’ argument seriously; therefore, he confesses his 
previous disappointment with the existing causal theory and develops the Final 
Argument (FA), which considers the soul as the cause of life (Chapter 5, sections 
3–5). According to the FA, as the cause of life, the soul can never accept death, and 
must therefore be immortal. In Cebes’ counterargument, the soul can be damaged 
through the process of giving life to the body and enduring death.  
The FA offers a completely different perspective, which holds that the soul 
could never be damaged; as the cause of life, the soul does not merely endure death 
but never accepts it. The soul is the cause of life, furthermore, the cause should be 
imperishable. Socrates’ perspective on life encourages Cebes to drastically alter his 
own understanding of the cause of life. Cebes suggests the concept of a 
consumable soul, as the soul must be damaged through its own animating function 
of the body and through its separation from the body. According to his perspective 
on the soul, the soul is merely animating energy, and like the body, it will 
eventually perish. Even though the soul can exist much longer than the body, it is 
consumable and perishes in the end. In other words, the soul is merely a 
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strengthened or improved version of a physical entity. However, in the FA, the 
soul fundamentally differs from the body, similar to the way the Forms completely 
differ from particular things, which is suggested in the AA through its discussion 
on the oppositional nature of their essential characteristics. Therefore, Cebes must 
also drastically alter his perspective on both the soul and the body when he agrees 
with Socrates. Cebes’ mode of self-discovery affects how he lives and cares for his 
soul. If he clings to his first view––which is that of a consumable soul––he would 
be caught by a kind of nihilism that suggests that everything will perish in the end, 
which would diminish the value of self-improving. Conversely, if he adopts 
Socrates’ perspective on the soul, he must continue improving his own soul in this 
life and even after death.   
 
Chapter 6.  
The scene of Socrates’s death vividly depicts the contrast between Socrates and 
his friends. Although they share discussions with Socrates, only he can remain in 
a harmonized state when confronting his own death (Ch. 6, sections 1–3). 
Additionally, each person understands Socrates and his arguments in a different 
way (Ch. 6, section 4). Crito, Phaedo and the prison servant shows different levels 
of understanding of Socrates. The result of sharing discussions with Socrates 
differs depending on their conditions. This implicitly suggests that they are 
required to manage their own conditions and their respective internalization of 
concepts as encouraged by Socrates through his arguments. The final part draws 
a contrast between Socrates as a person and his friends. It suggests that the 
requirement of improving one’s self is based on one’s recognition of the true target 
in life and the removal of false beliefs. 
 
As we see in each argument suggested above, self-discovery is concerned with 
the intellectual desire, governing function, and false beliefs in the soul. This does 
not mean that Socrates and the interlocutors come to know the nature of the self 
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or of the soul when they are living.207 The soul is given multiple attributes; it is an 
entity independent from the body (in the DD), an intellectual ability (in the RA), 
an existence that is similar to the divine but which can be polluted by bodily desire 
(in the AA), the cause of life (in the Criticism of the Harmonia Theory and the FA), 
a core of “Socrates” (in the ending part of Phaedo). Socrates does not seem to 
provide an absolute definition of the nature of the soul. Furthermore, Socrates 
retains epistemic modesty about the metaphysical status of the soul and 
acknowledges the necessity of further investigation of the theory of Forms (in the 
FA), which are foundational to the arguments in Phaedo.  
The nature of the self is the final goal of the philosopher’s investigation but is 
not the direct object of self-discovery in Phaedo. The nature of the self can be known 
after coming to know the Forms, however, such knowledge is possible only after 
death. Socrates and the interlocutors recognize the intellectual desire of the soul 
and its governing or animating function. That recognition serves to encourage self-
improvement since it reveals goodness of a life spent pursuing the Forms and the 
harmful effect of false beliefs, which disturb the philosophical life. In this view, the 
nature of self is not considered as a fixed position from which one begins 
investigation; rather, it is a goal to which one aspires through the improvement of 
his internal conditions. The type of self-discovery found in Phaedo presupposes 
such a continuous improvement of one’s own conditions. 
 
Method of self-discovery 
 
                                                        
207 In Republic Book X 611b9-d6, Socrates discusses the difficulty in knowing the true nature 
of the soul. This point is criticized by Dorothea Frede: “That Plato leaves the nature of the 
soul undefined, however, is a reproach from which one cannot, in my opinion, so easily 
release him, for this violates a rule which Socrates himself in several Platonic dialogues 
imposes on himself and on his partners: not to try to argue that a certain thing possesses a 
quality as long as one has not grasped the nature of the thing itself (cf. Meno 100 b on 
“virtue”; Rep. I, 354 c-e on “justice”; implicitly the same criticism is made at the end of the 
Euthyphro 15 d and the Laches l99cff).” (D. Frede 1978, 39.) 
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Phaedo utilizes an ingenious and complex method to reveal self-discovery; on 
one hand, it illuminates the philosopher’s normative dispositions and the 
occasions in which he can recognize his intellectual desire. On the other hand, it 
describes the interlocutor’s development through his self-recognition of the 
intellectual desire, the governing function and false beliefs of the soul. 
This complex structure is displayed with particular salience in the RA. Socrates 
discusses the process of recollection and the agent’s desire to know the Forms. At 
the same time, Phaedo shows that the interlocutor wants to practise that recollection 
by himself. If the interlocutor accurately practises recollection, the desire to know 
the Forms must be included in that practice. Furthermore, with regard to the 
revelation of false beliefs, Socrates uses an ingenious method in his criticism of the 
Harmonia Theory. He not only notices explicit self-contradiction in the 
interlocutor’s claim regarding the Harmonia theory but also highlights an implicit 
and serious issue in the theory’s lack of a harmonizing agent. The interlocutor is 
required to admit his intellectual desire and his false beliefs in ingenious and 
complex ways. The success of Phaedo’s overarching argument of the Phaedo 
depends on the interlocutors’ agreement; thus, it is implicitly suggested that they 
must discover both their intellectual desire and false beliefs. 
This method of self-discovery reveals its peculiar characteristics, which require 
self-awareness and the individual experiences of a philosopher and the 
interlocutors. It seems to proclaim the requirement of a subjective approach to the 
philosophical life. However, as I have already suggested in the Introduction, some 
influential scholars reject such a subjective approach to developing an 
understanding of ancient Greek thought: Christopher Gill’s mapping of 
personality or selfhood in ancient Greek and modern thought draws on thorough 
research of ancient texts and offers a comprehensive view of the problems raised 
by significant ancient Greek thinkers. Gill suggests two different views of selfhood: 
one is “the subjective-individualist conception” found in modern or post-Cartesian 
ideas, the other is “the objective-participant conception” found in ancient Greek 
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ideas.208 According to Gill, we must interpret ancient ideas, including those of Plato, 
from the viewpoint of the objective-participant conception. Gill’s research 
primarily focused on Republic209 and Alcibiades I 210 to justify his interpretation of 
Plato’s thought; however, he also seems to think that his interpretation covers a 
wide range of ancient Greek ideas. Therefore, I believe that Gill’s research is a 
helpful stance with which I can compare my interpretation of Phaedo by focusing 
on its subjective aspects. 
Gill characterizes his two sets of conceptions through five key points.211 To 
compare my perspective with Gill’s view, I have adopted the first and third points:  
 
First point.  
‘I’ vs ‘Reason’: In the subjective–individualist conception, “To be a ‘person’ 
is to be conscious of oneself as an ‘I’, a unified locus of thought and will”212 In the 
objective–participant conception, “To be a human being (or a rational animal) is to 
act on the basis of reasons, though these reasons may not be fully available to the 
consciousness of the agent.”213 
 
Third point.  
In the subjective–individualist conception, “To be a ‘person’ is to be capable of 
the kind of disinterested moral rationality that involves abstraction from localized 
interpersonal and communal attachments and from the emotions and desires 
associated with these.”214 In the objective–participant conception, “To be human is 
to be the kind of animal whose psycho-ethical life (typically conceived as ‘dialogue’ 
between parts of the psyche) is capable, in principle, of being shaped so as to 
                                                        
208 Gill 1996, 11–12. 
209 Ibid., 240–320. 
210 Gill 2006, 344–359. 
211 Gill 1996, 11–12. 
212 Ibid., 11. 
213 Ibid., 11. 
214 Ibid., 11. 
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become fully ‘reason ruled’ by (a) the action-guiding discourse of interpersonal 
and communal engagement and (b) reflective debate about the proper goals of a 
human life.” 215 
 
 These two points show that the contrast between the two conceptions is 
related to both the cognitive and ethical structures of a human being. Regarding 
cognition, the modern subjective concept presupposes the essence of 
consciousness as ‘I.’ Conversely, the objective–participant conception focuses on 
actions guided by reason, while consciousness is not a central issue. In the modern 
subjective-individualist conception, morality should be abstracted from 
communal rules and desires connected with these communal rules. In comparison, 
the objective–personal conception regards “interpersonal engagement” and 
“reflective debate” about the “goals of a human life’’ as integral to becoming a 
“fully reason ruled” human being.  
 Regarding the cognitive structure of a human being, subjectivity is a central 
target of criticism in Gill’s argument of ancient Greek thought. Furthermore, he 
also rejects an autonomous or absolute perspective towards morality in ancient 
Greek ethics and perceives attributes of ethics that are more communal and 
participatory. To understand Gill’s claim and compare it with my own perspective, 
we need further explanation regarding “subjectivity,” since my reading 
emphasizes the subjective aspects of the dialogue. Gill explains Cartesian or post-
Cartesian subjective views using Wilkes’ criticism of subjectivity as a perspective 
that investigates the mind: 216  subjectivists ascribe “a privileged status” to the 
subject or ‘I’ as “a seat of consciousness” and also ascribe the privileged status to 
the “subjective perspective” in the “access of human psychology”; this perspective 
especially takes the form of the first-person view.217  Thus, ‘I’ is emphasized as the 
                                                        
215 Ibid., 12. 
216 Ibid., 6–7. 
217 Ibid., 6. 
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basis of our cognition, which gives the ‘I’ privileged status of knowing oneself; this 
is representative of the subjective view.  
In contrast to Gill’s perception of a human being in ancient Greek thought, my 
perspective of  Phaedo holds that Socrates and his interlocutors require a subjective 
way of self-examination. As I have suggested in Chapters 1 and 2, the interlocutors 
must recognize and experience their intellectual desire. If they do not experience 
that type of desire and instead live according to other kinds of desire (specifically, 
physical desire), they must cling to fake virtues, as suggested in the DD, and their 
souls may come into animal’s bodies after death, as suggested in the AA. 
Furthermore, if the interlocutors do not have that desire, the demonstration of the 
soul in the RA would be meaningless to them, because Socrates suggests that 
intellectual desire is an essential factor in recollection. 
Moreover, as we see in Chapter 3, in the AA the interlocutors must find that 
they still have a childish fear that the soul will dissipate after death, as if it had 
been blown away by a strong wind.  In other words, this fear is a result of a 
materialistic view of the soul, whether they hold it consciously or unconsciously. 
The AA also suggests the positive development of the philosopher’s soul after 
receiving the encouragement of “philosophy” (82d9–83b4).  The soul finally agrees 
with that encouragement and chooses a good life, which implies a soul’s self-made 
decision concerning life. We should also notice that this passage states that “lovers 
of learning” are “aware” that the prisoner perceives the philosopher’s 
encouragement (82d9–82e1). Thus, Socrates supposes the self-recognition of 
goodness of being released from the body. 
In his Soul-Harmonia theory (discussed in Chapter 4), Simmias also shows 
his unstable understanding of the theory. Socrates makes him recognize the 
critically problematic inconsistency in his beliefs. Why is that inconsistency 
problematic? It is problematic because the interlocutor himself agrees that he has 
these inconsistent beliefs. Indeed, the interlocutor, Simmias, finds that his 
Harmonia theory is inconsistent with the RA and chooses the latter since the 
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former is merely with “a sort of plausibility and outward appeal” but “with no 
proof” (92c11–d2).218 However, he is also “aware that arguments that give their 
proofs by means of what is plausible make hollow claims…” (92d2–4). 219 
Conversely, the RA “has been provided by means of a hypothesis worthy of 
acceptance” (92d6–7). Therefore, he offers Socrates the following agreement: “And 
I have accepted that hypothesis, or so I convince myself, on both sufficient and 
correct grounds. So, for these reasons, it seems, I mustn't allow myself or anyone 
else to say that soul is attunement.” (92e1–4)220.  Simmias discovers the issue of the 
Harmonia theory. It is noteworthy that Simmias discovers that the place where the 
problem arises is “myself” (ἐμαυτὸν). His acceptance of the hypothesis is also 
indicative of the point at which he has convinced himself. Simmias directly 
convinces himself and prohibits himself from claiming an incorrect theory.221 In 
this act of self-persuasion, he references his own experiences in geometry and other 
subjects (92d5–6). These subjects taught him that he should not rely on mere 
plausibility to find truth. This concept is particularly relevant to geometry because 
accurate demonstrations are needed to arrive at a correct answer in a geometrical 
problem. Thus, Simmias discovers a problematic inconsistency in his beliefs by 
making use of his own experiences, which took place outside of the discussion 
itself. 
These points which suggest the requirement of self-awareness of 
intellectual desire and problematic inconsistency cannot be reduced to mere 
objective discussions. The dialogue of Phaedo displays various and ingenious 
                                                        
218  ὅδε μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν 
καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· (92c11–d2) 
219  ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις σύνοιδα οὖσιν 
ἀλαζόσιν… (92d2–4) 
220  ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἱκανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμαι. ἀνάγκη οὖν 
μοι, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μήτε ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος ὡς ψυχή 
ἐστιν ἁρμονία. (92e1–4) 
221 cf. A. G. Long 2013, 86. “Simmias agrees that he will never allow himself such an answer, 
and later concedes that he cannot accept a view of soul as attunement either from himself or 
from someone else (92e2–4). So Socrates invites a companion to undertake the sort of self-
criticism that, as the autobiography reveals, Socrates himself has undertaken.” 
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approaches to foster the improvement of the interlocutors. Self-discovery is 
accomplished through these complex methods. 
 
Significance of self-discovery 
 
If my claim regarding self-discovery in Phaedo is correct, what significance does 
that kind of self-discovery have? In other words, how do the discovery of the 
intellectual desire, governing function, and false beliefs in the soul benefit a human 
being? I argue that self-discovery contributes to a philosopher’s decision on how 
he should live. He manages his bodily pleasure by making use of his intellectual 
ability and desire to the extent that it is possible and conducts his life accordingly. 
At first glance, Phaedo seems to focus on demonstrating the soul’s immortality. In 
this dialogue, however, we can also understand what a good life is for a 
philosopher and how one can organize one’s life accordingly. Self-discovery 
contributes to an understanding of what constitutes a good life.  
Phaedo also includes points of uncertainty. As I have mentioned in this thesis, 
Socrates and the interlocutors do not know the nature of the soul. Thus, we cannot 
identify self-discovery with the self-knowledge regarding the nature of self. They 
do not know the nature of the soul, therefore, they do not know their own nature 
either. Arguably, Socrates cannot define himself. This limitation accords his 
statement in Phaedrus:  
 
I am still unable, as the Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it really 
seems to me ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood that. 
This is why I do not concern myself with them. I accept what is generally 
believed, and, as I was just saying, I look not into them but into my own self: 
Am I a beast more complicated and savage than Typhon, or am I a tamer, 
simpler animal with a share in a divine and gentle nature?222 (229e5–-230a6) 
                                                        




Although Socrates cannot determine the soul’s nature, he suggests a guiding 
principle in Phaedo: the soul is depicted by its affinity to the Forms. If one continues 
investigating the Forms and making use of the soul’s intellectual ability, one 
understands more regarding both the Forms and the purified conditions of the 
soul. All Socrates can do in Phaedo is to suggest the soul’s essential characteristics 
(its intellectual desire and governing function). This is not worthless in aiming at 
knowing soul’s nature, because the recognition of its characteristics encourages an 
investigation of the Forms. When Socrates and the interlocutors know the Forms 
after death, their soul’s nature will also be revealed. A philosopher must do his 
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